Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 579-610

  Peters, Anne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

constitution; constitutionalism; democracy; global governance; legitimacy; rule of law

Indexed keywords

EID: 34447538121     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156506003487     Document Type: Article

References (152)

1. See, seminally, A. Verdross, Die Verfassung der Vö lkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1926), Preface.
2. See for an excellent and critical historical overview of the various ‘schools’ and lines of thought describing and/or propagating an international constitution and constitutionalization H. Ruiz Fabri and C. Grewe, ‘La constitutionnalisation à l'é preuve du droit international et du droit europé en’, in L. Gard et al. (eds.), Les dynamiques du droit europé en en dé but de siè cle, Etudes en l'honneur de Jean-ClaudeGautron (2004), at 189-206. See for important recent articulations, albeit in very different perspectives, J.Habermas, ‘Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Vö lkerrechts noch eine Chance?’, in J. Habermas, Der gespalteneWesten” Kleine politische Schriften (2004), 113-93; E. de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’, (2006) 55 ICLQ 51-76; R. MacDonald and D. Johnston (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism” Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (2005).
3. In US-occupied Iraq of 2003-4, employees of federal contractors and sub-contractors (Blackwater USA, Kroll Inc., Custer Battles, the Titan corporation, and others)worked asmercenaries, police, guards, prison officers, and interrogators.
4. J. N. Rosenau, ‘Governance, Order, and Change inWorld Politics’, in J. N. Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel (eds.), Governance Without Government (1992) 1, at 7” ‘Governance’, as opposed to ‘government’, does not stem from some overarching governmental authority. See also Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood” The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (1995).
5. This is the central argument of T. Cottier and M. Hertig, ‘The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism’, (2003) 7Max Planck Yearbook of UnitedNations Law 261-328. See in this sense also the recent Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the 2005World Summit Outcome, recognizing ‘the need for universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at both the national and international level ‘. UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 of 24 Oct. 2005, para. 134 (emphasis added).
6. See for excellent historical and lexical accounts in different national traditions” H. Mohnhaupt and D. Grimm, Verfassung. Zur Geschichte des Begriffs von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (1995); U. K. Preuss, ‘Verfassung’, in J. Ritter (ed.),HistorischesWö rterbuch der Philosophie,Vol. 11 (2001), at 635-43;O. Beaud, ‘Constitution et constitutionnalisme’, in P. Raynaud and S. Rials (eds.), Dictionnaire de philosophie politique (2003), at 133-42. See also A. Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas (2001), at 38-92.
7. E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliqué s à la conduite et aux affaires de Nations et des Souverains (1758, repr. 1916), book I, chap. III, § 27 (at 31).
8. See D. Fellmann, ‘Constitutional Law’, in Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 5 (1980), 84 et seq.
9. Beyond the purely domestic context, the term ‘constitutionalization’ was coined with regard to the EC/EU. See, seminally, ‘The Constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome’, G. Casper, ‘Remarks’, in American Society of International Law (ed.), Proceedings of the 72-d AnnualMeeting (1978) 169, at 173.
10. See G. Casper, ‘Constitutionalism’, in L. W. Levy, K. L. Karst, and D. J. Mahoney (eds.), Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, Vol. 2 (1986), at 473-80; U. K. Preuss, ‘Constitutionalism’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2 (1998), 618 et seq.; Red., ‘Konstitutionalismus’, in J. Ritter (ed.), Historisches Wö rterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. 4 (1989), at 1005; Beaud, Beyond the purely domestic context note 6, at 133 et seq.
11. Casper, Beyond the purely domestic context note 11, at 474. J. H.Weiler and M.Wind have correctly pointed out that ‘there is a difference between constitution and constitutionalism. Constitutionalism… embodies the values, often non-stated, which underlie the material and institutional provisions in a specific constitution. At this level, separating constitution from constitutionalism would allow us to claim, rightly or wrongly, for example, that the Italian and German constitutions, whilst very different in theirmaterial and institutional provisions, share a similar constitutionalism vindicating certain neo-Kantian humanistic values, combined with the notion of the Rechtsstaat’ (J. H.Weiler and M.Wind, ‘Introduction’, in J. H.Weiler and M.Wind (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (2003) 1, at 3). See extensively on the ‘divorce’ of constitution and constitutionalism Beaud, Beyond the purely domestic context note 6, at 136-42.
12. See B. Ackerman, ‘The Rise ofWorld Constitutionalism’, (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review 771-97.
