Decentralized administrative law in the organization for economic cooperation and development

Law and Contemporary Problems

Volumn 68, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 190-224

  Salzman, James ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 30944441109     PISSN: 00239186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (115)

1. Some of the background information in this article has been previously published in James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization, and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 Mich. J. Int'l L. 769 (2000).
2. Its founding treaty mandates the organization to promote policies designed: (a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability[ ] and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy[;] (b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic development; and (c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations. See Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 1, 14-15, 12 U.S.T. 1728.
3. The Member countries and dates of accessions are: Australia (1971), Austria (1961), Belgium (1961), Canada (1961), Czech Republic (1995), Denmark (1961), Finland (1969), France (1961), Germany (1961), Greece (1961), Hungary (1996), Iceland (1961), Ireland (1961), Italy (1962), Japan (1964), Korea (1996), Luxembourg (1961), Mexico (1994), The Netherlands (1961), New Zealand (1973), Norway (1961), Poland (1996), Portugal (1961), Slovak Republic (2000), Spain (1961), Sweden (1961), Switzerland (1961), Turkey (1961), United Kingdom (1961), United States (1961). Ratification of the Convention of the OECD, available at http:// www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html.
4. http://www.oecd.org/document/18/ 0,2340,en_2649_201185_2068050_1_1_1_1,00.html.
5. Perhaps one reason the OECD's mandate is so broad is its lack of direct political power authority, as described on the next page of text. As Lawrence Krause and Joseph Nye have observed, it is sometimes said that intergovernmental organizations operate according to "the law of inverse salience": the greater the political prominence of an issue, the less the operational autonomy of the organization. This law is sometimes used as a reason for limiting the scope of an organization's domain to a narrow range of issues that are more likely to be susceptible to technical than to broad political treatment. Lawrence B. Krause & Joseph S. Nye, Reflections on the Economics and Politics of International Economic Organizations, 29 Int'l Org. 323, 335 (1975)
6. Books and reports must be approved by all member countries prior to derestriction and publication. http://www.oecd.org/document/18/ 0,2340,en_2649_201185_2068050_1_1_1_1,00.html#public.
7. OECD Ann. Rep. (1998), http://www.oecd.org/publications/97_rep/ sec_gene1.htm.
8. While decisions are considered binding on member states and are expected to be implemented at the domestic level, there is no requirement for domestic ratification. Indeed, the OECD itself distinguishes between decisions and "internationally agreed instruments." http:// www.oecd.org/about/ 0,2337,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. In terms of the hierarchy of international legal instruments, this would place OECD decisions at a level below treaties.
9. Padideh Ala'i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Ongoing Crusade Against Corruption, 33 Vand. J. of Transnat'l L. 877, 913 n.163 (2000) (discussing the development of U.N. Doc. E/AC.67/L.1 (1979)).
10. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, December 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, 4.
11. See generally Ala'i, supra note 9, at 910-18 (recounting the history of the influence of intergovernmental organizations on the U.N.'s adoption of standards for public officials regarding bribery).
12. Http://www.oecd.org/document/18/ 0,2340,en_2649_201185_2068050_1_1_1_1,00.html.
13. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 Foreign Aff. 183, 196 (1997).
14. TUAC is the formal representative of labor organizations to the OECD. Originally created in 1948 to provide advice to the OEEC in its implementation of the Marshall Plan, TUAC has continued to provide feedback from the international labor community through regular consultations with OECD committees, the OECD secretariat, and Member country delegates. Based in Paris, TUAC is a free-standing organization with affiliates from over fifty-six national trade unions in the thirty OECD Member countries, representing approximately sixty-six million workers. http://www.tuac.org/about/cabout.htm.
15. The Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) was created at the time of the OECD's birth in 1962. An independent organization, BIAC is regarded by the OECD as its official link with employers - business and industry interests. In terms of interactions with the OECD, BIAC shares many of the same features as TUAC. It holds regular consultations with the OECD secretariat, committees and groups in order to provide an institutional counterbalance to the efforts of TUAC.
