Path to democracy? Assessing village elections in China

Journal of Contemporary China

Volumn 18, Issue 60, 2009, Pages 359-378

  O'Brien, Kevin J ^a   Han, Rongbin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; DEMOCRATIZATION; ELECTION; POLITICAL CHANGE; RURAL POLITICS;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST;

EID: 70449688105     PISSN: 10670564     EISSN: 14699400     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10670560902770206     Document Type: Article

References (245)

1. For review essays, see Gunter Schubert, 'Village elections in the PRC: a Trojan horse of democracy?', Project Discussion Paper No. 19, (2002), available at: http://www.uni-duisburg.de/Institute/OAWISS/neu/downloads/pdf/orange/discuss19.pdf (accessed 25 July 2007).
2. Björn Alpermann, 'An assessment of research on village governance in China and suggestions for future applied research', prepared for the China-EU Training Programme of Village Governance, Beijing, (2003), available at: http://www.china.uni-koeln.de/papers/No%202003-1.pdf, (accessed 28 July 2007).
3. Tong Zhihui, 'Cunji Xuanju de Lishi Fazhan he Xueshu Yanjiu' ['Historical development and academic research on village elections'], in Liu Yawei, ed., Wusheng de Geming: Cunmin Zhixuan de Lishi Xianshi he Weilai [Silent Revolution: The History, Reality and Future of Village Elections] (Xi'an: Xibei Daxue Chubanshe, 2002), p. 18.
4. He Xuefeng, 'Cunweihui Xuanju Zhuhuanjie de Diaocha yu Fenxi: Hunansheng Sishigexian Cunweihui Xuanju Xinxi Huifang Huodong Baogao' ['An investigation and analysis of procedures of village committee elections: a report on the data verification of the village committee election in 40 counties in Hunan Province'], available at: http://www.chinarural.org/news_show.aspx?cols=1812&ID=11780 (accessed 1 December 2006). On an 86% turnout rate in 120 villages in Heilongjiang and Anhui.
5. see David Zweig and Chung Siu Fung, 'Elections, democratic values, economic development in rural China', Journal of Contemporary China 16(50), (February 2007), pp. 25-26. On 71% turnout in 12 Anhui villages.
6. see Qingshan Tan and Xin Qiushui, 'Village election and governance: do villagers care?', Journal of Contemporary China 16(53), (November 2007), p. 585. For 48% turnout (excluding proxy votes) in 12 Jiangsu counties.
7. see Yang Zhong and Jie Chen, 'To vote or not to vote: an analysis of peasants' participation in Chinese village elections', Comparative Political Studies 35(6), (August 2002), pp. 692-693.
8. See Qingshan Tan, 'Building institutional rules and procedures: village election in China', Policy Sciences 37(1), (March 2004), pp. 1-22.
9. Baogang He, Rural Democracy in China: The Role of Village Elections (New York: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 24, 39.
10. Sun Long and Tong Zhihui, 'The standardization of villager committee election procedures', available at: http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1096.pdf (accessed 29 March 2007).
11. 'Election observation report: Fujian Province village elections, People's Republic of China' (Washington, DC: International Republican Institute, 2003).
12. Melanie Manion, 'How to assess village elections in China', Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), (June 2009).
13. Tianjian Shi, 'Village committee elections in China: institutionalist tactics for democracy', World Politics 51(3), (April 1999), pp. 385-412.
14. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions aboutUncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. ix-x, also ch. 3.
15. Alfred Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), chs 5 and 8.
16. See also Qingshan Tan, Village Elections in China: Democratizing the Countryside (Lewiston, NY: Edward Mellen, 2006).
17. He, Rural Democracy in China.
18. Jamie P. Horsley, 'Village elections: training ground for democracy', China Business Review 28(2), (March-April 2001), pp. 44-52.
19. Sebastian L. Mazzuca, 'Reconceptualizing democratization: access to power versus excercise of power', in Gerardo L. Munck, ed., Regimes and Democracy in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
20. On the relationship of village elections to temple associations, the tax-for-fee reform, and anti-corruption efforts, see Lily L. Tsai, 'The struggle for village public goods provision: informal institutions of accountability in rural China'
21. John James Kennedy, 'The implementation of village elections and tax-for-fee reform in rural northwest China'
22. Richard Levy, 'Village elections, transparency, and anticorruption: Henan and Guangdong Provinces', all in Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman, eds, Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
23. For a discussion of the grassroots 'public sphere' and the role village elections play in it, see Mao Dan and Ren Qiang, Zhongguo Nongcun Gonggong Lingyu de Shengzhang: Zhengzhi Shehuixue Shiye li de Cunmin Zizhi zhu Wenti [The Growth of Public Sphere in Rural China: Village Self-Governance from the Perspective of Political Sociology] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 2006).
24. David Collier, Fernando Daniel Hidalgo and Andra Olivia Maciuceanu, 'Essentially contested concepts: debates and applications', Journal of Political Ideologies 11(3), (October 2006).
25. Mazzuca, 'Reconceptualizing democratization'.
26. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, 'Democracy with adjectives: conceptual innovation in comparative research', World Politics 49(3), (April 1997), p. 434.
27. also Aurel Croissant and Wolfgang Merkel, 'Introduction: democratization in the early twenty-first century'
28. Wolfgang Merkel, 'Embedded and defective democracies'
29. Leonardo Morlino, 'What is a "good" democracy?'
30. Collier and Levitsky, 'Democracy with adjectives'.
31. Nowadays, few would say that democracy can be reduced to majority rule. However, a procedural minimum definition can encourage such a view.