13. J. Rubenfeld, ‘The Two World Orders’, (2003) 27 Wilson Quarterly 28 et seq. See also the contributions in G. Nolte (ed.), American and European Constitutionalism (2005).
14. See, seminally, D. Grimm, ‘Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?’, (1995) 50 Juristen-Zeitung 581 et seq.
15. A higher rank is not incumbent on the British Constitution; see section 3.1.
16. See for the US view J. Madison, ‘No. 51’, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (1961 [1788]), at 322” ‘In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this” you must first enable the government to control the governed and in the next place, oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control of government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.’ See for a German view the classic work byW. von Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen derWirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen (1792). See for French constitutionalism Beaud, A higher rank is not incumbent on the British Constitution note 6, at 136.
17. Cf. B. Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’, (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529, at 552” ‘the concept [of constitutionalism] is meant to describe or promote a legal integration of states which ismore intense than the traditional one… International constitutionalism is a progressive movement which aims at fostering international cooperation by consolidating the substantive legal ties between states as well as the organizational structures built in the past.’
18. R. Falk, ‘The Pathways of Global Constitutionalism’, in R. Falk et al. (eds.), The Constitutional Foundations of WorldPeace (1993) 13, at 14. ‘Thisoutlookisbasedonbothwill (or desire)andinterest (ornecessity) [to achieve] a more institutionalized (although not necessarily more centralized) form of governance that avoids war in conflict situations and works towards aworld in which the well-being of all is safeguarded by enforceable rights, and the environment is protected on behalf of future generations as well as those now alive… “Global constitutionalism” as used here, is itself a manifestation of global civil society in a nascent form’ (A higher rank is not incumbent on the British Constitution., emphasis added).Seealso J.H. Jackson,'ChangingFundamentalsof InternationalLawandInternationalEconomicLaw’, (2003) 41 Archiv des Vö lkerrechts 435, at 447” ‘We are going to need a new constitutionalismof institutions.’
19. D. Rousseau, ‘Une ré surrection” La notion de Constitution’, (1990) 106 Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et l'é tranger 5.
20. Flexible constitutions ‘proceed from the same authorities which make the ordinary laws; and they are promulgated or repealed in the same way as ordinary laws.’ In a polity with a flexible constitution, ‘all laws (excluding of course by-laws, municipal regulations, and so forth) are of the same rank and exert the same force. There is, moreover, only one legislative authority competent to pass laws in all cases and for all purposes.’ In contrast, ‘the distinctive mark of these Rigid Constitutions is their superiority to ordinary statutes. They are not the work of the ordinary legislature, and therefore cannot be changed by it.’ (J. Bryce, ‘Essay III” Flexible and Rigid Constitutions’, in J. Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Vol. 1 (1901, repr. 1980), at 150-1 and 217-18).
21. G.Meyer and G. Anschü tz, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts (1914-19), at 743-4.
22. A. Sieye, Qu'est-ce qu'est le tiers é tat? (1789).
23. C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (1928), at 75-6.
24. Aconstitutional act calls ‘into life a being the development ofwhichcould nothavebeen foreseen completely by themost gifted of its begetters.’ Justice O.WendellHolmes, in Missouri v.Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1919).
25. See extensively Peters, ‘The Pathways of Global Constitutionalism’ note 6, at 76 et seq.
26. See for references to the ‘international community as a whole’, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (second phase), [1970] ICJ Rep. 3, para. 33; ICC Statute of 17 July 1998 (UNTS Vol. 2187, No. 38544), Preamble, para. 4, and ILC Articles on state responsibility (2001), Doc. A/CN.4/L.602, Rev. 1, Art. 42(b). See in scholarship A. Paulus, Die internationale Gemeinschaft im Vö lkerrecht (2001), Eng. summary at 439 et seq.
27. E.g. D. Thü rer, ‘Von der komplexen Gestalt des Vö lkerrechts,’ in J. Brö hmer et al. (eds.), Internationale Gemeinschaft undMenschenrechte (2005), 307, at 312.
28. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (2001), 14-18, available at http//www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (last visited 28 Aug. 2005).
29. A.-M. Slaughter and W. Burke-White, ‘An International Constitutional Moment’, (2002) 43 Harvard International Law Journal 1, esp. at 2-3 (suggesting that besides the prohibition of the use of force between states is established a provision prohibiting the use of force by civilians against civilians as ‘parallel prohibitions that are the twin foundations of international order').