16. See infra Part III.
17. An interesting question is why the OECD's institutional outreach efforts to civil society only extended to labor and employer groups. This is merely speculation, but a possible explanation was the political importance of labor parties in OECD countries in the 1950s and the prominent, formal role unions and employer organizations played in domestic politics.
18. Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the Economic Development of Least Developed Countries, 27 Colum. J. L. & Arts 277 (2004).
19. "In the early 1990s, Poland experienced a forty-fold increase in inward FDI following its rapid liberalization and deregulation program.... China experienced a ten-fold increase in FDI between 1990-1995, receiving nearly $36 billion in 1995. Additionally, Mexico experienced a sharp increase in FDI following the passage of NAFTA, as did Chile." Id.
20. Eric M. Burt, Note, Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization, 12 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1015, 1019 (1997).
21. Kenneth Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 373, 382 (1998).
22. Id.;
23. Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The Antinomies of the Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 19 U. Pa. J. Int'l. Econ. L. 731, 744 (1998);
24. Burt, supra note 19, at 1016.
25. Kenneth Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 90 A.J.I.L. 545 (1996) (book review).
26. Id.
27. Vandevelde, supra note 20, at 373 n.2.
28. TUAC claimed that none of the 1600 BITs address labor issues. Interview by the author with TUAC personnel (December 1998).
29. Trying to increase employment, for example, countries have employed a range of operational restrictions (also known as performance requirements) such as mandating the hiring of local workers and limiting the ability of the company to employ foreign employees. For this reason as well as concerns over sovereignty, developing countries have preferred negotiating BITs and, with few exceptions, uniformly opposed strong multilateral rules liberalizing FDI under the auspices of the GATT or WTO.
30. The substantive reasons for this opposition are set out, infra note 34.
31. OECD, A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Report by the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) and the Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT), Paris, 1995.
32. David Robertson, The MAI Affair, A Story and its Lessons, 17, available at http://www.cairnsgroupfarmers.org/ni/reportspapers/maipaper.pdf.
33. Standstill measures prohibit the introduction of additional non-conforming measures. Rollback measures allow only future liberalization of measures.
34. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the MAI's text in detail, but it is important to recognize that despite the reassurances of its proponents, the MAI did more than simply harmonize BITs. For a discussion of the specific reasons behind NGO opposition, see Salzman, supra note 1, at 824.
35. In a revealing anecdote on how low-profile the MAI exercise was within the OECD, a member of the OECD secretariat related that she was at a U.N. Commission for Sustainable Development meeting in 1996 when an NGO participant started denouncing the MAI negotiations. The European Union delegate had to call back to Paris to ask what the MAI negotiations were. Interviews with OECD personnel. December 12, 2003.
36. Stephen Kobrin, The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations, 112 Foreign Pol'y 97, 97-98 (Fall 1998).
37. NGOs criticized the legitimacy of the closed door process, but their fundamental concerns were substantive. They charged that the MAI weakened the regulatory capacity of host countries in favor of investor protections. Under the guise of technical harmonization, in other words, the MAI negotiations were imposing an undesirable policy choice with the potential to fundamentally change the status quo.
38. Robertson, supra note 29, at 41.
39. See, e.g., http://www.citizen.org/trade/issues.
40. Robertson, supra note 29, at 46.
41. Id. at 17.
42. A study for the OECD found yearly net savings from MAD to be $54 million ($63.5 million savings from avoided testing, less $9.5 million in program administration. Rob Visser, OECD Chemicals Division, Personal Communication to James Salzman, Dec. 12, 2003.
