The exercise of international public authority through national policy assessment: The OECD's PISA policy as a paradigm for a new international standard instrument

International Organizations Law Review

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 241-298

  Von Bogdandy, Armin ^a,b   Goldmann, Matthias ^c  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW   (Germany)

^b OECD Nuclear Energy Tribunal ^*  (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 72549116241     PISSN: 15723739     EISSN: 15718069     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/157237408X412907     Document Type: Review

References (343)

1. For more information see .
2. For an analysis of reactions in Germany and the United Kingdom, see T. Weigel, Die PISA-Studie im bildungspolitischen Diskurs. Eine Untersuchung der Reaktionen auf PISA in Deutschland und im Vereinigten Königreich, diploma thesis, University of Trier (2004), (last visited 9 April 2008).
3. See also D. Smolka, "PISA - Konsequenzen für Bildung und Schule", Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 12 (2005), 21.
4. See Verwaltungsvereinbarung Investitionsprogramm "Zukunft Bildung und Betreuung", 29 April 2003, (last visited 28 July 2008).
5. See e.g. the press release of the Kultusministerkonferenz (standing conference of the ministers of education of the states) of 6 December 2001, .
6. E.g. "Rahmenplanung für die Qualitätsentwicklung der Schulen im Land Bremen" (2006), which contains numerous references to PISA, (last visited 28 July 2008);
7. on the reform projects of the Land Baden-Württemberg, see Reformprojekte in Baden-Württemberg, undated document, (last visited 9 April 2008).
8. Sometimes, however, administrations prefer to specifcally prepare their students for PISA, e.g. Hessisches Kultusministerium, "Materialsammlung und Übungsaufgaben des Instituts für Qualitätsentwicklung", press briefng, 17 August 2006, (last visited 28 July 2008).
9. K. Martens, "How to Become and Influential Actor - the 'Comparative Turn' in OECD Education Policy", in id., A. Rusconi & K. Leuze (eds), New Arenas of Education Governance (2007) 40-56.
10. Although the media reaction to PISA was by far strongest in Germany, PISA received considerable media coverage in other participating states. See OECD INES Network A, Review of Assessment Activities, issue 16, February/March 2004, 2-4. The impact of PISA on the expert level was considerable everywhere. On the influence of OECD educational policies in Australia, see M. Henry, B. Lingard, F. Rizvi & S. Taylor, The OECD, Globalisation and Education Policy (2001);
11. in a Finnish context R. Rinne, J. Kallo & S. Hokka, "Too Eager to Comply? OECD Education Policies and the Finish Response", European Educational Research Journal 3 (2004) 454-485.
12. Cf. OECD, A Strategy for Enlargement and Outreach. Report by the Chair of the Heads of Delegation Working Group on the Enlargement Strategy and Outreach, Ambassador Seiichiro Noboru, 13 May 2004, 7;
13. OECD, The OECD - Challenges and Strategic Objectives: 1997. Note by the Secretary General, C(97)180, 10 September 1997.
14. On these problems, see M. Marcussen, "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as ideational artist and arbitrator. Reality or dream?", in B. Reinalda & B. Verbeek, Decision Making Within International Organizations (2004) 90-105, at 99-103.
15. The terminology and definitions used for this and similar governance modes vary. For example, "governance by persuasion" is used by N. Noaksson & K. Jacobsson, "The Production of Ideas and Expert Knowledge in the OECD", Score Rapportserie 2003:7 (www.score.su.se/pdfs/2003-7. pdf>, last visited 28 July 2008), at 32-34;
16. while D. Lehmkuhl's paper is entitled "Governance by Rating and Ranking", paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu (2005), on file with the authors.
17. Martens et al. use the term "governance by opinion formation", see K. Martens, C. Balzer, R. Sackmann & A. Weymann, "Comparing Governance of International Organizations - The EU, the OECD and Educational Policy", University of Bremen et al., TranState Working Paper No. 7 (2004).
18. Elsewhere (supra note 6, at 41), Martens speaks of "governance by comparison." With respect to national law, M. Kloepfer uses the broader notion of "informational steering" (informationelle Steuerung), see Staatliche Informationen als Lenkungsmittel (1998) 14-17.
19. Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000, (last visited 28 July 2008).
20. See . The drafting of the 2007 Fourth Assessment Reports received worldwide media attention (e.g. , last visited 25 July 2008), and experienced increasing politicization (, last visited 9 April 2008).
21. For further details on these instruments, see below 5.2.
22. In detail A. von Bogdandy, P. Dann & M. Goldmann, "Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities", German Law Journal 9 (2008) 1375-1400.
23. M. Goldmann, "Der Widerspenstigen Zähmung, oder: Netzwerke dogmatisch gedacht", in S. Boysen et al. (eds), Netzwerke (2007) 225-246, at 234-236.
24. See German Law Journal 9 (2008), issue 11, with the following contributions: von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, supra note 14;
25. E. de Wet, "Governance through Promotion and Persuasion: The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work";
26. A. Farahat, "Regulating Minority Issues through Standard-Setting and Mediation: the Case of the High Commissioner on National Minorities";
27. I. Feichtner, "The Administration of the Vocabulary of International Trade: The Adaptation of WTO Schedules to Changes in the Harmonized System";
28. C. Feinäugle, "The UN Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee: Emerging Principles of International Institutional Law for the Protection of Individuals?";
29. J. Friedrich, "Legal Challenges of 'Voluntary' Instruments: The Case of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries";
30. C. Fuchs, "Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) - Conservation Efforts Undermine the Legality Principle";
31. K. Kaiser, "WIPO's International Registration of Trademarks: An International Administrative Act Subject to Examination by the Designated Contracting Parties"; P. Láncos, "Flexibility and Legitimacy - The Emissions Trading System under the Kyoto Protocol";
32. S. Less, "International Administration of Holocaust Compensation: The International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims";
33. R. Pereira, "Why Would International Administrative Activity Be Any Less Legitimate? - A Study of the Codex Alimentarius Commission";
34. B. Schöndorf-Haubold, "The Administration of Information in International Administrative Law - The Example of Interpol";
35. G. Schuler, "Effective Governance through Decentralized Soft Implementation: The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises";
36. M. Smrkolj, "International Institutions and Individualized Decision-Making: An Example of UNHCR's Refuge Status Determination";
37. J. Windsor, "The WTO Committee on Trade in Financial Services: The Exercise of Public Authority within an Informational Forum";
38. D. Zacharias, "The UNESCO Regime for the Protection of World Heritage as Prototype of an Autonomy-Gaining International Institution";
39. M. Goldmann, "Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources to Standard Instruments for the Exercise of International Public Authority";
40. A. von Bogdandy, "General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research Field";
41. J. von Bernstorf, "Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International Organizations";
42. A. von Bogdandy & P. Dann, "International Composite Administration: Conceptualizing Multi-Level and Network Aspects in the Exercise of International Public Authority";
43. E. de Wet, "Holding International Institutions Accountable: The Complementary Role of Non-Judicial Oversight Mechanisms and Judicial Review";
44. I. Venzke, "International Bureaucracies from a Political Science Perspective - Agency, Authority and International Institutional Law";
45. R. Wolfrum, "Legitimacy of International Law and the Exercise of Administrative Functions: The Example of the International Seabed Authority, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Fisheries Organizations."