32. Collier and Levitsky, 'Democracy with adjectives'.
33. For other research on 'democracy with adjectives', see Croissant and Merkel, 'Introduction'
34. Merkel, 'Embedded and defective democracies'
35. Morlino, 'What is a "good" democracy?'.
36. Mazzuca, 'Reconceptualizing democratization', p. 1. We depart from Mazzuca, however, and follow 'third generation' theorists, by treating improvements in the 'quality of democracy' as an element of democratization.
37. For similar 'third generation' understandings of democratization, see Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, eds, Assessing the Quality of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005)
38. Guillermo O'Donnell, Jorge Vargas Cullell and Osvaldo M. Iazzetta, eds, The Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004).
39. On the introduction of elections, see Schubert, 'Village elections in the PRC'
40. Shi, 'Village committee elections in China'
41. Daniel Kelliher, 'The Chinese debate over village self-government', China Journal 37, (January 1997).
42. Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, 'Accommodating "democracy" in a one-party state: introducing village elections in China', China Quarterly 162, (June 2000).
43. On voting behavior, see Zhong and Chen, 'To vote or not to vote'.
44. Baogang He, 'A survey study of voting behavior and political participation in Zhejiang', Japanese Journal of Political Science 7(3), (2006). Attempts have begun to explore the three other components of village self-governance. In his report to the EU-China Training Programme on Village Governance, Björn Alpermann suggested that more attention be paid to post-election administration, decisionmaking, and control: Alpermann, 'An assessment of research on village governance in China'.
45. On the effects of elections, more generally, see Guo Zhenglin and Thomas Bernstein, 'The impact of elections on the village structure of power: the relations between village committees and village Party branches', Journal of Contemporary China 13(39), (May 2004).
46. Björn Alpermann, 'The post-election administration of Chinese villages', China Journal 46, (July 2001).
47. John James Kennedy, 'The face of "grassroots democracy" in rural China: real versus cosmetic elections', Asian Survey 42(3), (May/June 2002).
48. Lianjiang Li, 'The empowering effect of village elections in China', Asian Survey 43(4), (July/August 2003).
49. Loren Brandt and Matthew A. Turner, 'The usefulness of corruptible elections', Economics and Society 19(3), (November 2007).
50. Melanie Manion, 'Democracy, community, trust: the impact of elections in rural China', Comparative Political Studies 39(3), (April 2006).
51. 'Zuohao Minzheng Gongzuo, Qieshi Weihu Renmin Hefa Quanyi: Fang Minzhengbu Buzhang Li Xueju' ['Improve civil affairs work and earnestly defend people's legal rights: interview with the Minister of Civil Affairs Li Xueju'], Renquan [Human Rights] no. 5, (2004), p. 6.
52. Björn Alpermann, 'Provincial legislation on village elections', Zeitschrift für Chinesisches Recht no. 1, (2007)
53. also Yuan Dayi, 'Cunmin Zizhi de Xianzai' ['The current situation of village self-governance'], paper prepared for EU-China Training Programme on Village Governance Conference, Beijing, 5-7 April 2006, available at: http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=92565 (accessed 2 August 2007).
54. See Jorgen Elklit, 'The Chinese village committee electoral system', China Information 11(4), (1997), pp. 4-5.
55. Kevin J. O'Brien, 'Villagers, elections, and citizenship in contemporary China', Modern China 27(4), (October 2001), p. 420.
56. Alpermann, 'Provincial legislation on village elections'.
57. For data on election committees in 116 villages in six provinces, see Xu Zhigang, Liu Mingxing and Tao Ran, 'Cunzhuang Xuanju Zuiyou Guize de Fei Yizhixing' ['Incongruence in optimal rules for village elections'], Zhongguo Nongcun Guancha [China Rural Survey] no. 6, (2006), pp. 62-71. In the 2002 elections, village assemblies, village groups, or village representative assemblies selected election committee members in 98% of Shaanxi's villages. See 'Table of 2002 village elections in Shaanxi', available at: http://www.chinarural.org/news_show.aspx?cols=1810&ID=35295 (accessed 5 August 2007).
58. In Shaanxi's 2002 elections, for example, 79% of election committees were chaired by the Party secretary and 7% were chaired by the village committee director. See 'Table of 2002 village elections in Shaanxi'. Similar rates were found in other provinces: 87% and 6% in Fujian's 2003 elections, 91% and 7% in Chongqing's 2004 elections. See 'Table of 2003 village elections in Fujian', available at: http://www.chinarural.org/news_show.aspx?cols=1810&ID=35282 (accessed 11 August 2007).
59. 'Table of 2004 village elections in Chongqing', available at: http://www.chinarural.org/news_show.aspx?cols=1811&ID=35745 (accessed 11 August 2007). On election committees in Jiangsu that are 'usually' led by village Party secretaries.
60. see Zhong and Chen, 'To vote or not to vote', p. 696. In some places, local leaders continue to impede election committees. For examples from Shaanxi and Jiangxi.
61. see Mu Ge, 'Xuanweihui he Cunweihui de Jiaoliang' ['The struggle between an election committee and the village committee'], available at: http://www.96990.cn/Blog/3/11206.shtml (accessed 6 August 2007).
62. Xiao Tangbiao and Qiu Xinyou, 'Cunweihui Xuanju Zhong de Xuanju Weiyuanhui' ['Election committees in village elections'], Qiushi [Seeking Truth] no. 2, (2002), pp. 60-62.
