Revising theory in light of experimental findings

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 73, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 68-72

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a,b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 72949092954     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.008     Document Type: Note

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