46. OECD, Globalisation: What Challenges and Opportunities for Governments? (1996).
47. See also Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood (1995).
48. We refer in this context to the chronologically first and probably dominant stream of global governance research. This comprises J.N. Rosenau, "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics", in id. & E.-O. Czempiel (eds), Governance without Government (1992) 1-29, at 4;
49. J. Kooiman, "Findings, Recommendations and Speculations", in id., Modern Governance (1993) 249-262, at 253;
50. R. Mayntz, "Governance Theory als fortentwickelte Steuerungstheorie?", in G.F. Schuppert (ed.), Governance-Forschung, 2nd edn (2006) 11-20;
51. M. Zürn, "Global Governance", Governance-Forschung ,in ibid. 121-146, at 127-128;
52. A. Benz, "Einleitung: Governance - Modebegrif oder nützliches sozialwissenschaftliches Konzept?", in id. (ed.), Governance - Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen (2004) 11-28, at 13-14;
53. In the meantime the concept has been adapted by different schools of thought, see M.J. Hofmann & A.D. Ba (eds), Contending Perspectives on Global Governance (2005).
54. This analytical perspective needs to be distinguished from the related, but distinctly normative concept of (good) governance, a collective term for values like democracy and the rule of law, cf. T. Weiss, "Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges", Third World Quarterly 21 (2000) 795-814, at 801.
55. K. Dingwerth & P. Pattberg, "Was its Global Governance?", Leviathan 34 (2006) 377-399, at 381.
56. Much of the global governance literature is a brainchild of liberal and cosmopolitan IR scholarship; cf. A. Hurrell, "Power, institutions, and the production of inequality", in M. Barnett & R. Duval (eds), Power in Global Governance (2005) 33-58.
57. Not surprisingly, the concept has spurred criticism from historical materialist (H. Overbeck, "Global governance, class, hegemony", in A.D. Ba & M.J. Hofmann, Contending Perspectives on Global Governance (2005) 39-56, especially at 53)
58. and critical perspectives (M. Koskenniemi, "Global Governance and Public International Law", Kritische Justiz 37 (2004) 241-254).
59. A.-M. Slaughter, "International Law and International Relations", Recueil des Cours 285 (2000) 21-235, at 43-51.
60. M.J. Hofmann, "What is global about global governance? - A constructivist account", in A.D. Ba & id. (eds), Contending Perspectives on Global Governance (2005) 110-128.
61. B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch & R. Stewart, "The Emergence of Global Administrative Law", Law & Contemporary Problems 68 (2005) 15-61;
62. see the further articles on Global Administrative Law in the same issue as well as the symposium in Eur. J. of Int'l L. 17 (2006), issue 1. The toolbox is suggested by D.C. Esty, "Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law", Yale Law Journal 115 (2006) 1490-1562.
63. Similar is the approach of J.E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers (2005), who stresses the importance of providing legal accounts of the instruments and procedures of international organizations.
64. See e.g. S. Kadelbach & T. Kleinlein, "International Law - A Constitution for Mankind? An Attempt at a Re-appraisal with an Analysis of Constitutional Principles", German Yearbook of International Law 50 (2007) 303-348;
65. A. Peters, "Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures", Leiden Journal of International Law 19 (2006) 579-610.
66. See J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2002);
67. H. Schermers & N. Blokker, International Institutional Law, 4th edn (2003).
68. For an overview, see A. Voßkuhle, "Neue Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft", in W. Hof-mann-Riem, E. Schmidt-Aßmann & A. Voßkuhle (eds), Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, vol.1 (2006) 1-61.
69. For a shorter English version see A. Voßkuhle, "The Reform Approach in the German Science of Administrative Law: The 'Neue Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft'", in M. Rufert (ed.), The Transformation of Administrative Law in Europe (2007) 89-141.
70. Seminal works include E. Schmidt-Aßmann, Das Allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee, 2nd edn (2004);
71. G.F. Schuppert, Verwaltungswissenschaft (2000).
72. R. Pitschas, "Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht als Teil der öfentlichen Informations-ordnung", in W. Hofmann-Riem, E. Schmidt-Aßmann & G.F. Schuppert (eds), Reform des Allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts (1993) 219-305;
73. C. Bumke, "Publikumsinformation. Erscheinungsformen, Funktionen und verfassungsrechtlicher Rahmen einer Handlungsform des Gewä hrleistungsstaates", Die Verwaltung 37 (2004) 3-33;
74. C. Gusy, "Die Informations-beziehungen zwischen Staat und Bürger", in W. Hofmann-Riem, E. Schmidt-Aßmann & A. Voßkuhle (eds), Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, vol.2 (2008) 221-304;
75. from an Italian perspective see B.G. Mattarella, "Informazione e communicazione amministrativa", Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico 55 (2005) 1-21;
76. on the European information order see A. von Bogdandy, "Links between National and Supra-national Institutions: A Legal View of a New Communicative Universe", in B. Kohler-Koch (ed.), Linking EU and National Governance (2003) 24-52;
77. id., "Die Information sbeziehungen im Europäischen Verwaltungsverbund", in W. Hoffmann-Riem, E. Schmidt-Aßmann & A. Voßkuhle (eds), Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, vol.2 (2008) 305-403.