63. For disputes that resulted in lawsuits, see 'Wu Shaohui Bufu Xuanmin Zige Chuli Jueding An' ['The case of Wu Shaohui disagreeing with a voter eligibility decision'], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao [Bulletin of People's Supreme Court, PRC] no. 6, (2003), p. 29.
64. Zhang Xinguo and Chen Junxian, 'Nongjiafei Jiafei le Xuanjuquan' ['Losing voter eligibility owing to marriage to a non-rural resident'], Jiangsu Nongcun Jingji [Jiangsu Rural Economy] no. 10, (2002), p. 34
65. 'Chen Chencai Xuanmin Zige An' ['The case of Chen Chencai's voter eligibility'], available at: http://www.gdcourts.gov.cn/alxc/ms/t20031225_2684.htm (accessed 4 August 2007).
66. 'Table of 2002 village elections in Shaanxi'.
67. Alpermann, 'Provincial legislation on village elections', p. 5. On opening the candidate selection process.
68. see Kennedy, 'The implementation of village elections', pp. 63-64.
69. Ma Fuyun, 'Cunweihui Zhijie Xuanju de Moshi Yanjiu' ['Research on the election system of village committees'], Zhongguo Nongcun Guancha [China Rural Survey] no. 4, (2006), pp. 65-72.
70. 'Zhejiang Jinhua Wu Houxuanren Xuanju Jiang Quanmian Tuiguang' ['Elections in Jinhua, Zhejiang without pre-selected candidates will be popularized'], Lingdao Juece Xinxi [Information on Leadership Policy] no. 15, (April 2005), p. 22.
71. Xiao Mei, 'Tongzhou: Cunweihui Xuanju Jiang Changshi Wu Houxuanren Yicixing Zhijie Toupiao Xuanju' ['Tongzhou: one time ballot without pre-selected candidates will be tried in village committee elections'], available at: http://www.tz.gov.cn/tzdz/showinfo/showInfo.aspx?InfoID=2edb6a04-178d-4553-95ad-5aeb18f0f8f8 (accessed 6 August 2007).
72. Huang Hui and Li Qing, 'Jiangxi Xuanchu Shoupi Zijian Haixuan Cunguan' ['The first village officials by selfnominated sea election are elected in Jiangxi'], Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily], (31 October 2005). In the 28 provinces in which it is allowed, write-in candidates have on occasion been elected.
73. Pan Jia'en and Jiang Yunxiang, 'Yuecun Beihou de Gushi' ['Inside story of Yue village'], Zhongguo Gaige Nongcun Ban [China Reform Rural Edition] no. 3, (2003), pp. 39-41.
74. Elklit, 'The Chinese village committee electoral system'.
75. O'Brien, 'Villagers, elections, and citizenship in contemporary China'.
76. Ma Wenquan, 'Guanyu Cunmin Zizhi de Shijian yu Sikao' ['Practice and reflection on village self-governance'], available at: http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=23806 (accessed 6 August 2007).
77. Final candidates are usually chosen according to the number of nominating votes received, by a second round of voting, or by the village representative assembly or election committee. Xu Zhigang et al., 'Cunzhuang Xuanju Zuiyou Guize de Fei Yizhixing', p. 68.
78. Dai Lichao, 'Gaopingcun Xuanju Guancha' ['Observation of Gaoping village election'], in Lianjiang Li, Guo Zhenglin and Xiao Tangbiao, eds, Cunweihui Xuanju Guancha [Observation of Village Elections] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 2001), pp. 44-112.
79. Elklit, 'The Chinese village committee electoral system', p. 9.
80. Song Yuehong, 'Fujiansheng 2000 Niandu Cunweihui Xuanju Tongji yu Huifang Diaocha Shuju Bijiao' ['Comparison of statistics and data verification of 2000 village elections in Fujian Province'], available at: http://www.chinarural.org/news_show.aspx?cols=1812&ID=11774 (accessed 6 August 2007).
81. He Xuefeng, 'Cunweihui Xuanju Zhuhuanjie de Diaocha yu Fenxi'. Campaign speeches have been encouraged by some local officials to combat unlawful campaign activities, such as attracting votes via coercion or buying votes with cash, gifts, or banquets. The logic is that institutionalizing campaigning will make elections less dependent on personal resources and also offer candidates regular channels to present themselves.
82. Zhang Rongmin, 'Qiantan Guifan he Zhili Cunweihui Xuanju zhong de Jingzheng Xingwei' ['A preliminary discussion of regulating and managing campaign activities in village elections'], paper prepared for EU-China Training Programme on Village Governance Conference, Beijing, 5-7 April 2006, available at: http://www.chinaelections.com/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=91176 (accessed 6 August 2007).
83. The Carter Center, 'Report of the Fifth Mission on Chinese village elections', (20 June-3 July 1998), p. 4.
84. Alpermann, 'Provincial legislation on village elections', p. 6. One source claimed that over 90% of villages in 11 provinces used secret ballot booths.
85. Shi Weimin, 'Zhongguo Cunmin Zizhi Zouxiang Weilai' ['China village self-governance in the future'], paper prepared for EU-China Training Programme on Village Governance Conference, Beijing, 5-7 April 2006, available at: http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=92552 (accessed 6 August 2007).
86. See also Fan Yu, 'Cunweihui Xuanju Zhidu de Yanjin ji Tedian' ['Evolution and characteristics of the village committee electoral system'], Zhongguo Nongcun Guancha [China Rural Survey] no. 1, (2006), p. 63.