43. The three decisions are: • Decision of the Council Concerning the Mutual Acceptance of Data (MAD) in the Assessment of Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(81)30 (May 12, 1981), with its associated Test Guidelines and Principles of Good Laboratory Practice (GLP); • Council Decision-Recommendation on Compliance with Good Laboratory Practice, OECD Doc. C(89)87, (Oct. 2, 1989); • Council Decision on the Adherence of Non-Member Countries to the Council Acts related to the Mutual Acceptance of Data in the Assessment of Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(97)114, (Nov. 26, 1997).
44. The relevant Decision text states that "data generated in the testing of chemicals in an OECD Member country in accordance with OECD Test Guidelines and OECD Principles of Good Laboratory Practice shall be accepted in other Member countries for purposes of assessment and other uses relating to the protection of man and the environment." Decision of the Council Concerning the Mutual Acceptance of Data (MAD) in the Assessment of Chemicals, Part 1(1) at 2.
45. These are in the areas of physical-chemical properties, human toxicity, ecotoxicity, and degradation and accumulation.
46. OECD Series on Principles of Good Laboratory Practice and Compliance Monitoring No. 1, OECD Doc. ENV/MC/CHEM(98)17, § 3.3 at 21 (1997).
47. ICAPO defines its mission as seeking "to promote new test guidelines [that] fully incorporate alternative methods that can replace, reduce, and refine animal use (the 'Three Rs'). Similarly, ICAPO will seek to limit animal use and promote alternative methods in OECD testing programs, such as the OECD's emerging programs to assess 'high production volume' chemicals and 'endocrine disrupting' chemicals." http://www.hsus.org/ace/16124.
48. Decision of the Counsel concerning the Mutual Acceptance of Data (MAD) in the Assessment of Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(81)30(Final), Annex 2, (May 12, 1981), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/15/2017640.pdf.
49. Two OECD countries are currently establishing monitoring programs, and three have not yet implemented the Council Decisions, though they are required to accept data from the other participating countries.
50. Japan, too, sometimes requires additional testing (for example, a 28-day test with an added control beyond what is called for in the Test Method). This is appropriate since the Council Decision establishes a floor, not a ceiling. One can ask for additional tests, in other words, but not different tests.
51. Rob Visser, OECD Chemicals Division, Personal Communication to James Salzman, Dec. 12, 2003 (on file with author).
52. It is worth noting that such an objection could not have been mandated in the United States through administrative law channels.
53. The group overseeing the mutual joint visits is the only Chemicals group restricted to government officials. This helps ensure frank and open discussion of compliance monitoring and enforcement weaknesses.
54. According to the World Bank, ECAs' "total exposure to developing countries reached an estimated $500 billion at the end of 2000 - one-quarter of developing countries' long term debt." The World Bank, Global Development Finance: Financing the Poorest Countries, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: Office of the Publisher, 2002), I: 107 in Globalization's Most Perverse Secret (paper presented May 23-24, 2002), available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/ 2487_Globalizations_Secret.pdf, at 5;
55. see also http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/dynamicPDFcache/ BE-Section-Issues_ECA_FAQ-1110637439.pdf, at 2.
56. Jakarta Declaration for Reform of Official Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agencies (May 1-7, 2000), available at http://www.eca-watch.org/goals/jakartadec.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
57. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Rep. No. GAO-03-1093, Export Credit Agencies, Movement Toward Common Environmental Guidelines, but National Differences Remain, 35-36 (Sept. 2003), available at www.gao.gov/ new.items/d031093.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 36. (stating that in 1997 the Export-Import Bank began requiring a series of environmental reviews, and that project developers seek to alleviate the environmental effects with a deep-sea tailings disposal system, operating a revegetation program, and initiating a study of water seepage patterns).
60. Id. at 38-39.
61. Id. at 39.
62. In the United States, for example, Ex-Im Bank funding decisions are not subject to review under Executive Order 12114, requiring environmental impact reviews of actions with foreign impacts.
63. David Hunter, The World Bank: A Lighter Shade of Green?, in Yearbook of International Co-Operation on Environment and Development 2001/2002, 61 (Olav Schram Stokke & Øystein B. Thommessen eds., 2001), available at http://www.greenyearbook.org/articles/01_06_hunter.pdf.