78. For an overview, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, supra note 14.
79. In the Global Administrative Law discourse, this "bottom up" perspective is complemented by "top down" analyses of the impact of transnational institutions, instruments and procedures on domestic administrative law, see S. Cassese, "Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure", Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (2005) 109-126.
80. E. Schmidt-Aßmann, "Die Herausforderung der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft durch die Internationalisierung der Verwaltungsbeziehungen", Der Staat 45 (2006) 315-338;
81. M. Rufert, Die Globalisierung als Herausforderung an das Öfentliche Recht (2004) 67-68.
82. Tus far, mostly the US perspective seems to have been explored, cf. R.B. Stewart, "U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?", Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (2005) 63-108;
83. Esty, "Good Governance", supra note 23.
84. The potential of EU law is explored by M. Savino, "EU 'Procedural'Supranationalism: On Models for Global Administrative Law", manuscript, on file with the authors.
85. Similar large-scale assessments of adult competencies and the outcomes of higher education are currently being explored by the OECD, like the envisaged OECD Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (, last visited 9 April 2008).
86. Slovak Republic, Turkey.
87. Brazil, Latvia, Liechtenstein and the Russian Federation.
88. Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Hong Kong-China, Indonesia, Israel, FYR Macedonia, Peru, Romania, Tailand.
89. Brazil, Hong Kong-China, Indonesia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Macao-China, Russian Federation, Serbia, Tailand, Tunisia, Uruguay.
90. See OECD, Learning for Tomorrow's World. First Results from PISA 2003 (2004), 20.
91. The Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, which carries out most of the OECD's educational projects (infra note 46), was set up in 1967. However, the first statistics on school attendance and public spending on education were published in 1961 according to I. Richter & H.-P. Füssel, "System-, Leistungs- und Politikvergleiche in der Bildungsforschung", Recht der Jugend und des Bildungswesens 51 (2003) 252-255, at 252. An independent Directorate of Education within the OECD Secretariat was created only in 2002.
92. Art. 5, Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 14 December 1960, 888 UNTS 180-191, hereinafter OECD Convention.
93. Art. 1, OECD Convention.
94. Art. 1(a), OECD Convention.
95. Cf. OECD, OECD Employment Outlook 2004 (2004), 306-309.
96. See OECD, The New Economy: Beyond the Hype (2001);
97. R.J. Barro, "Education and Economic Growth", in J.F. Helliwell (ed.), The Contribution of Human and Social Capital to Sustained Economic Growth and Well-being, International Symposium Report, OECD and Human Resources Development Canada (2001).
98. Based on the taxonomy developed by R. Mayntz, "Die Implementation politischer Programme: Teoretische Überlegungen zu einem neuen Forschungsgebiet", Die Verwaltung 10 (1977) 51-66. This taxonomy differs from Mayntz insofar as it does not include the "impact stage" suggested by Mayntz, which is most amorphous in a legal perspective, and adds the adoption stage. The adoption stage is added on grounds of its significance for ensuring consent and support by various actors within a multilevel system of governance, not all of which have been involved in the process so far. The classical example for the adoption stage is the ratification process of an international treaty, which is drafted by, e.g., an ad hoc committee within an International Organization, and which, after endorsement by an intergovernmental conference or by the General Assembly of the respective International Organization, is opened for ratification, and finally enters into force after receiving the necessary number of ratifications. The content of the treaty can still be modified in this stage by the addition of reservations, and the factual impact of the treaty hinges on the number and significance of the ratifying states. Ratification is mostly the business of domestic parliaments, which often do not get involved before this stage.
99. S. Leibfried & K. Martens, "PISA - Internationalisierung von Bildungspolitik. Oder: Wie kommt die Landespolitik zur OECD?", Leviathan 36 (2008) 3-14, at 7-8.
100. The current mandate of CERI is contained in the Resolution of the Council approved at its 1046th session, 14 December 2006, C/M(2006)20, item 265, and C(2006)173.
101. We use the term "subsidiary body" for bodies formally established by statutory organs or other subsidiary bodies of the organization. For a critical discussion of the terminology, see T. Bernárdez, "Subsidiary Organs", in R.-J. Dupuy (ed.), Manuel sur les organisations internationales (1988) 100-146, at 101 et seq.
102. INES was established as a joint project to be financed by both the OECD and the member states (CERI Governing Board, Summary Record of the 38th Session (held at Paris on 30-31 May 1988), CERI/CD/M(88)1, 25 October 1988, para. 13). Since 2000, the activities of INES have been coordinated by the INES Strategic Management Group, which was jointly established by the CERI Governing Board and the OECD Education Committee in order to achieve a more strategic and transparent management of INES (Decision of the Education Committee DEELSA/ED/M(2000)2, para. 18; decision of the CERI Governing Board CERI/CD/M(2000)2 para. 42). The Strategic Management Group is composed of four members of the CERI Governing Board and four of the OECD Education Committee, along with two additional members from the Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Committee. According to its mandate, the INES Strategic Management Group is principally charged with reviewing the management of INES and making recommendations to the Joint Session of the CERI Governing Board and Education Committee in respect of proposals submitted by INES Networks, as well as on the priorities for the work of INES. The activities of INES are carried out through these Networks.
103. N. Bottani, "OECD International Education Indicators", International Journal of Educational Research 25 (1996) 279-288, at 287.
104. The INES Networks were originally established by the CERI Governing Board on the proposal of the Secretariat (CERI Governing Board, Summary Record of the 38th Session (held at Paris on 30-31 May 1988), CERI/CD/M(88)1, 25 October 1988, para. 13). Today, the Networks have received greater formalization. The mandate of Network A, for example, has been approved by the CERI Governing Board, the OECD Education Committee, the joint session of both mentioned bodies, and eventually by the OECD Council, see (last visited 28 July 2008).
105. DEELSA/ED/CERI/CD(97)4, 28 March 1997.
106. G. Dahm, J. Delbrück & R. Wolfrum, Völkerrecht, vol.I/3, 2nd edn (2002), 542.
107. OECD, A Strategy for Producing Student Achievement Indicators on a Regular Basis, Summary of Decisions Taken, Meeting in Budapest, Hungary, 7-8 May 1997, DEELSA/ED/CERI/CD(97)7, 19 August 1997, para. 19.