30. B. Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’, (1998) 9 EJIL 599-625; J. L. Cohen, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire versus International Law’, (2004) 128 Ethics & International Affairs 1-24.
31. See ICISS, extensively Peters note 31; J. P. Mü ller, ‘Wandel des Souverä nitä tsbegriffs im Lichte der Grundrechte’, in R. Rhinow, S. Breitenmoser, and B. Ehrenzeller (eds.), Fragen des internationalen und nationalenMenschenrechtsschutzes (1997), 45, at 61-6.
32. Krasner, extensively Peters note 34.
33. Cf. Art. I-1 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of 29 October 2004, which begins with the formula” ‘Reflecting thewill of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future, this Constitution establishes the European Union,… ’ (OJ 2004 C 310/1). See in scholarship on the dual foundation of the global legal order Habermas, extensively Peters note 2, at 133; Cohen, extensively Peters note 33, at 13. Arguably, this dual foundation is still lopsided in the sense that the state sovereignty pillar is the load-bearing one.
34. C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for StatesWithout or Against TheirWill’, (1993) 241-IV Recueil des cours 209-40.
35. J. Charney, ‘The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law’, (1986) 56 BYIL 1-24.
36. See comprehensively for the lawof treatieswith numerous examples G. Dahm, J. Delbrü ck and R.Wolfrum, Vö lkerrecht, Vol. 1 / 3 (2002), at 613-32 (§ 152 on ‘Verträ ge zugunsten und zu Lasten Dritter; insbesondere Verträ ge mit erga omnes Wirkung'). But see critically M. A. Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Parties and the Law of Treaties’, (2002) 6Max Planck Yearbook of UnitedNations Law 37-137, concluding that the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt remains the general rule and that rights and obligations of third states stemming from treaties to which they are not parties remain exceptional.
37. H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, rev. and ed. R.W. Tucker (1966), 487.
38. See Art. 63 ('Treaties providing for objective ré gimes') of the International Law Commission (ILC) draft for the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1964 by special rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock” ‘A treaty establishes an objective ré gime when… the intention of the parties is to create in the general interest general obligations and rights relating to a particular region, State, territory, locality, river, waterway, or to a particular area of the sea, sea-bed, or air-space… ’ (Third Report on the Law of Treaties, (1964) II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 26, emphasis added). The construction of an objective regime has, however, not without grounds, been criticized as reflecting imperialist tendencies.
39. Art. 380 of theTreaty ofVersailles of 28 June 1919 opened theCanal to vessels of all nations ('toutes les nations en paix avec l'Allemagne') (Martens N.R.G. 3iè me Sé r., Vol. 11, 321 et seq.). This provision internationalized the until then purely national waterway ‘for the benefit of all nations of the world’ (Wimbledon, (1923), PCIJ Ser. A, No. 1, at 22).
40. The contractually agreed mandate was not terminated by the dissolution of the League of Nations (International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, [1950] ICJ Rep. 128, 132-6). See also Judge Sir Arnold McNair” ‘From time to time it happens that a group of Great Powers, or a large number of States both great and small, assume a power to create by amultipartite treaty some newinternational ré gime or statuswhich soon acquires a degree of acceptance and durability extending beyond the limits of the actual contracting parties, and giving it an objective existence. This power is used when some public interest is involved, and its existence often occurs in the course of a peace settlement at the end of a great war’ (McNair, Separate Opinion, extensively Peters., 146, at 153 (emphasis added)).
41. Art. X of the Antarctic Treaty of 1 December 1959 (UNTS Vol. 71, 402) may be interpreted as imposing on third parties an obligation to intervene (see critically B. Simma, ‘The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty Providing for an “Objective Regime”, (1986) 19 Cornell International Law Journal 189-209).
42. See UNCLOS of 10 December 1982, UNTS Vol. 1833, 3, Art. 137. See on the third-party effect of this provision R.Wolfrum, Die Internationalisierung staatsfreier Rä ume (1984), at 395-6.
43. E. Klein, Statusverträ ge im Vö lkerrecht (1980), on the third-party effects at 345-8.
44. See, seminally, B. Simma, ‘FromBilateralism toCommunity Interests’, (1994) 250-VI Recueil des cours 217-384. The emergence of community interests is one of the core propositions of the Spanish ‘objectivist school’ of international law; see, e.g., J. D. Gonza’ lez Campos, L. I. Sa’ nchez Rodre’ guez, and P. A. Sa’ enz de Santa Mare’ a, Curso de derecho internacional pu’ blico (2002), 68. See with regard to the human rights instruments Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 (1994), paras. 8 and 17 (CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.6). Negating the ‘collective’ character of the WTO-Agreement” J. Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations” AreWTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’ (2003) 14 EJIL 907-51.
45. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1951] ICJ Rep., at 23 (emphasis added).
46. See notably the Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 33(2)” ‘States Parties shall take measures consistent with this Agreement and international law to deter the activities of vessels flying the flag of non-parties which undermine the effective implementation of this Agreement’ (Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation andManagement of Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 8 September 1995, (1995) 34 ILM 1542 et seq., emphasis added). See on the third-party effect J. Ziemer, Das gemeinsame Interesse an einer Regelung der Hochseefischerei (2000), 187 et seq.
47. See S. Talmon, ‘The Security Council asWorld Legislature’, (2005) 99 AJIL 175-93.
48. Notably UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), installing the ICTY; UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) on the financing of terrorism; UN Doc. S/RES/1540 (2004) on weapons ofmass destruction in the hand of private actors.
49. J. Delbrü ck (ed.), New Trends in International Lawmaking-International ‘Legislation’ in the Public Interest (1997).
50. J. A. Frowein, ‘Konstitutionalisierung des Vö lkerrechts’, (2000) 39 Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft fü r Vö lkerrecht 427, at 447.
51. Under the declarative theory of recognition, the act of granting orwithholding recognition does not intheory affect statehood (the international legal personality).However, the idea of an ‘objective’ legal personality of a of the construction was highlighted by the post-1989 recognition practice which pro-actively consolidated weak political entities which did not fulfil or only to a limited degree fulfilled the ordinary criteria of statehood.
52. Most recently J. d'Aspremont, ‘La cré ation internationale d'Etats dé mocratiques’, (2005) 109 RevueGé né rale de Droit International Public 889, concluding that ‘nowadays, international administrations of territories entail thecreationofdemocraticinstitutions… it isbeyonddoubtthatwhilsttheinternationalcommunitycannot entirely control the birth of States, it strives to… impose a precise type of political regime’ (quotation from English abstract). See alsoB. A.Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in InternationalLaw(1999); R. Rich, ‘Recognition of States” The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union’, (1993) 4 EJIL 36-65; Frowein, extensively Peters note 55, at 429-32; J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2006).
53. UN Doc. S/RES/554 (1984), paras. 1-2 and UN Doc. A/39/2 (1984), para. 1.
54. Guidelines of 16 December 1991, repr. in (1992) 31 ILM 1486 et seq.
55. See in the press, e.g., M. Spillmann, ‘Kein Ende des Blutvergiessens in Afghanistan’, Neue Zü richer Zeitung, 27 Aug. 1999.
56. Report of the Secretary-General on theUnitedNations Transitional Administration in East Timor of 17 April 2002, para. 5 (UN Doc. S/2002/432); see also UN Doc./S/RES/1480 (2003), para. 2 of the Preamble.
57. UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).
58. Art. 11 BV.
59. See also infra, section 6.5.
60. See for the international imposition of standards of democracy to states infra section 6.4. See on the effects of globalization on domestic democracy A. von Bogdandy, ‘Demokratie, Globalisierung, Zukunft des Vö lkerrechts-eine Bestandsaufnahme’, (2003) 63 Zeitschrift fü r auslä ndisches ö ffentliches Recht und Vö lkerrecht 853-77.
61. M. J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent” America in Search of a Public Policy (1996), 202.
62. ‘Democracy within a nation-state requires democracy within a network of intersecting international forces and relations. This is the meaning of democratization today.’ D. Held, ‘Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System’, in D. Held, Political Theory Today (1991), 197, at 232. See for concrete proposals We the Peoples” Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance” Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations (June 2004), Doc. A/58/817 (Cardoso Report), available at http//www.unngls. org/UNreform.htm (last visited 1 Sept. 2005), Part VI, ‘Engaging with elected representatives’ (paras. 101-52).
63. Cardoso Report, also infra, section 6.5. note 67.
64. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction of 18 September 1997, UNTS Vol. 2056, at 211.
65. See also ICC Statute, Cardoso Report note 28, Arts. 15(2) and 44(4), on information submitted by NGOs and on ‘gratis personnel’ employed by the ICC.