87. He, Rural Democracy in China, p. 33.
88. 'Table of 2002 village elections in Shaanxi'.
89. O'Brien, 'Villagers, elections, and citizenship in contemporary China', pp. 421-422.
90. The Carter Center, 'The Carter Center delegation to observe village elections in China', (4-16 March 1997), p. 15.
91. The Carter Center, 'Carter Center delegation report: village elections in China and agreement on cooperation with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, People's Republic of China', (2-15 March 1998), pp. 11-12.
92. International Republican Institute, 'Election observation report: Sichuan, People's Republic of China', (November 1998), p. 11.
93. The Carter Center, 'Observation of village elections in Fujian and the conference to revise the national procedures on villager committee elections', (1-7 August 2000), p. 22.
94. Alpermann, 'Provincial legislation on village elections', p. 8.
95. Tan, Village Elections in China, pp. 234-250.
96. Yu Weiliang, ed., Cunmin Weiyuanhui Xuanju Guicheng Jiaopian Shuoming [Overhead Transparencies on Village Elections: A Handbook], EU-China Training Programme on Village Governance, (2003), p. 58.
97. Alpermann, 'Provincial legislation on village elections', p. 8.
98. Xiao Tangbiao, Qiu Xinyou, Tang Xiaoteng et al., Duowei Shijiao zhong de Cunmin Zhixuan [Direct Village Elections from Multiple Perspectives] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehuikexue Chubanshe, 2001), p. 27.
99. Out of 19,320 villages, 91% had election assemblies, 60% set up voting stations, 92% provided secret ballot booths and 71% used roving boxes. 'Table of 2002 village elections in Jiangxi', available at: http://www.chinarural.org/news_show.aspx?cols=1810&ID=35270 (accessed 9 August 2007).
100. He, Rural Democracy in China, pp. 59, 150, 214.
101. On screening candidates and circumscribed rights of recall, see Alpermann, 'Provincial legislation on village elections', pp. 4-5, 10.
102. For more on problematic recall efforts, see Xin Wang and Du Ke, 'Bamian Nan, Nan Zai Hechu?' ['Difficult to recall: where the difficulties lie?'], Zhongguo Gaige Nongcun Ban [China Reform Rural Edition] no. 10, (2004), pp. 26-27.
103. Li Shan, 'Minxuan Cunguan: Feifa Bamian Shifei Duo' ['Elected village officials: illegally recalling them causes many problems'], Jiangsu Nongcun Jingji [Jiangsu Rural Economy] no. 1, (2003), pp. 42-43.
104. 'Cunmin Bamian Buliao Cunzhuren: Wenti Chuzai Nali?' ['Villages cannot recall village committee chairs: where are the problems?'], Lingdao Juece Xinxi [Information on Leadership Policy] no. 13, (April 2007), p. 22.
105. On a 'hoodlum election' in Shaanxi, see Kennedy, 'The face of "grassroots democracy" in rural China', p. 479. The Ministry of Civil Affairs has acknowledged many of these problems.
106. See Guan Xiaofeng, 'Progress and problems mark elections', available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/10/content_6142535.htm (accessed 20 December 2007).
107. also Kevin J. O'Brien, 'Improving election procedures: some modest proposals', unpublished paper, (23 April 2006), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1/41157092.
108. Qingshan Tan, 'Building democratic infrastructure: village electoral institutions', Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), (June 2009). On vote-buying suggesting that votes have value and interference by townships may be declining.
109. see John James Kennedy, 'Legitimacy with Chinese characteristics: "two increases, one reduction"', Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), (June 2009).
110. Li, 'The empowering effect of village elections in China'.
111. also Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O'Brien, 'The struggle over village elections', in Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds, The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reform (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 140-143.
112. Lianjiang Li, 'Elections and popular resistance in rural China', China Information 15(2), (2001), pp. 10-18.
113. John James Kennedy, Scott Rozelle and Yaojiang Shi, 'Elected leaders and collective land: farmers' evaluation of village leaders' performance in rural China', Journal of Chinese Political Science 9(1), (Spring 2004).
114. Brandt and Turner, 'The usefulness of corruptible elections'. On elections, both competitive and noncompetitive, increasing the share of public expenditure in a village's budget.
115. see Shuna Wang and Yang Yao, 'Grassroots democracy and local governance: evidence from rural China', World Development 35(10), (October 2007).
116. He, Rural Democracy in China, pp. 109-111.
117. Kennedy, 'The face of "grassroots democracy" in rural China'.
118. Jie Chen, 'Popular support for village selfgovernment in China: intensity and sources', Asian Survey 45(6), (November/December 2005)
119. Manion, 'Democracy, community, trust'.
120. Kennedy, 'Legitimacy with Chinese characteristics'.
121. O'Brien, 'Villagers, elections, and citizenship in contemporary China'.
122. See also, Susanne Brandstädter and Gunter Schubert, 'Democratic thought and practice in rural China', Democratization 12(5), (December 2005), pp. 810-813.
123. He, Rural Democracy in China, p. 50
124. On, however, villages with well-run elections in which civic consciousness has not noticeably increased, see Lily Tsai, Accountability without Democracy: Solidarity Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 198, 223-226.
125. Li, 'The empowering effect of village elections in China'.
126. Gunter Schubert and Chen Xuelian, 'Village elections in contemporary China: new spaces for generating regime legitimacy? Experiences from Lishu County', China Perspectives, no. 3 (2007), pp. 12-27.