108. On the difficulties to distinguish between binding and non-binding instruments of international organizations, see M. Goldmann, "Inside Relative Normativity", supra note 16.
109. OECD, Resolution of the Council C(97)176/FINAL, 26 September 1997. Although the instrument is entitled "resolution", the first paragraph of the preamble refers to Art. 5(a) of the OECD Convention, which enables the OECD to adopt binding "decisions." OECD practice uses both terms synonymously.
110. OECD, Resolution of the Council C(97)176/FINAL, 26 September 1997, operative para. 4.
111. The retrieved documents of the exchange of notes between the OECD and Germany explicitly endorse the Strategy. Further, para. 3 of the preamble of the Council resolution mentions countries which "have agreed to participate in a Programme for Producing Student Achievement Indicators on a Regular Basis." Obviously, the programme mentioned here is the one laid down in the Strategy. Likewise, the operational role of the Pisa Governing Board states that it should monitor a programme to be carried out as described in the Strategy.
112. It finds its legal basis in the resolution setting up PISA, supra note 55.
113. OECD Council, Operational Role of the Board of Participating Countries, C(97)176, 10 September 1997, appendix.
114. DEELSA/ED/CERI/CD(97)4, 28 March 1997, para. 72.
115. INES Network, Plenary Meeting of 28-30 October 1996, Meeting Record, 4.
116. Meeting Record, 4. Ibid.
117. Tenth Meeting of the BPC, Summary Meeting Record, DEELSA/PISA/BPC/M(2001) 1, 18 May 2001, 8.
118. The PGB derives this power from the OECD Council, cf. Art. 5(a), OECD Convention. The binding nature can be concluded ex negativo: Usually, OECD documents stipulate explicitly if a decision is not intended to be binding.
119. OECD Council, Operational Role of the Board of Participating Countries, C(97)176, 10 September 1997, appendix, para. 8.
120. The voting results are not tracked in the meeting records, though.
121. OECD Council, Operational Role of the Board of Participating Countries, C(97)176, 10 September 1997, appendix, para. 11.
122. See, e.g., Third Meeting of the BPC, Summary of Main Outcomes, DEELSA/PISA/BPC(98)8, 20-21 April 1998, 2.
123. Functional Expert Groups on reading literacy, mathematics, sciences, as well as problem solving were established in order to link the policy objectives specified by the PGB with the necessary scientific expertise (DEELSA/ED/CERI/CD(97)4, 28 March 1997, para. 78 et seq.). Each member of the expert groups was appointed as a contact point for several countries in order to ensure adequate representation of national interests. The Strategy stipulates a procedure for the appointment of the members of the Functional Expert Groups. Accordingly, the experts were to be nominated by the prime international contractor and appointed by the OECD Secretariat after consultation with the PGB. In practice, this procedure was modified in that the OECD Secretariat and the PGB played the main roles in the appointment procedure, see Third Meeting of the BPC, Summary of Main Outcomes, DEELSA/PISA/BPC(98)8, 20-21 April 1998, 3.
124. Cf. (last visited 28 July 2008).
125. DEELSA/ED/CERI/CD(97)4, 28 March 1997, para. 116.
126. DEELSA/ED/CERI/CD(97)4, 1997, Ibid.
127. E.g. Environmental Policy Committee, "OECD environmental performance reviews: second cycle work plan", ENV/EPOC(98)21, and the mandate of the Working Party on Environmental Performance, Environment Policy Committee, ENV/EPOC(2004)32, 10 November 2004.
128. See, e.g., I. Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784).
129. S. Cassese, "Lo spazio giuridico globale", Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico 52 (2002) 323-339.
130. M. Seckelmann, "Keine Alternative zur Staatlichkeit - Zum Konzept der 'Global Governance'", Verwaltungsarchiv 98 (2007) 30-53, at 41-46.
131. This is not necessarily a Weberian idea. Weber assumed that the mere existence, and not the specific contents of a legal framework for rational-bureaucratic decision-making lead to legitimacy through legality; cf. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, vol.1, 2nd edn (1925) 19 (§ 7).
132. Applying this idea to global governance is J. Stefek, "The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach", European Journal of International Relations 9 (2003) 249-275.
133. For overviews on the state of the discussion J.E. Alvarez, "International Organizations: Ten and Now", Am. J. of Int'l L. 100 (2006) 324-347, at 339-346;
134. D. Bodansky, "The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?", Am. J. of Int'l L. 93 (1999) 596-624;
135. M. Zürn, "Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems", Government and Opposition 39 (2004) 260-287;
136. M. Kumm, "The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis", Europ. J. of Int'l L. 15 (2004) 907-931, at 909-917;
137. C. Möllers, Gewaltengliederung (2006) 233-251.
138. R.D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", International Organization 42 (1988) 427-460;
139. E. Benvenisti, "Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization", Michigan Law Review 98 (1999-2000) 167-213.
140. On two-level games in the German Empire and in the European Union S. Oeter, "Federalism and Democracy", in A. von Bogdandy & J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2006) 53-93, at 77-82.
141. There is abundant literature describing these dynamics. See from a legal perspective J. Klabbers, "The Changing Image of International Organizations", in J.-M. Coicaud & V. Heiskanen (eds), The Legitimacy of International Organizations (2001), 221-255;
142. Alvarez, supra note 23;
143. D. Sarooshi, International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (2005);
144. from the standpoint of liberal international relations theory A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (2004), more critical Venzke, supra note 16.
145. For a proposal to curb the dynamics of such delegations by legal rules C.A. Bradley, "International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution", Stanford L. Rev. 55 (2002-2003) 1557-1596.
146. P.M. Haas, "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", International Organization 46 (1992) 1-35.
147. Schuppert, supra note 26, at 247.
148. Cf. P. Kunig, "Völkerrecht als öfentliches Recht - Ein Glasperlenspiel", in A. Randel-zhofer, R. Scholz & D. Wilke, Gedächtnisschrift für Eberhard Grabitz (1995) 325-346.