66. G. Shaffer, Defending Interests” Public-Private Partnerships inWTO Litigation (2003).
67. These partnershipswere officially recognized as ‘Type II outcomes’ at the 2002World SummitonSustainable Development. See Plan of Implementation, revised version of 23 Sept. 2002 (Doc. A/CONF.199/20), available at http//www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/summit_docs/2309_planfinal.htm (visited 1 June 2004). In scholarship, C. Streck, ‘TheWorld Summit on Sustainable Development” Partnerships asNewTools in Environmental Governance’, (2002) 13 Yearbook of Environmental Law 3-95.
68. See the World Bank Executive Directors’ decision of 20 July 1999 to establish the PCF, available at http//carbonfinance.org/pcf/router.cfm?Page=About (visited 27 May 2004). TheWorld Bank's partnership with thepublic and private sectors is intended to mobilizenewresources for its borrowingmembercountries while addressing global environmental problems through market-based mechanisms. The PCF will invest contributions made by companies and governments in projects designed to produce emission reductions consistent with the Kyoto Protocol. Participants in the PCF will receive a pro rata share of the emission reductions.
69. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters of 25 June 1998, available at http//www.unece.org./env/pp/documents/cep43g.pdf (last visited 27May 2004).
70. Decision I/7 on review of compliance, part. VI ‘Communications from the Public’, paras. 18-24, available at www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance.htm (last visited 27May 2004).
71. Note that the term ‘public-private split’ in domestic law is often used to designate the separation of two distinct branches of law, namely public and private law. Both branches of law are state-made law to a large extent. A different question is whether private entities are (by the relevant legal framework) authorized to makelaw.Thetraditional and uncontested formsof law created by private actors are contractswhich bind the (private) parties. The novel phenomenon (both on the national and on the international plane) is to entrust private actors with standard-setting. Private actors are thereby allowed to make (or to participate in the making of) general rules which potentially bind third actors. This is meant by ‘erosion of the public-private split’ in this paper.
72. G. Teubner, ‘Globale Zivilverfassungen” Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie’, (1993) 63 Zeitschrift fü r auslä ndisches ö ffentliches Recht und Vö lkerrecht 1-28.
73. R. Monaco, ‘Le caractè re constitutionnel des actes institutifs d'organisations internationales’, in Mé langes offerts à Charles Rousseau (1974) 153, at 154.
74. Legality of the Use by a State of NuclearWeapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep. 66, para. 19.
75. P.-M. Dupuy, ‘L'unité de l'ordre juridique international’, (2002) 297 Recueil des cours 15, at 227.
76. D. Mitrany, A Working Peace System (1944), 6 and 54, and Mitrany, The Progress of International Government (1933).
77. J. Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’, (2004) 1 International Organizations Law Review 31, at 44-5.
78. See on the problem of fragmentation infra, section 7.1.
79. on the problem of fragmentation infra, section 7.1. note 17.
80. Supranationality is here understood as resulting from the wealth of the organization's competencies, compulsory adjudication, its law making powers without need for transformation by member states, and the direct effect of many provisions of EC law.
81. D. Z. Cass, Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization” Legitimacy, Democracy and Community in the International Trading System (2005).
82. D. Z. Cass, ‘The “Constitutionalization” of International Trade Law” Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade’, (2001) 12 EJIL 39, at 42.
83. Cottier, Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization” Legitimacy, Democracy and Community in the International Trading System note 87, at 56-7.
84. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions, Cottier note 87, Ch. V (at 96 et seq.).
85. J. Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
86. Cottier, Petersmann note 87, at 57.
87. The quest for compensatory constitutionalism as formulated here of course includes the suggestion of linking those two academic discourses.
88. B. Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto” A Constitutional Perspective (1998); Fassbender, The quest for compensatory constitutionalism as formulated here of course includes the suggestion of linking those two academic discourses. note 18, at 529-619; R. Macdonald, ‘The Charter of the United Nations in Constitutional Perspective’, (1999) 20 The Australian Yearbook of International Law 205-31; P.-M. Dupuy, ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’, (1997) 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1-33. PioneeringW. Jenks, ‘Some Constitutional Problems of International Organization’, (1945) 2 BYIL 11-72; A. Ross, Constitution of the United Nations” Analysis of Structure and Functions (1950).
89. Fassbender, The quest for compensatory constitutionalism as formulated here of course includes the suggestion of linking those two academic discourses. note 18, at 567-8.
90. Fassbender., at 585 and 588.
91. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Art. 53.
