Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 134-142

  Kojima, Fuhito ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Envy freeness; Multiple object assignment; Ordinal efficiency; Probabilistic serial mechanism; Random assignment; Strategy proofness

Indexed keywords

EID: 57749176404     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.07.003     Document Type: Article

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