149. For Germany, the concept of "state authority" finds its basis in Art. 20(2) Basic Law.
150. On its interpretation by the Federal Constitutional Court see Case No.2 BvR 134, 268/76, Decision of 15 February 1978, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE) 47 (1978) 253, at 273-276.
151. R.A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power", Behavioral Science 2 (1957) 201-215, at 202.
152. M. Weber, supra note 77, at 122.
153. R. Dahrendorf, Über den Ursprung der Ungleichheit unter den Menschen (1961), 20.
154. On the "legal method", see infra, 4.1.
155. G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd edn, edited by W. Jellinek (1914) 387.
156. Schuppert, supra note 26, at 144-148;
157. Schmidt-Aßmann, Ordnungsidee, supra note 26, at 348-349;
158. further references in C. Franzius, "Modalitäten und Wirkungsfaktoren der Steuerung durch Recht", in W. Hofmann-Riem, E. Schmidt-Aßmann & A. Voßkuhle, Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, vol.1 (2006) 177-237, at marginal note 1.
159. See A. Guzman, How International Law Works (2008) 71-117;
160. D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance. The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System (2000);
161. in the context of German administrative law Michael Fehling, "Informelles Verwal- tungshandeln", in W. Hofmann-Riem, E. Schmidt-Aßmann & A. Voßkuhle, Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, vol.2 (2008) 1341-1404, at marginal note 7.
162. M. Barnett & R. Duval, "Power in Global Governance", in id. (eds), Power in Global Governance (2005) 1-32. Barnett and Duval define power in very broad terms as "the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate" (ibid., at 8). Their research on power applies mutatis mutandi to our concept of authority.
163. On power by identity formation, see T. Porter & M. Webb, "The Role of the OECD in the Orchestration of Global Knowledge Networks", Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting (2007), (last visited 28 July 2008).
164. Koskenniemi, supra note 20; E. Benvenisti, "'Coalitions of the Willing' and the Evolution of Informal International Law", in C. Callies, G. Nolte & P.-T. Stoll (eds), Coalitions of the Willing: Avantgarde or Treat? (2006) 1-23;
165. J. Klabbers, "Institutional Ambivalence by Design: Soft Organizations in International Law", Nordic Journal of International Law 70 (2001) 403-421.
166. See infra 3.3.
167. These problems are discussed in more detail in von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, supra note 14.
168. Note that this definition is not exhaustive. On the problems related to functionally equivalent private authority, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, supra note 14. Some put the task to discharge public duties at the heart of their approach, e.g. M. Rufert, "Perspektiven des Internationalen Verwaltungsrechts", in C. Möllers, A. Voßkuhle & C. Walter (eds), Internationales Verwaltungsrecht (2007) 395-419, at 402.
169. See supra text accompanying note 10.
170. From the perspective of German public law: C. Gusy, supra note 27, at marginal notes 95-97.
171. W.R. Andersen, "Informal Agency Advice - Graphing the Critical Analysis", Administrative L. Rev. 54 (2002) 595-609.
172. The effects of such warnings can be as detrimental for producers as direct prohibitions. For this reason, public law often specifies under which conditions warnings may be issued. On the situation in Germany, see Federal Constitutional Court, Case 1 BvR 558, 1428/91 ("Glykol"), decision of 26 June 2002, BVerfGE 105 (2003) 252; comprehensive overview on the German literature on public warnings in Bumke, supra note 28, at footnote 5.
173. Haas, supra note 81.
174. Instructive J.M. Dostal, "Campaigning on expertise: how the OECD framed EU welfare and labour market policies - and why success could trigger failure", Journal of European Public Policy 11 (2004) 440-460, at 446-448.
175. OECD, Jobs Study, (1994).
176. E.g. H. Rindermann, "Was messen internationale Schulleistungsstudien? Schulleis-tungen, Schülerfähigkeiten, kognitive Fähigkeiten, Wissen oder allgemeine Intelligenz?", Psychologische Rundschau 57 (2006) 69-86;
177. which triggered responses by J. Baumert, M. Brunner, O. Lüdtke & U. Trautwein, "Was messen internationale Schulleistungsstudien? - Resultate kumulativer Wissenserwerbsprozesse", Psychologische Rundschau 58 (2007) 118-145;
178. and M. Prenzel, O. Walter & A. Frey, "PISA misst Kompetenzen", Psychologische Rundschau 57 (2006) 128-136.
179. C. Engel, "Integration durch Koordination und Benchmarking?", in H. Hill & R. Pitschas (eds), Europäisches Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht (2004) 408-443, at 431.
180. See M. Goldmann, 'Holding Governments Accountable through Governance by Information', Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico 58, (2008), 41-69.
181. See generally supra note 7;
182. Martens, supra note 6;
183. M. Lehtonen, "OECD Benchmarking in Enhancing Policy Convergence: Harmonisation, Imposition and Diffusion through the Environmental Performance Reviews?", Conference on International Organizations and Global Environmental Governance, Freie Universität Berlin (2005), (last visited 28 July 2007), at 15: Lehtonen argues that PISA is more successful than the OECD Environmental Performance Review, because the OECD has been an "early mover" in educational policy promoting policy innovation, while environmental standards had been agreed in different for a before the OECD started its activities.
184. DEELSA/ED/CERI/CD(97)4, 28 March 1997, paras. 13-25.
185. Marcussen, supra note 9.
186. Often, no clear distinction is being made between assessments and benchmarks. Cf. M. John-Koch, "Nicht-normative Steuerung durch Ziele und Vergleiche", in J. Oebbecke (ed.), Nicht-normative Steuerung in dezentralen Systemen (2005) 363-402, at 372.
187. This recalls the concept of "framing" as used in behavioural economics. Accordingly, whether something is considered a loss or a benefit is not an ontological question, but depends on circumstantial factors which determine the assessment. See B. Nagel, Recht und Gerechtigkeit im gesellschaftlichen Wandel (2007) 128.
188. On the definition of education in the OECD, see Bottani, supra note 49, at 279-280.
189. For an analysis of the predominantly neo-liberal concept of education within the OECD, see Henry, Lingard, Rizvi & Taylor, supra note 7, at 61 et seq., 102-105, 175.