92. A. Fischer-Lescano, ‘Die Emergenz derGlobalverfassung’, (2003) 63 Zeitschrift fü r auslä ndisches ö ffentlichesRecht und Vö lkerrecht 717, at 743-8.
93. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1993] ICJ Rep. 4, at 440, para. 100 (Lauterpacht, Separate Opinion).
94. To borrow a term from B. Ackerman,We The People, Vol. 1” Foundations (1991).
95. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide notes 25 and 26.
96. See already G. Scelle, ‘Le droit constitutionnel international’, (1933)Mé langes Raymond Carré deMalberg 501, at 514; R. Uerpmann, ‘Internationales Verfassungsrecht’, (2001) 56 Juristen-Zeitung 565, at 567-9.
97. C. Turpin, British Government and the Constitution” Text, Cases andMaterials (2002), 5.
98. See sceptically W. Kä lin, ‘Der Menschenrechtsschutz der UNO” Ein Beispiel fü r die Konstitutionalisierung des Vö lkerrechts?’, in W. Kä lin and T. Cottier (eds.), Die ö ffnung des Verfassungsrechts” Symposium zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Jö rg Paul Mü ller, (2005) recht Sonderheft 42, at 45. But see C. Tomuschat, ‘Die internationale Gemeinschaft’, (1995) 33 Archiv des Vö lkerrechts 1, at 7” There is a constitution of the international community in which certain basics of peace and justice are laid down. See also E. deWet, ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order’, (2006) 19 LJIL 611-32. See for a powerful analysis of the ‘relativity of the universal’ and the ‘universality of the relative’ in the current international legal order, and a call for ‘ordered pluralism’, M. Delmas Marty, Le relative et l'universel (2004).
99. See for the claim that liberal principles and institutionsmakea difference to the conduct of the foreign affairs of states M.W. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, (1983) 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 205. See for empirical evidence B. Russett, J. Oneal, and D. Davis, ‘The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace” International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985’, (1998) 52 International Organization 441-67. The authors ‘find major benefits of joint democracy… If both members of a dyad are fully democratic, conflict is 35 percent less likely’.
100. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 21; CCPR, Art. 25; ACHR, Art. 23(1); Banjul Charter, Art. 13(1).
101. See OAS Charter (last amended on 10 June 1993), Arts. 2(b), 9; Statute of the Council of Europe of 5 May 1949, Preamble; NATO Treaty of 4 April 1949, Preamble; CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 21 November 1993; Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/57/270 of 31 July 2002, Part V” ‘Human rights, democracy and good governance’, paras. 82 et seq.; UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1999/57 of 27 April 1999, ‘Promotion of the right to democracy'; OAS Interamerican Democratic Charter of 11 September 2001 (text in (2001) 41 ILM 1289); Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the 2005 World Summit Outcome of 24 October 2005 (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1), para. 135” ‘We reaffirm that democracy is a universal value… 136. We renew our commitment to support democracy by strengthening countries’ capacity to implement the principles and practices of democracy… ’. See in scholarship G. Fox and B. Roth (eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law (2000); S. Wheatley, ‘Democracy in International Law” A European Perspective’, (2002) 51 ICLQ 225-47; L. Ali Khan, A Theory of Universal Democracy” Beyond the End of History (2003); J. I. Ibegbu, Right to Democracy in International Law (2003).
102. Although not always to be taken at face value, the surveys of ‘FreedomHouse’ are helpful to assess the degree of democracy in countries around the world. See www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2005.html (last visited 1 Sept. 2005).
103. See E. Stein, ‘International Integration and Democracy” No Love at First Sight’, (2001) 95 AJIL 489-534, on democracy-legitimacy deficits in the World Health Organization (WHO), the WTO, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the EU.
104. See, for the WTO, Hilf and Benedek, OAS Charter (last amended on 10 June 1993) note 87, at 267-70; for the UN, Cardoso Report, OAS Charter (last amended on 10 June 1993) note 67, passim.
105. The notion of a ‘constitutional network’ does not describe an institutional design such as a ‘policy network’ (see J. M. Witte, W. H. Reinicke, and T. Benner, ‘Beyond Multilateralism” Global Public Policy Networks’, (2000) 7 Internationale Politik undGesellschaft 176-88); or ‘transgovernmentalnetworks’ (as inK.Raustiala, ‘The Architecture of International Cooperation” Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law’, (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 1-92; A.-M. Slaughter,ANewWorld Order (2004), esp. at 213-24), or a ‘public-private network’ as a bridge between the public and the private sector.