64. See generally, David Hunter, James Salzman & Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law and Policy 1482 (2d ed. 2002).
65. Environmental Review Procedures, Export-Import Bank of the U.S., 61 Fed. Reg. 17,701-01 (Apr. 22. 1996). For further detailes, see http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/environment/envproc.html.
66. See Export-Import Bank of the United States, International Environmental Guidelines, Annex A, (May 1998, revised July 2, 2003) at http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/environment/envguide.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
67. Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank Environmental Procedures and Guidelines (revised July 7, 2004), at http://www.exim.gov/ products/policies/environment/envproc.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
68. See id. (stating what the environmental assessment should include).
69. See also Export-Import Bank of the United States, Environmental Procedures, Introduction (revised July 2, 2003) (listing the categories as Category N: Nuclear, Category A: Large Greenfield Projects or Projects located in, or impacting a Sensitive Site [requires submission of an environmental assessment and related documentation describing the environmental effects of the project], Category B: Expansions, Upgrades and Projects Having Limited Environmental Impact [requires submission of environmental information sufficient to establish whether or not the project meets relevant host-country environmental guidelines and applicable international guidelines], Category C: Categorial Exclusions [no further environmental information is required because the project has minimal environmental impact], at http://www.exim.gov/products/ policies/environment/envproc.html (categories revised July 1, 2004 to be consistent with OECD Common Approaches.)
70. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 53 at 4.
71. Nicholas Hildyard, Snouts in the Trough: Export Credit Agencies, Corporate Welfare and Policy Incoherence, ECA Watch, at http://www.eca-watch.org/eca/snouts4.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
72. Campaign Goals, ECA Watch, at http://www.eca-watch.org/goals/index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). The clearest statement of the NGOs' position was the Jakarta Declaration for Reform of Official Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agencies issued in May, 2000.
73. See supra, note 52.
74. Based on the experiences of Indonesia and other developing country hosts of ECA-backed projects, the Jakarta Declaration called for the development of "binding common environmental and social guidelines and standards no lower and/or less rigorous than existing international procedures and standards... coherent with...the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity." Id.
75. The Action Statement declared: (1) [Members agree to] continue to develop, within their national systems of official export credit support, procedures and methodologies for identifying and assessing the environmental impact of projects.... (2) [Members agree to] continue to monitor and evaluate, over time, their own experiences with these procedures and methodologies, as well as their own experiences related to mitigating the environmental impact of individual projects, and share these experiences with the other Members.... (3) [Members agree] based on ECAs' experiences (e.g. with Environmental Information Exchanges), to explore ways to synthesize common elements and best practices related to environmental review and impact assessment in order to strengthen a framework of common approaches amongst export credit Agencies.... 4 [Members agree to] exchange views on an informal basis with appropriate stakeholders. Export Credits and the Environment: Work-Plan, OECD (Apr. 2000), at http://www.oecd.org/document/7/ 0,2340,en_2649_34181_1888199_1_1_1_1,00.html.
76. In summarizing its goals, the Sixth Revision stated that it would [p]romote coherence between policies regarding officially supported export credits and policies for the protection of the environment, including relevant international agreements and conventions, thereby contributing towards sustainable development[;] [d]evelop common procedures and processes relating to the environmental review of projects benefiting from officially supported export credits, with a view to achieving equivalence among the measures taken by the Members and to reducing the potential for trade distortion[;] [and p]romote good environmental practice and consistent processes for projects benefiting from officially supported export credits, with a view to achieving a high level of environmental protection. Draft Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits: Revision 6, Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, OECD Doc. TD/ECG(2000)11/REV6 (December 14, 2001) available at http:// www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/32/2726700.pdf.
77. Statement by the OECD Secretary-General Donald J. Johnson on Export Credits and the Environment (Apr. 12, 2001), at http://www.oecd.org/ document/33/0,2340,en_2649_34181_2675489_1_1_1_1,00.html.