190. Similarly, the formulation of best practices entails the risk of ignoring alternative practices, which might prove equally, or even more successful in certain contexts, see D. Lazer, "Global and Domestic Governance: Modes of Interdependence in Regulatory Policy making", European Law Journal 12 (2006) 455-468, at 463-466.
191. Longer Term Strategy of the Development of PISA, 20th meeting of the PISA Governing Board, 27 September 2005, EDU/PISA/GB(2005)21.
192. On the importance of reputation for OECD effectiveness: J. Sharman, "Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation", Political Studies 55 (2007) 20-37.
193. K. Martens & K.D. Wolf, "Paradoxien der Neuen Staatsräson. Die Internationalisierung der Bildungspolitik in der EU und der OECD", Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 13 (2006) 145-176.
194. E.g. Belgium, Canada, Germany, Spain (shared responsibility of both the national government and the autonomous communities), Switzerland, the UK, and the United States.
195. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
196. This is close to a constructivist understanding of power, cf. Barnett & Duval, supra note 92.
197. Lehtonen, supra note 107, at 15; Martens, supra note 6.
198. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
199. G.F. Schuppert, "Governance im Spiegel der Wissenschaften", in id. (ed.), Governance-Forschung (2006) 371-469, at 386-392.
200. On the parallel development, see M. Stolleis, Geschichte des öfentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, vol.2 (1992) 318-319;
201. and P. Schiera & R. Gherardi, "Von der Verfassung zur Verwaltung: bürgerliche Staatswissenschaft in Deutschland und Italien nach der nationalen Einigung", in E.V. Heyen (ed.), Wissenschaft und Recht der Verwaltung seit dem Ancien Régime (1984) 129-146, at 140-144.
202. A. von Bogdandy, "Wissenschaft vom Verfassungsrecht: Vergleich", in id., P. Cruz Villalón, P. Huber (eds), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum, vol.2 (2008) 807-842, at marginal note 15 et seq. On the developments in France and England, see ibid., at marginal note 24-25.
203. In detail W. J. Mommsen, "Das deutsche Kaiserreich als System umgangener Entschei-dungen", in id., Der autoritäre Nationalstaat (1990) 11-38, at 23-31.
204. While the constitution of the German empire of 1871 recognized universal male sufrage. However, Bismarck's oppression of socialism (1878-1890) undermined the democratic value of the elections, and property qualifications persisted in elections for the legislative assemblies of many territorial states, most notably in Prussia.
205. Stolleis, supra note 124, 318-321;
206. D. Willoweit, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 5th edn (2005) 282-283, 285-286, 312-314, 331-334.
207. W.J. Mommsen, "Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches von 1871 als dilatorischer Herrschaftskompromiß", in id., Der autoritäre Nationalstaat (1990) 39-65.
208. Willoweit, supra note 128, at 283-284.
209. Willoweit, supra note 128, at 332.
210. Stolleis, supra note 124, at 382.
211. H. Schulze-Fielitz, "Art. 20 (Rechtsstaat)", in H. Dreier, Grundgesetz, vol.2, 2nd edn (2006), marginal notes 13, 46.
212. T. Vesting, "Die Staatsrechtslehre und die Veränderung ihres Gegenstandes", Veröfentli-chungen der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatrechtslehrer 63 (2004) 41-70, at 43-45.
213. In constitutional law, prominent representatives of this method were R. von Mohl and O. von Gierke; in administrative law Lorenz von Stein, see his Verwaltungslehre, 7 vols, 1st edn (1865-1868).
214. von Bogdandy, supra note 125, at marginal notes, 17-23.
215. C.F. von Gerber, Ueber oefentliche Rechte (1852);
216. id., Grundzüge eines Systems des deutschen Staatrechts (1865);
217. P. Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, 3 vols, 1st edn (1876-1880).
218. Stolleis, supra note 124, at 330-348;
219. a good illustration for the "legal method" provides Laband's distinction of formal and material laws, see W. Pauly, Der Methodenwandel im deutschen Spätkonstitutionalismus (1993) 177-186.
220. For an insightful analysis into the nature of Dogmatik see N. Luhmann, Rechtssystem und Rechtsdogmatik, (1974), 9-23.
221. A rough translation of Dogmatik would be "doctrine." However, elements of Dogmatik, which are created by both scholarly analysis and jurisprudence, usually have considerable impact on decision-making and even on law-making: Christoph Möllers, "Methoden", in W. Hofmann-Riem, E. Schmidt-Aßmann & A. Voßkuhle (eds), Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, vol.1 (2006) 121-175, at marginal notes 35-37;
222. Schmidt-Aßmann, Ordnungsidee, supra note 26, at 4-6.
223. Note that system building is only one aspect of Dogmatik, Ordnungsidee, ibid., at 3-4.
224. In fact, the idea of the Rechtsstaat was introduced in Germany by R. von Mohl, Die Polizei-Wissenschaft nach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaats, 2 vols (1832-1833), for whom the Rechtsstaat still coincided much more with the idea of material justice. See Stolleis, supra note 124, at 258.
225. Laband, supra note 137, vol.2 (1878), 216-229.
226. For similar efforts by other writers, see Stolleis, supra note 124, at 394-403;
227. M. Engert, Die historische Entwicklung des Rechtsinstituts Verwaltungsakt (2002), 117-122.
228. He explicitly followed the approach of the legal method, see O. Mayer, Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht, vol.1, 2nd edn (1914), VIII.
229. O. Mayer, Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht, vol.1, 1st edn (1895).
230. Mayer, supra note 143, at 59. The notion Verwaltungsakt had been used before Mayer, but not in a consistent way.
231. On the significance of the acte administratif as a tool for conveying statal power G. Bigot, "Les mythes fondateurs du droit administratif", Revue Française de Droit Administratif 16 (2000) 527-536.
232. This particular merit of Mayer has been pointed out by Engert, supra note 141, at 125-126
233. Mayer, supra note 143, at 94-104;
234. on his method R. Schmidt-De Caluwe, Der Verwaltungsakt in der Lehre Otto Mayers (1999), 206-10;
235. C. Bumke, "Die Entwicklung der verwaltungsrechtswissenschaftlichen Methodik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", in E. Schmidt-Aßmann & W. Hofmann-Riem (eds), Methoden der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft (2004) 73-130, at 86-89.