106. Some scholars have advanced the idea of constitutionalism as a bulwark against fragmentation, ‘as a promise that there is some system in all themadness’. Cf. Klabbers, OAS Charter (last amended on 10 June 1993) note 82, at 49.
107. Aptly putting into perspective these ‘threats’ are M. Koskenniemi and P. Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’, (2002) 15 LJIL 533 et seq.
108. R.Hofmann, ‘Concluding Remarks’, in A. Zimmermann and R.Hofmann (eds.), Unity and Diversity in International Law (2006), 491.
109. C.Walter, ‘Constitutionalizing (Inter)national Governance-Possibilities for and Limits to theDevelopment of an International Constitutional Law’, (2001) 44 German Yearbook of International Law 170, at 191-6.
110. H. Heller, Staatslehre (1963 [1934]), 270 (author's translation, emphasis added).
111. ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’.
112. G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1914), at 521 (author's translation, emphasis added).
113. See in scholarly works, e.g., D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance” The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (2000); J. Marquier, Soft Law” Das Beispiel des OSZE-Prozesses-Ein Beitrag zur vö lkerrechtlichen Rechtsquellenlehre (2003). See, e.g., the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) of 26 November 2002 with currently 109 subscribing states, available at http//www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=MBZ460166 (last visited 1 June 2004).
114. But see K.W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, (2000) 54 International Organization 421, distinguishing ‘soft’ from ‘hard’ law along the parameters of obligation, precision, and delegation, whichmeans that there is a sliding scale between harder and softer norms.
115. See, e.g., the Wolfsberg Statement on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of January 2002, issued by the so-called Wolfsberg group of leading international banks (available at http//www.wolfsbergprinciples. com/standards.html (last visited 1 June 2004)). See also ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’. section 4.6. on non-state actors.
116. Final Act of 1 August 1975, Basket I, Questions relating to Security in Europe” Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, Principle VII on human rights and fundamental freedoms, available at http//www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/helfa75e.htm (last visited 1 June 2004).
117. See for a classic critique P.Weil, ‘Towards RelativeNormativity in International Law?’, (1983) 77 AJIL 413-42 (orig. ‘Vers une normativité relative?’, (1983) 86 Revue gé né rale de droit international public 5).
118. Shelton, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’. note 122, at 12.
119. See in detail A. Peters, ‘The Growth of International Law between Globalization and the Great Power’, (2003) 8 Austrian Review of International and European Law 109-39.
120. For example, jurisdiction is claimed over European firms which seek to trade with Cuba. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms Burton Act), P.L. 104-14, available at http//usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/libertad.htm (last visited 1 Sept. 2005).
121. Judicial review denied by Al Odah v. US (consolidated withRasul v. Bush), Judgment of 11March 2003, US Ct. of App. DC Circ.; but see Rasul et al. v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004), granting habeas corpus review.
122. Agreement between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations of 23 February 1903, available at http//www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/cuba/cuba002.htm (last visited 27May 2004).
123. The exact number of BIAs (most of which were concluded under pressure) actually in force is currently not verifiable. TheUS State Department reports over 90 (signed) agreements. In some states a BIA is concluded as anexecutiveagreementwhichdoesnotrequire ratification.Of the90states,41areICCstate parties.See'Status ofUS Bilateral ImmunityAgreements’, available athttp//www.iccnow.org/documents/USandICC/BIAs.html (last visited 30March 2005).
124. UN Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002), prolonged for one year until 30 June 2004 by UN Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003). These Security Council resolutions were adopted pursuant to the US threat not to prolong the deployment of its forces in the peacekeepingmission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
125. American Service Members’ Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA), entry into force 2 August 2002, Sec. 2002 and 2004 (repr. in (2002) 27 HRLJ 275).
126. ICCPR of 1966 (ratified in 1992, but not the optional protocol on individual communications); CERD of 1966 (ratified by the United States in 1994); CAT of 1984 (ratification in 1994 and acceptance of individual communications to the Committee (under Art. 21 CAT)); Genocide Convention of 1948 (ratified by the United States in 1988).
127. See on sovereign equalitymost usefully B. Fassbender, ‘Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law’, in N.Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (2003), 115-43.
