Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 77, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 354-376

  Jackson, Matthew O ^a   Manelli, Alejandro M ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031539882     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2327     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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