236. Bumke, supra note 146, at 87.
237. Mayer, supra note 143, at 95.
238. Cf. sec. 35 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (Administrative Procedures Act) of 1976.
239. The translation of the terminology follows M.P. Singh, German Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective, 2nd edn (2001), 63 et seq.
240. 43 (2) and 44 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz.
241. Sec. 42 Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (Administrative Court Procedures Code) of 1960.
242. I.a. sec. 38, 39, 41 and 48-50 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz.
243. R. Martucci, Storia costituzionale italiana, (2002), 36.
244. Universal male sufrage was only achieved in 1913.
245. E.g. the royal interventions in government activities described by P. Colombo, Storia costituzionale della monarchia italiana, (2001) 74-88;
246. cf. further R. Martucci, supra note 153, at 50-57.
247. G. Melis, "La storia del diritto amministrativo", in S. Cassese (ed.), Trattato di diritto amministrativo, vol.1, 2nd edn (2003) 95-171, at 98-101.
248. Trattato di diritto amministrativo, vol.1, 2nd edn (2003) 95-171, at 98-101, Ibid.
249. S. Cassese, Cultura e politica del diritto amministrativo, (1971), 15-21.
250. Nevertheless, the organization of the Italian administration in many respects bears the traits of the French model, see S. Cassese, "Toward a European Model of Public Administration", in D.S. Clark (ed.), Comparative and Private International Law (1990) 353-367, at 355-362.
251. Melis, supra note 156, at 102.
252. Among those were Gianquinto and Mantellini, cf. G. Rebufa, La formazione del diritto amministrativo in Italia, (1981) 100 et seq. and 128 et seq.
253. S. Spaventa, "Giustizia nell'amministrazione", in S. Ricci (ed.), La giustizia amministrativa (1993) 41-75.
254. V.E. Orlando, "I criteri tecnici per la ricostruzione giuridica del diritto pubblico", in id., Diritto pubblico generale (1940) 3-22.
255. See also Melis, supra note 156, at 110-111.
256. V.E. Orlando, Principii di diritto costituzionale, 1st edn. (1889) 23-24;
257. id., Principii di diritto amministrativo, 1st edn (1890). The challenge to spell out administrative law in terms of abstract legal principles was considerable, as earlier scholarship had confined itself to commenting on administrative legislation and reglementations.
258. See M. Fioravanti, La scienza del diritto pubblico, vol.1 (2001), 147-148.
259. The term provvedimento seems to be understood as a generic term comprising both the internal law of the administration and every law regulating its relationship with citizens, be it in the form of legislative acts, abstract police orders (ordonnanze) or individual orders (ordini). Cf. V.E. Orlando, Principii di diritto amministrativo, 2nd edn. (1892), 232-234.
260. Orlando, supra note 165, at 229-285.
261. Orlando, supra note 165, at 233-236.
262. Melis, supra note 156, at 117-118.
263. M.S. Giannini, Lezioni di diritto amministrativo, vol.1 (1950), 289 et seq.
264. On the development and current theory of the provvedimento amministrativo see B.G. Mattarella, "Il provvedimento", in S. Cassese (ed.), Trattato di diritto amministrativo, vol.1, 2nd edn (2003) 797-1034.
265. While for Kant systemic thinking was a precondition of knowledge, see his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787), vol.4 (1974 edn), B 861, this epistemological holism has meanwhile come under great strain, as it is difficult to identify an overarching principle establishing the unity of the system that is not entirely contingent.
266. See R. Christensen & A. Fischer-Lescano, "Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung. Zur Funktionsweise der holistischen Semantik", Zeitschrift für Rechtsphilosophie (2007) 8-14.
267. W. Wilhelm, Zur juristischen Methodenlehre im 19. Jahrhundert, (1958), 159;
268. S. Mastellone, Storia ideologica d'Europa da Stuart Mill a Lenin (1982), at 158.
269. Well-known is the turn against the legal method by R. von Ihering, Der Kampf ums Recht (1872).
270. Cassese, supra note 158, at 17.
271. See also A. Paulus, "International Law After Postmodernism: Towards Renewal or Decline of International Law?", Leiden Journal of International Law 14 (2001) 727-755.
272. Supra note 24.
273. Mayer, supra note 142, at 95.
274. Goldmann, supra note 15.
275. G.J.H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law, (1983);
276. E. Riedel, "Standards and Sources. Farewell to the Exclusivity of the Sources Triad in International Law?", Europ. J. of Int'l L. 2 (1991) 58-84 (suggesting "standards" as a new category of international law);
277. J. Brunnée, "Reweaving the Fabric of International Law? Patterns of Consent in Environmental Framework Agreements", in R. Wolfrum & V. Röben (eds), Developments of International Law in Treaty Making (2005) 101-126;
278. J. Klabbers, "Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law: Fuller's Procedural Natural Law", No Foundations. Journal of Extreme Legal Positivism 5 (2008) 84-112.
279. E. Schmidt-Aßmann, "Die Lehre von den Rechtsformen des Verwaltungshandelns", Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 104 (1989) 533-541, at 541;
280. W. Pauly, "Grundlagen einer Hand-lungsformenlehre", in K. Becker-Schwarze et al. (eds), Wandel der Handlungsformen im Öfentlichen Recht (1991) 25-45, at 32-34.
281. Bumke, supra note 28.
282. Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), Case No.3 C 34/84 ("Trans-parenzliste"), judgment of 18 April 1985, 71 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts (1986) 183;
283. Case No.7 C 20/04 (anti-Scientology declarations), judgment of 15 December 2005, 121 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (2006) 387;
284. Federal Constitutional Court, supra note 100.
285. In German: Handlungsformen, i.e. standard instruments.
286. On the terminology in the context of European law: J. Bast, "Legal Instruments", in A. von Bogdandy & J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2006) 373-418, at 373-374;
287. A. von Bogdandy, J. Bast & F. Arndt, "Legal Instruments in European Union Law and their Reform: A Systematic Approach on an Empirical Basis", Yearbook of European Law 23 (2004) 91-136.