127. Manion, 'Democracy, community, trust'.
128. See Mao Dan and Ren Qiang, Zhongguo Nongcun Gonggong Lingyu de Shengzhang, pp. 53-68.
129. Thomas P. Bernstein ['Village democracy and its limits', ASIEN99, (April 2006), p. 30] writes: 'evenwhen village electionswork well, the power of elected village committees is limited because they necessarily functionwithin an authoritarian political environment that is not structured to respond to the demands of constituents'.On data that suggest that village committees 'are still in the long shadowof township governments and village Party secretaries'
130. see Tan and Xin, 'Village election and governance', p. 596.
131. also Wang and Yao, 'Grassroots democracy and local governance', pp. 1635-1636.
132. In a suburban village outside Tianjin that O'Brien visited in 1999, it was clear that the Muslim elders who managed the mosque dominated community decision making. Much younger village committee members appeared to be little more than their errand boys.
133. For a summary of reasons why local governments interfere in village affairs, see Alpermann, 'An assessment of research on village governance in China'.
134. also Bernstein, 'Village democracy and its limits', p. 33
135. On ways, however, that townships support free and fair elections, see He, Rural Democracy in China, pp. 142-146.
136. Alpermann, 'The post-election administration of Chinese villages', p. 47.
137. Ibid., p. 46.
138. also Xu Wang, Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Village Self-Government in Rural China (New York: Nova Science, 2003), p. 67.
139. Björn Alpermann, 'Institutionalizing village governance in China', Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), (June 2009).
140. See Mao Dan and Ren Qiang, Zhongguo Nongcun Gonggong Lingyu de Shengzhang, p. 52.
141. For a collection of such cases, see Xu Yong and Xiang Jiquan, eds, Cunmin Zizhi Jincheng zhong de Xiangcun Guanxi [Township and Village Relations in the Process of Village Self-Governance] (Wuhan: Huazhong Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 2003).
142. For case studies and statistical analysis of weak village committees, and a conclusion that 'even in villages with extremely good implementation of democratic reforms, citizens do not necessarily have a great deal of leverage over officials, accurate information about their activities, or a particularly strong sense of public duty'.
143. see Tsai, Accountability without Democracy, ch. 7, quoted text on p. 190.
144. Xu Liming, Zhang Linsheng and Wang Zhiheng, Nongcun Shuifei Gaige Chuyi [Opinions on Rural Tax-for- Fee Reform] (Beijing: Zhongguo Nongye Kexue Jishu Chubanshe, 2002), p. 158.
145. also Xu Yong, 'Cunmin Zizhi, Zhengfu Renwu ji Shuifei Gaige' ['Village self-governance, government tasks and tax-for-fee reform'], Zhongguo Nongcun Jingji [Chinese Rural Economy] no. 11, (2001).
146. He Xuefeng and Wang Ximing, 'Cunzu de Guimo yu Ganbu' ['Scale of village groups and their cadres'], in Xu Yong and Xiang Jiquan, eds, Cunmin Zizhi Jincheng zhong de Xiangcun Guanxi, p. 502.
147. Cho Soo-sung, 'On the relationship between Chinese township/town governments and villager committees'
148. Zhang Guangxiu, 'A study of the relationship between villager self-government and basic-level government'
149. and Cheng Tongshun, 'The relationship between the township/town government and the village in the context of villager self-government in China', papers all prepared for the International Symposium on Villager Self-Government and the Development of Rural Society in China, sponsored by the Carter Center and the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Beijing, 2-5 September 2001.
150. Liu Tao, 'Shuifei Gaige hou de Zhibiaohua: Chongxin Jiedu Xiang, Cun, Zu, Min Guanxi' ['Target-setting after tax-for-fee reform: rethinking relations among townships, villages, small groups, and villagers'], available at: http://www.snzg.cn/article/show.php?itemid-6758/page-1.html (accessed 2 October 2007).
151. For this incident and county pressures placed on townships, which are then transmitted to villages, see Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, 'Selective policy implementation in rural China', Comparative Politics 31(2), (January 1999), p. 176.
152. Lan Yuanjun, 'Liangtou Shouqi hou Mo Chulai de Luzi' ['A way out of pressure from both sides'], Xiangzhen Luntan [Township Forum] no. 11, (2001), p. 14.
153. Mao Dan and Ren Qiang, Zhongguo Nongcun Gonggong Lingyu de Shengzhang, p. 53.
154. See Tsai, Accountability without Democracy, ch. 7.
155. also, Yuan Song, 'Gonggongpin Gongji Zhikun: Fucun Diaocha Lianzai (9)' ['Difficulties in public goods provision: ninth in a series of reports from the investigation of Fu village'], available at: http://www.snzg.cn/article/show.php?itemid-7233/page-1.html (accessed 2 October 2007).
156. One counter-trend, which should make elected cadres more accountable to voters, is that 'villagers' evaluations' (minzhu pingchou) are now sometimes consulted when township authorities decide on a village cadres' salary. But even in these cases, baseline salary is usually set by the township according to its own criteria. Cheng Sinian, 'Rang Cunmin Gei Cunguan Ping Gongzi de Banfa Hao' ['It is a good method to let villagers grade village cadres' salary'], Nongcun Fazhan Luncong [Rural Development Forum] no. 10, (2000), p. 45.
157. Tian Yuanxin, Qu Xuan and Li Dao, 'Cunmin Gei Cun Ganbu Ding Baochou' ['Villagers assess how much village cadres should earn'], Xiangzhen Luntan [Township Forum] no. 3, (2005), p. 13
158. also Alpermann, 'The post-election administration of Chinese villages', p. 68.