78. See Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits, OECD Doc., II, para. 4-6 (2003) (including in Category A any project that has the potential to create significantly adverse environmental impacts and including all projects in "sensitive areas" [as listed by Annex I], in Category B any project where the potential environmental impacts are less adverse than those of Category A and where mitigation is available and the effects are reversible, and in Category C any project that has minimal to no likely environmental impact), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/33/ 21684464.pdf.
79. For instance, a Category A project requires an Environmental Impact Assessment that includes an "executive summary; policy, legal and administrative framework; project description; baseline data (involving the existing environmental conditions); environmental impacts; analysis of alternatives; environmental management plan; and record of consultation." This is based on the World Bank's Operational Manual. Id. at Annex II.
80. Interview with OECD personnel secretariat in Paris, France (July 2003).
81. Interview with OECD secretariat in Paris, France (July 2003).
82. Press Release, ECA Watch, Groups blast weak OECD agreement on environment. Loopholes allow export credit support for harmful projects to continue (Dec. 11, 2003), at http://www.eca-watch.org/press/ PressReleaseOECDDecember11.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
83. Id.;
84. see, e.g., ECA Watch, What's New! Vol. 4, No. 2 at § 13 (Feb. 2005), at http://www.eca-watch.org/WhatsNew/WNV4_2005[WhatsNewV4N2.html (demonstrating that ECA Watch continues to follow developments at the OECD).
85. The best known examples during this period were the involvement of ITT and other U.S. companies in the 1973 Chilean coup that overthrew president Allende and the series of bribes paid by Lockheed to Japanese politicians for military contracts.
86. Declaration on Int'l Investment and Multinational Enterprises, in Declarations and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Basic Texts, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME(2000)20, 5-6 (June 21, 1976), revised June 27, 2000, at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/ 2000doc.nsf/4f7adc214b9a685c12569fa005d0ee7/ c125692700623b74c1256991003b5147/SFILE/00085743. pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
87. http://www.oecd.org/documentprint/ 0,2744,en_2649_34889_2349370_1_1_1_1,00.html.
88. Guidelines, supra note 78, Chapter IX.
89. The Guidelines called on MNEs to § respect the right of their employees to be represented by trade unions and other bona fide organisations and engage in constructive negotiations with them on employment conditions; § provide assistance and information to employee representatives; § provide information for a true and fair view of the performance of the enterprise; § observe standards of employment and industrial relations not less favorable than those observed by comparable employees in the host country; § utilise, train and prepare for upgrading their labor force; § provide reasonable prior notice of changes in operations, in particular on intended closures and collective layoffs; § refrain from discriminatory practices in their employment policies; § not exercise unfair influence over bona fide negotiations with employee's representatives; § enable authorized representatives of their employees to conduct negotiations on collective bargaining or labor-management relations with management representatives authorised to take decisions on the matters at hand. Id. at 13-14.
90. For case summaries, see Christopher R. Coxson, The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: Promoting Labor Law Reforms Through the ILO as an Alternative to Imposing Coercive Trade Sanctions, 17 Dick. J. Int'l L. 469 (1999);
91. see also International Encyclopedia on Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Volume 6 (Roger Blanpain ed., 1985).
92. Although Venezuela would not have a National Contact Point in its government, the Procedural Guidance annex to the Council Decision on the Guidelines provides advice and guidance for the U.S. National Contact Point to follow in case of challenges in non-adhering countries. The actual coverage of the Guidelines could be larger still, since the General Policies chapter mentions subcontractors and suppliers of MNEs. See Guidelines, supra note 78 at Chapter II(10).
93. Interview with OECD secretariat in Paris, France (July 2003).
94. Approximately two-thirds of the specific instances concerned company operations in non-adhering countries. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: 2003 Annual Meeting of the National Contact Points, Report by the Chair at 9, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/47/15941397.pdf.
