Experimental economics: Where next?

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 73, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 87-100

  Binmore, Ken ^a   Shaked, Avner ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 72949095494     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.019     Document Type: Article

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