159. This is not a nationwide practice, though it has been implemented widely. For details, see Ning Zekui, Liu Hailiang, Wang Zhengbing and Chai Haofang, 'Cunganbu Xiang Hechu Qu' ['Where village cadres are heading'], Zhongguo Nongcun Guancha [China Rural Survey] no. 1, (2005), p. 60.
160. also Zhong and Chen, 'To vote or not to vote', p. 698.
161. Fubing Su and Dali Yang, 'Elections, governance, and accountability in rural China', Asian Perspective 29(4), (2005).
162. On township supervision of village finances in five provinces, see Alpermann, 'Institutionalizing village governance in China'.
163. Song Yuehong, 'Cunmin Zizhi Zhong de Liangwei Guanxi' ['Relations between village Party branches and village committees in village self-governance'], Zhongguo Gaige Nongcun Ban [China Reform Rural Edition] no. 7, (2002), p. 47.
164. Yang Jirong, 'Lun Nongcun Jiceng Dangnei Minzhu yu Cunmin Zizhi de Xianjie yu Hudong' ['On grassroots democracy within the Party and its connection and interaction with village self-governance'], Lilun yu Gaige [Theory and Reform] no. 6, (2003), pp. 33-36.
165. Chu Zhi, 'Cunzhishu Zenyang Danghao Yibashou' ['How can village Party secretaries perform well as number one'], Dangyuan Ganbu Zhiyou [Party Members' and Cadres' Friend] no. 9, (2002), pp. 12-13.
166. also Zhong and Chen, 'To vote or not to vote', p. 697.
167. Schubert and Chen, 'Village elections in contemporary China', p. 19.
168. He, Rural Democracy in China, p. 114.
169. On the growing power of village committees, but their continuing secondary status, see Tan and Xin, 'Village election and governance', pp. 588-593.
170. also Wang, Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry, pp. 143-147.
171. Liang Kaijin and He Xuefeng, Cunji Zuzhi Zhidu Anpai yu Chuangzhi [Institutional Arrangements and Innovations in Village-Level Organizations] (Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 1999), p. 118.
172. Dong Jiang'ai, 'Cunji Xuanju zhong Xingcheng de Liangwei Guanxi Duili ji Chulu' ['Outbreak of rivalry between Party branches and village committees in village elections and its solution'], Huazhong Shifan Daxue Xuebao, Sheke Ban [Journal of Huazhong Normal University, Social Sciences Edition] 44(1), (January 2005), p. 56.
173. Baogang He, 'The theory and practice of Chinese grassroots governance: five models', Japanese Journal of Political Science 4(2), (2003), pp. 308-310.
174. He, Rural Democracy in China, pp. 112-113.
175. On the relative power of Party secretaries and committee directors hinging on control over income-producing enterprises and land, see Jean C. Oi and Scott Rozelle, 'Elections and power: the locus of decision-making in Chinese villages', China Quarterly 162, (June 2000), pp. 513-539.
176. See Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, Cunmin Zizhi yu Xingzhengquan de Chongtu [Conflicts between Village Self-Governance and Administrative Power] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2004), pp. 145-146.
177. also Xu Zhiyong, 'Xuanju Zhihou: Lijicun Cunmin Zizhi Diaocha' ['Post-election: investigation of village selfgovernance in Liji'], Zhongguo Gaige Nongcun Ban [China Reform: Rural Edition] no. 2, (2003), pp. 10-14.
178. Bernstein, 'Village democracy and its limits', p. 36.
179. Zhang Jingping, 'Jingxuan Cunguan de Jiaoliang' ['Struggle in the village election'], Nanfeng Chuang [Southern Exposure] no. 9, (May 2005), pp. 30-35.
180. Cui Shixin, 'Cunguan Weihe Yao Cizhi' ['Why village heads want to resign'], Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], (21 March 2001).
181. also Xu Zhiyong, 'Xuanju Zhihou'. For regulations concerning control of the village seal, see He, Rural Democracy in China, p. 112.
182. Guo Zhenglin, 'Cunmin Xuanju hou de Nongcun Dangzheng Eryuan Quanli Jiegou' ['The bicameral power structure of the rural Party apparatus and its administration in the wake of villagers' elections'], paper prepared for the International Symposium on Villagers' Self-Government and the Development of Rural Society in China, sponsored by the Carter Center and the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Beijing, 2-5 September 2001, p. 253.
183. 'Summarizing table of seventh round village elections in Jiangsu Province', available at: http://www.chinarural.org/news_show.aspx?cols1/41810&ID1/435289 (accessed 12 December 2006).
184. Percentages are calculated from the following tables: 'Table of 2002 village elections in Shaanxi'.
185. 'Table of 2002 village elections in Shanghai', available at: http://www.chinarural.org/news_show.aspx?cols1/41810&ID1/435331.
186. 'Table of 2003 village elections in Fujian'; all accessed 12 December 2006. For similar statistics on earlier elections in a number of provinces.
187. see Pastor and Tan, 'The meaning ofChina's village elections', p. 140.
188. For data, mostly fromthe 1990s, that show an increasing number on non-communists on village committees, see He, Rural Democracy in China, pp. 107-108.
189. Guo and Bernstein, 'The impact of elections on the village structure of power'.
190. Sylvia Chan, 'Villagers' representative assemblies: towards democracy or centralism?', China: An International Journal 1(2), (2003), p. 192.