95. Id. at 10-11.
96. Id. at 10.
97. 2003 Annual Meeting, supra note 85, at 12-13.
98. The 2003 Annual Review notes, for example, that practices differ widely in relation to informing parties of the progress in handling specific instances, provision of information to non parties, publication of the fact that a specific instance has been raised, making statements while the specific instance is being considered, publication of the reasons for not agreeing to consider a specific instance, and the naming of parties to a specific instance. Id. at 14.
99. Id. at 14-15. The 2003 Annual Review notes that NCPs differed in their response as to whether the fact that a specific instance concerned business conduct covered by legal, regulatory or administrative procedures would influence their approach to a specific instance. Nine experienced NCPs felt that if could or has already influenced decisions. For example, one experienced NCP was confronted with a specific instance that concerned business conduct that was also the subject of legal proceedings. In this situation, the NCP felt it could not proceed in dealing with the specific instance. Another experienced NCP felt that national legal, regulatory or administrative procedures would not affect their decision. Id. at 33.
100. CIME also formally invited the ILO to all Working Party meetings. See http://www1.oecd.org/media/release/nw00-27a.html.
101. Slaughter, supra note 13, at 196.
102. Id. at 184-85.
103. "International organizations provide the physical contact and aura of legitimacy that translate some of these potential transgovernmental coalitions into active ones.... These coalitions form not only through contacts in the countries but sometimes through an active role by secretariat officials." Krause and Nye, supra note 5, at 337-38.
104. Although an epistemic community need not be linked with a specific IGO or necessarily include government officials, this is often the case. See generally Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 Int'l Org. 1 (1992).
105. Richard B. Stewart, Essay: Administrative Law In The Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 437, 455 (2003).
106. This is reinforced by the observation of Krause and Nye that "With the growth of economic interdependence, more bureaucracies that were once considered domestic become involved in international affairs. Many bureaucracies and agencies of governments have similar interests. In some cases, the similarity of interests is greater across national lines than it is with competing domestic agencies and interests." Krause and Nye, supra note 5, at 337 (emphasis added).
107. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/33/34011915.pdf.
108. The influence can be indirect, as well: As such practices [that is, patterns of regularized policy coordination] become widespread, transgovernmental elite networks are created, linking officials in various governments to one another by ties of common interest, professional orientation, and personal friendship. Even where attitudes are not fundamentally affected and no major deviations from central policy positions occur, the existence of a sense of collegiality may permit the development of flexible bargaining behavior in which concessions need not be requited issue by issue or during each period. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 World Politics 39, 46 (1974). This observation is equally true for nongovernmental officials.
109. Stewart, supra note 95, at 456.
110. Of course, this also means that certain issues are not addressed, or are possibly avoided. For example, the ELSA Committee has not considered issues of female and child labor as seriously as at the World Bank, or labor market flexibility as seriously as at the International Labor Organization.
111. Keohane and Nye, supra note 97, at 53-54.
112. Comments from David Trubek to James Salzman, Comments on Salzman's OECD Chapter - 2/17/04, prepared for NYU workshop (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
113. It is not at all clear that different administrative law procedures have led to a successful MAI negotiation, given the substantive disagreements over the text, but the administrative process certainly helped fan the public outrage over the negotiations that ultimately doomed them.
114. Benedict Kingsbury has described the question as whether the operation of OECD regulatory processes is the direct expression of the common sensibility of national government delegates in their network... or alternatively whether the design of these regulatory processes interposes institutional features, e.g., a layer of fairly independent international bureaucrats between the network and the decisions. E-mail from Benedict Kingbury to James Salzman, Conversation with Jim Salzman re Global Ad Law paper, September 18, 2003 (on file with author).
115. Widely different views on the appropriate transparency, responsiveness, and accountability of government action are not only held across different ministries but across different governments, as well. Thus the United States holds starkly different views on appropriate administrative safeguards compared to Japan, Mexico, or Turkey, yet all are OECD Member states.