128. See for the full argument A. Peters, ‘International Dispute Settlement” A Network of Cooperational Duties’, (2003) 14 EJIL 1, at 20-1. Another example of a constitutionalist reading of treaty clauses on judicial control is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Case no. 54, Ivcher Bronstein-Competencia, paras. 32-55; Case no. 55, Caso del Tribunal Constitutional, paras. 31-54; both judgments of 24 September 1999, available at http//www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/54-ing.html and http//www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/55-ing.html (last visited 26May 2004). Here the Court held that withdrawal from submission to jurisdiction is only possible by denouncing the treaty as awhole.The Court thereby transformed the optional jurisdictional clause into a quasi-compulsory one.
129. See on this issue G. Watson, ‘Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court’, (1993) 34 Harvard International Law Journal 1-45; J. Klabbers, ‘Straddling Law and Politics” Judicial Review in International Law’, in R.MacDonald and D. M. Johnston (eds.), TowardsWorld Constitutionalism (2005), 809.
130. See Fassbender, Shelton note 95, at 309-15; E. deWet, The Chapter VII Powers of the UnitedNations Security Council (2004), esp. at 372-5. In this context, the constitutionalist approach to international organizationsmeets the more general international constitutionalism.
131. G. Knaus and F.Martin, ‘Lessons from Bosnia andHerzegovina” Travails of the EuropeanRaj’, (2003) 14 Journal of Democracy 60-74.
132. See also Shelton section 6.5. on the network picture.
133. Cf.E.A.Young, ‘TheTrouble with GlobalConstitutionalism’, (2003) 38Texas International LawJournal 527-45.
134. ‘Global constitutionalism, which is anawfully vague and possibly sinister term… [means] that international norms are increasingly called upon to play the role that constitutional principles play in the domestic legal order’. also also Shelton section 6.5. on the network picture. section 6.5. on the network picture., at 528.
135. Rubenfeld, ‘Global constitutionalism, which is anawfully vague and possibly sinister term… [means] that international norms are increasingly called upon to play the role that constitutional principles play in the domestic legal order’. note 14.
136. See, e.g., J. R. Bolton, arguing that international law is not (democratically) legitimate and therefore not really law, which means that the United States is not legally bound by it (J. R. Bolton, ‘Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?’, (2000) 10 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 1 et seq.). See on the other hand M. Kumm for ‘constitutionalist’ arguments in favour of the legitimacy and thus of the bindingness of international law (M. Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law” A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’, (2004) 15 EJIL 907-31).
137. U. Haltern, ‘Internationales Verfassungsrecht’, (2003) 128 Archiv des ö ffentlichen Rechts 511-56.
138. Rubenfeld., at 533-4, drawing on B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (1983).
139. Compare generally H. Charlesworth and C. Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law (2000), at 18-22.
140. Klabbers, Rubenfeld. note 82, at 48.
141. M. Neves, Symbolische Konstitutionalisierung (1998).
142. Kä lin, Symbolische Konstitutionalisierung note 107, at 47.
143. Kä lin., at 49.
144. Klabbers, Kä lin. note 82, at 47.
145. N. Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1993), at 407-39.
146. P. Allott, ‘The Emerging International Aristocracy’, (2002) 35 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 308, at 336. Allott continues, ‘The consoling Kantian myth that the republicanising of national constitutions will naturally produce a constitutionalising of international society, a patchwork cosmopolis, seems more improbable than ever. The UN Charter, an illusionary written constitution of international society, was and is merely the groundwork of an international oligarchy of oligarchies’.
147. See for the notion of governance Klabbers note 4.
148. Habermas, for the notion of governance Klabbers note 4. note 2, at 115.
149. M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (2002), at 488-94; J. Petman, Human Rights and Violence” The Hope and theMemory of the NewWorld Order (2007).
150. The Expert Commission with R. Falk and others qualified the Kosovo intervention as illegal, but legitimate (Independent International Commission onKosovo, TheKosovo Report” Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (2000), 185-98, esp. at 186).
151. Cf. R. von Ihering, Geist des rö mischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, Part II (1898), at 471” ‘Die Formist die geschworene Feindin derWillkü r, die Zwillingsschwester der Freiheit. Denn die Form hä lt derVerlockung der Freiheit zur Zü gellosigkeit dasGegengewicht, sie lenkt die Freiheitssubstanz in feste Bahnen, dass sie sich nicht zerstreue, verlaufe, sie krä ftigt sie nach innen, schü tzt sie nach aussen. Feste Formen sind die Schule der Zucht und Ordnung und damit der Freiheit selber und eine Schutzwehr gegen ä ussere Angriffe-sie lassen sich nur brechen, nicht biegen.’
152. Kumm, Habermas note 147, at 929.