191. Baogang He, ('The theory and practice of Chinese grassroots governance', p. 309) also speaks of 'a deliberate attempt to strengthen the Party branch'
192. 'Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Cunmin Weiyuanhui Huanjie Xuanju Gongzuo de Tongzhi' ['Circular by General Offices of Party Central Committee and State Council on further improving the work of next round village committee elections), (14 July 2002), available at: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61679.htm (accessed 1 December 2007).
193. also Bernstein, 'Village democracy and its limits', p. 37.
194. Guo and Bernstein, 'The impact of elections on the village structure of power', pp. 272, 275.
195. He, Rural Democracy in China, p. 119.
196. For Shandong, see Dazhong Ribao [The Masses Daily], (25 September 2004).
197. for Henan, see http://news. sohu.com/20050715/n226325095.shtml.
198. for Hunan, see http://www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2004year/2004-06-01/ 26/443107.shtml.
199. for Anhui, see http://www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2004/2004-11-07/26/503213.shtml.
200. for Hainan, see http://www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2004year/2004-07-23/26/463605.shtml.
201. for Guangdong, see http://www.southcn.com/news/gdnews/gdtodayimportant/200501250071.htm
202. for Shanxi, see http://cpc.people. com.cn/GB/64093/64100/5946051.html (all accessed 30 November 2007)
203. Wang Kequn, 'Nongyeshui Quxiao hou Xiangzhen Guanli Tizhi Yudao de Wenti' ['Problems encountered in the township management system after abolishing the agricultural tax'], Zhongguo Fazhan Guancha [China Development Observation] no. 5, (2005), pp. 38-40.
204. Guangdong also advocates 70% overlap of branches and committees. See Richard Levy, 'The village self-government movement', China Information 17(1), (2003), p. 34.
205. Dang Guoying, 'Liangwei Heyi Shige Hao Banfa' ['Concurrent holding of offices is a good solution'], Zhongguo Gaige (Nongcun Ban) [China Reform (Rural Edition)] no. 2, (2004), p. 28.
206. Party members remain subject to Party discipline, and they may also be more accommodating to township leaders. Lu Fuxing, 'Yijiantiao de Shixiao yu Lilun zhi Chayi' ['Gaps between real effects and theoretical implications of concurrent office-holding'], Hunan Gong'an Gaodeng Zhuanke Xuexiao Xuebao [Journal of Hunan Public Security College] 16(5), (October 2004), p. 17. Some researchers (Lianjiang Li, personal communication, November 2007) argue that what really matters is not who serves as both the secretary and director, but how one gets the two positions.
207. Zhang Yuanhong, 'Liangwei Heyi Qineng Tuiguang' ['Concurrent office-holding should not be promoted'], Zhongguo Gaige [China Reform] no. 8, (2001), pp. 56-57.
208. Chang Zizhong, 'Cunliangwei Yijiantiao Wenti Baicun Tiaocha' ['One-hundred-village survey on concurrent office-holding in village committees and party branches'], Xiangzhen Luntan [Township Forum] no. 7, (2007), pp. 9-10.
209. Qin Junbo, 'Cunzhishu Jianren Cunzhuren Ying Huanxing' ['Concurrent-holding of Party secretary and village head positions should be deferred'], Xiangzhen Luntan [Township Forum] no. 3, (2002), p. 12.
210. Chang Zizhong, 'Cunliangwei Yijiantiao Wenti Baicun Tiaocha'.
211. Qin Junbo 'Cunzhishu Jianren Cunzhuren Ying Huanxing'. Some authors argue that concurrent office-holding will help resolve personal conflicts between party secretaries and village committee directors, but cannot remedy organizational conflicts or reduce disputes over authority.
212. Xu Zengyang and Ren Baoyu, 'Yijiantiao Zhenneng Jiejue Liangwei Chongtu Ma: Cunzhibu yu Cunweihui Chongtu de Sanzhong Leixing ji Jiejue Silu' ['Will concurrent office-holding resolve conflicts between the two organizations? Three types of conflict between village committees and Party branches and one possible resolution'], Zhongguo Nongcun Guancha [China Rural Survey] no 1, (2002), pp. 69-74.
213. Lily L. Tsai, 'Solidarity groups, informal accountability, and local public goods provision in rural China', American Political Science Review 101(2), (May 2007)
214. Lily L. Tsai, 'Cadres, temple and lineage institutions, and governance in rural China', China Journal no. 48, (July 2002).
215. Bernstein, 'Village democracy and its limits', p. 38. In Lishu County, Jilin, like much of the Northeast, clans are not important power-brokers.
216. See Schubert and Chen, 'Village elections in contemporary China', p. 20.
217. Xu Yong, Zhongguo Nongcun Cunmin Zizhi [Village Self-Government in Rural China] (Wuhan: Huazhong Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 1997), pp. 354-366.
218. Yu Jianrong, 'Yao Jingti Zongzu Shili dui Nongcun Jiceng Zhengquan de Yingxiang' ['Be alert to clan influences on rural grassroots government'], Jiangsu Shehui Kexue [Jiangsu Social Sciences] no. 4, (2004), pp. 7-8.
219. Kennedy, 'The face of "grassroots democracy" in rural China', pp. 480-481.
220. For evidence, however, that elections can also produce balanced village committees and mitigate lineage conflict, see Kennedy, 'The implementation of village elections', pp. 67-68.
221. On declining clan influence overall, but continuing relevance especially in poorer, agricultural, and single surname dominant villages, see He, Rural Democracy in China, pp. 177-194.