288. Supra, 3.3.
289. Schmidt-Aßmann, Ordnungsidee, supra note 26, at 298.
290. None of these aspects needs to be part of the legal regime; and each of these aspects may also be a constitutive element of the definition of the standard instrument. See on this in the context of European law J. Bast, Grundbegrife der Handlungsformen der EU. (2006), 6-21.
291. Schmidt-Aßmann, Ordnungsidee, supra note 26, at 298;
292. W. Krebs, "Die Juristische Methode im Verwaltungsrecht", in E. Schmidt-Aßmann & W. Hofmann-Riem (eds), Methoden der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft (2004) 209-221, at 217 et seq.
293. Krebs, supra note 187, at 219.
294. Supra 4.1.3.
295. Vesting, supra note 134, at 43-47
296. Article 5, OECD Convention.
297. In the context of the European Union, see e.g. J. Bast, Grundbegrife der Handlungsformen der EU (2006);
298. F. v. Alemann, Die Handlungsform der interinstitutionellen Vereinbarung (2006).
299. On the two-step method see Schmidt-Aßmann, Ordnungsidee, supra note 26, at 298-299.
300. For this purpose, it might also be useful to take recourse to existing standard instruments by way of analogy, see Goldmann, supra note 15, at 240.
301. See OECD, Resolution of the Council on a New Governance Structure for the Organisation, C(2006)78/FINAL, 24 May 2006, 17.
302. Similarly, J. Salzman concludes that the OECD has no meaningful administrative law thus far, see his "Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development", Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (2005) 189-224.
303. On Guidelines see Goldmann, supra note 15.
304. On the epistemology of legal scholarship, see U. Neumann, "Wissenschaftstheorie der Rechtswissenschaft", in A. Kaufmann et al. (eds), Einführung in die Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart, 7th edn (2004) 385-400, at 396-400.
305. Supra 1.1. See also F. Pagani, "Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change", OECD Document SG/LEG(2002)1, 11 September 2002.
306. See < www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en-2649-34111-1-1-1-1-1,00. html> (last visited 25 October 2008).
307. See M. Lehtonen, "Deliberative democracy, participation, and OECD peer reviews of environmental policies", American Journal of Evaluation 27 (2006) 185-200.
308. See (last visited 9 April 2008). The 1994 OECD Jobs Study, which contained a number of policy recommendations, led to the OECD Jobs Strategy, which comprises individual country reviews in which the implementation of the recommendations is examined, among other things. Cf. Noaksson & Jacobsson, supra note 10.
309. See Art. 5(a) and (b), OECD Convention, which only mentions decisions and recommendations.
310. For a distinction of several governance instruments which operate through the dissemination of information see supra 3.3.
311. Goldmann, supra note 15.
312. On our concept of international institution, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, supra note 14.
313. In detail J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2002) 60 et seq.
314. For a comparative study A. von Bogdandy, Gubernative Rechtsetzung. (2000) 166 et seq.
315. On problems resulting from giving preference to political rather than scientific considerations see M. Prenzel, J. Baumert & E. Klieme, "Falscher Verdacht", Die Zeit, no.23 (2008), 73-74.
316. Supra 2.
317. DEELSA/ED/CERI/CD(97)7, 19 August 1997, para. 80.
318. E.g. Environmental Performance Reviews, Economic Surveys.
319. In this sense A.P. Jakobi & K. Martens, "Difusion durch internationale Organisationen: Die Bildungspolitik der OECD", in K. Holzinger, H. Jörgens, & C. Knill (eds), Transfer, Difusion und Konvergenz von Politiken (2007) 247-270.
320. See A. von Bogdandy, "General Principles of International Public Authority", supra note 16.
321. Alvarez, supra note 23, at 87-92;
322. P. Cahier, "L'ordre juridique interne des organisations internationales", in R.-J. Dupuy (ed.), Manuel sur les organisations internationales (1988) 235-257, at 247, 253-254;
323. J. Klabbers, "The Changing Image of International Organizations", in J.-M. Coicaud & V. Heiskanen (eds), The Legitimacy of International Organizations (2001) 221-255, at 234.
324. Cf. J. von Bernstorf, supra note 16.
325. E.g. European Court of Human Rights, Matthews v. UK, Judgment of 18 February 1999 [GC], Appl. 24833/94, ECHR 1999-I;
326. A. von Bogdandy, "General Principles", supra note 16.
327. On the emergence of an international principle of legitimacy see N. Petersen, Demokratie als teleologisches Prinzip. Zur Legitimität von Staatsgewalt im Völkerrecht (2009).
328. Cf. Art. 27, VCLT.
329. Vereinbarung zwischen Bund und Ländern über die wesentlichen Elemente einer Beteiligung, 18 December 1997, on file with the authors. After the 2006 reform of German federalism, the participation of state representatives stands now on a much more solid constitutional basis: The new Art. 91b (2) of the Basic Law provides that the Federal Government and the Länder may cooperate on the basis of special agreements in matters concerning international education assessments, including reporting and recommendations related thereto.
330. Cf. Art. 149(4), EC.
331. E.g. Council and the Ministers of Education meeting within the Council, Resolution including a Programme of Action on Education, 9 February 1976, Official Journal C 38 of 19 February 1976; see further A. Augenti and L. Amatucci, Le organizzazioni internazionali e le politiche educative (1998), 125-188.
332. Council and Ministers for Education, meeting within the Council, Resolution concerning the EURYDICE Education Information Network in the European Community, 6 December 1990, Official Journal C 329 of 31 December 1990.
333. Cf. the Bologna Declaration, (last visited 28 July (2008).
334. Cf. (last visited 28 July (2008).
335. On the activities of the IEA cf. Goldmann, supra note 106.
336. For the mandate of the Special Rapporteur see Resolution 1998/33 of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/33 of 17 April 1998 (several renewals).
337. United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education by Vernor Muñoz, Addendum, Mission to Germany, A/HRC/4/29/Add.3, 9 March 2007.
338. Ibid., para. 59.
339. Der Spiegel, 21 March 2007, .
340. Supra note 227, at para. 59.
341. Supra note 227, at para. 59. Ibid.
342. Supra note 227, at para. 60.
343. M. Rufert, "Zuständigkeitsgrenzen internationaler Organisationen im institutionellen Rahmen der internationalen Gemeinschaft", Archiv des Völkerrechts 38 (2000) 129-168, at 160-163.