222. Villagers claimed that this confrontation was even more intense than those that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Miao Yuexia, 'Xiangcun Minjian Zongjiao yu Cunmin Zizhi: Yixiang Shehui Ziben Yanjiu' ['Rural religion and village self-governance: research on social capital'], Zhejiang Shehui Kexue [Zhejiang Social Sciences] no. 6, (November 2006), pp. 99-104. In some locations, temples and churches provide an alternative form of public accountability. Tsai, Accountability without Democracy.
223. He Xuefeng, 'Dangqian Cunmin Zizhi Yanjiu Zhong Xuyao Chengqing de Ruogan Wenti' ['Some problems in current studies of villagers' self-government'], Zhongguo Nongcun Guancha [China Rural Survey] no. 2, (2002), pp. 66-67.
224. Yu Jianrong, 'Jingti Hei'e Shili Dui Nongcun Jiceng Zhengquan de Qinru' ['Be alert to the invasion of evil forces into rural grassroots government'], Juece Zixun [Policy Making Consultation] no. 8, (2003), pp. 34-35.
225. Sun Chunlong, 'Ruci Cunmin Zizhi' ['What village self-governance is like'], Xin Xibu [New West] no. 9, (2004), pp. 8-11.
226. Liu Lixin, Pao Jinxuan and Zhang Lingzhi, 'Hei'e Shili Ranzhi Nongcun Jiceng Zhengquan Toushi' ['Investigation of evil forces encroaching on rural grassroots governance'], Sanyue Feng [March Wind] no. 4, (2004), pp. 7-9.
227. Xu Liming, 'Cunmin Zizhi de Shehui Kunjing' ['Social predicament of village self-governance'], Zhonggong Zhengzhou Shiwei Dangxiao Xuebao [Journal of the Party School of Zhengzhou Municipal Committee] no. 3, (2005), p. 52.
228. Wang Jinhong, 'Liangwei Maodun: Jingyan Fenxi yu Lilun Piping' ['Conflict between Party branches and village committees: empirical analysis and theoretical critique'], Huazhong Shifan Daxue Xuebao, Sheke Ban [Journal of Huazhong Normal University, Social Sciences Edition] 44(5), (September 2005), pp. 18-24.
229. For an example, see 'Nongcun Queshao Shenme?' ['What is lacking in rural areas?'], available at: http://www.lwjx.com.cn/bbs/dv_rss.asp?s=xhtml&boardid=6&id=3210&page=15 (accessed 15 December 2007).
230. The term was first made popular by David Mayhew and was brought to the China field by Melanie Manion. See David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
231. Melanie Manion, 'The electoral connection in the Chinese countryside', American Political Science Review 90(4), (December 1996).
232. As we discuss above, it is also possible that these reforms will help democratize Party branches. For experiments with subjecting Party branch members to a village-wide vote of confidence, see Lianjiang Li, 'The twoballot system in Shanxi Province: subjecting village Party secretaries to a popular vote', China Journal 42, (July 1999).
233. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, 'The quality of democracy: An overview', Journal of Democracy 15(4), (1994), p. 22
234. Zhang Jing, Jiceng Zhengquan: Xiangcun Zhidu Zhu Wenti [Problems of Rural Level Governance in China] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Renmin Chubanshe, 2000), p. 208.
235. For examples, see the sources listed in footnotes 48-56.
236. Wei Xinghe and Guo Yunhua, 'Zhengzhi Lengmo: Nongmin dui Cunweihui Xuanju de Yizhong Xingwei' ['Political apathy: one kind of villagers' attitude towards village committee elections'], Qiushi [Seeking Facts] no. 10, (2003), pp. 60-62.
237. Wang Xiaojun, 'Zhixuan Lilian Zhihou de Cunweihui Xuanju Yanjiu: Yi Jiangxisheng T Xian 20 ge Cun Weili' ['Study of elections in 20 Jiangxi villages in T County which have experienced direct elections'], Yunnan Xingzheng Xueyuan Yuanbao [Journal of Yunnan Public Administration College] no. 1, (2007), pp. 82-85.
238. But compare, Tan and Xin, 'Village election and governance', p. 597.
239. See Xie Meili, 'Wanshan Cunweihui Xuanju Zhidu, Cujin Xinnongcun Hexie Fazhan' ['Improve village committee electoral institutions and promote harmonious development of new rural areas'], Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli [Chinese Public Administration] no. 11, (2006), p. 57.
240. also see Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 125.
241. For this remark, see Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O'Brien, 'Villagers and popular resistance in contemporary China', Modern China 22(1), (January 1996), p. 34
242. For similar sayings involving famished wolves or tigers, see Xu Yong, 'Qianghua Minzhu Jiandu, Cujin Zhili Zhuanxing' ['Strengthen democratic supervision and promote governance transition'], Xiangzhen Luntan [Township Forum] no. 4, (2001), p. 10.
243. He Xuefeng, 'Guanyu Cunzhuang Quanli Kuozhanxing de Taolun' ['Discussion on the expansion of village power structure'], Yunnan Shehui Kexue [Yunnan Social Sciences] no. 6, (2000), p. 39.
244. Norberto Bobbio, Which Socialism? Marxism, Socialism, and Democracy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 74.
245. On placing elections in a comprehensive framework that goes beyond the village and also considers cadre behavior, villager awareness, and cultural context, see Gunter Schubert, 'Studying "democratic" governance in contemporary China: looking at the village is not enough', Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), (June 2009).