Cadres, temple and lineage institutions, and governance in rural China

China Journal

Volumn , Issue 48, 2002, Pages 1-27

  Tsai, Lily Lee ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GOVERNANCE APPROACH; PUBLIC SERVICE; RURAL PLANNING; RURAL POLITICS;

CHINA;

EID: 0036323307     PISSN: 13249347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3182439     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. This paper draws on case studies from six months of pre-dissertation and dissertation research, conducted in the summer of 1999 and between October 2000 and March 2001. Fieldwork sites in wealthier districts included suburban Xiamen, in Fujian province, and Wenzhou and Tongxiang in Zhejiang. Fieldwork sites in districts with average or below average income per capita included Longyan, Fujian; Ganzhou, Jiangxi; and Yueyang and Linxiang, Hunan.
2. The Organic Law of Village Committees, implemented in 1988, assigns village committees the responsibility for village public welfare services, dispute mediation and the maintenance of public order, among other duties. See Kevin O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform in China's Villages", The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 32 (July 1994), p. 39.
3. Yongshun Cai similarly notes that township taxes go toward meeting targets set by the county levels of government and higher. See "Between State and Peasant: Local Cadres and Statistical Reporting in Rural China", The China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000), pp. 801-2.
4. do not include village health clinics because none of the villages I visited, rich or poor, had village clinics managed or financed by the village government. See Gail Henderson and T. Scott Stroup, "Preventive Health Care: Privatization and the Public Good", in Andrew Walder (ed.), Zouping in Transition: The Process of Reform in Rural North China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 187, 197.
5. Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China", Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1999), pp. 174-5. Yongshun Cai points out how institutional emphasis on quantifiable targets leads to statistical misreporting and exaggeration. See Cai, "Between State and Peasant", pp. 791, 794.
6. Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China", Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1999), pp. 174-5. Yongshun Cai points out how institutional emphasis on quantifiable targets leads to statistical misreporting and exaggeration. See Cai, "Between State and Peasant", pp. 791, 794.
7. Lorraine West, "Provision of Public Services in Rural PRC", in Christine Wong (ed.), Financing Local Government in the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 240. See also Lynn Paine, "Making Schools Modern: Paradoxes of Educational Reform", in Walder, Zouping in Transition, p. 212. The quality of facilities of rural primary schools has an enormous impact on the population as a whole; Paine reports that 91 per cent of primary schools are located in rural areas.
8. Lorraine West, "Provision of Public Services in Rural PRC", in Christine Wong (ed.), Financing Local Government in the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 240. See also Lynn Paine, "Making Schools Modern: Paradoxes of Educational Reform", in Walder, Zouping in Transition, p. 212. The quality of facilities of rural primary schools has an enormous impact on the population as a whole; Paine reports that 91 per cent of primary schools are located in rural areas.
9. According to Lorraine West, only 10 to 15 per cent of villages in the mid-1990s had rural cooperative medical insurance programs, and they were concentrated in coastal areas. West, "Provision of Public Services", p. 267.
10. A small group (production team) leader in a Xiamen village comments, "If you don't know whom to talk to and you don't know the procedures, then you can't make the deals you need to develop the village". Hu notes that one's ability to secure appropriations for public welfare projects is a common theme in campaign speeches during elections in one poor northern Fujian province. Hu Rong, "Village Committees in Rural China: Independent or Dependent Organisations?" Unpublished paper, Xiamen University, 1999, p. 18.
11. Throughout the 1990s, the government carried out campaigns to improve the physical infrastructure of education and eliminate dilapidated (weifang) school facilities. West, "Provision of Public Services", pp. 240, 245.
12. Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 79-80.
13. Ibid.
14. Village taxes (tiliu) are typically collected once a year at the same time as township taxes (tongchou). In some areas the township government decides the amount of tongchou and tiliu that will be collected from each village. In these cases, the amount is generally about the same for each village, with small adjustments made for a village's level of economic development. Village and township officials then collect tongchou and tiliu from residents and bring it to the township finance office, which then returns the tiliu portion to village governments. In other areas township governments allow village governments to decide how much tiliu they want to collect. In these areas, although village officials still collect tongchou and tiliu at the same time, the tiliu goes directly into village coffers and has little to do with township administration. Another type of levy called tanpai may be collected at the same time as tongchou and tiliu or at any other time in the year. Officially illegal but still widespread, this practice involves determining the total expenditure of a public project, such as the building of a school, then dividing by the total village population or the total number of households and requiring each person or household to pay their portion of the expenditure. For a discussion of local levies, assessments and fines, see Thomas B. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, "Taxation Without Representation: Peasants, the Central and Local States in Reform China", The China Quarterly, No. 163 (September 2000), pp. 743-4.
15. Ibid, pp. 750-2.
16. Thomas Bernstein and Dorothy Solinger, "The Peasant Question for the Future", paper prepared for the conference "China and World Affairs in 2010", Stanford University, 25-26 April 1996, p. 3. See also Jonathan Unger, "Power, Patronage, and Protest in Rural China", in Tyrene White (ed.), China Briefing 2000: The Continuing Transformation (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 77. In one Xiamen village that I visited, the contrast is particularly dramatic. While the village's dirt roads are deeply rutted with potholes, the village government's office buildings are in a new three-story building covered in shiny pink tiles with a spacious concrete courtyard, a parking area and an automated safety gate with guard booth and flashing red light.
17. Thomas Bernstein and Dorothy Solinger, "The Peasant Question for the Future", paper prepared for the conference "China and World Affairs in 2010", Stanford University, 25-26 April 1996, p. 3. See also Jonathan Unger, "Power, Patronage, and Protest in Rural China", in Tyrene White (ed.), China Briefing 2000: The Continuing Transformation (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 77. In one Xiamen village that I visited, the contrast is particularly dramatic. While the village's dirt roads are deeply rutted with potholes, the village government's office buildings are in a new three-story building covered in shiny pink tiles with a spacious concrete courtyard, a parking area and an automated safety gate with guard booth and flashing red light.
18. Lu also finds that in many townships, most of the revenues are spent for administrative purposes, such as the payroll. In one Liaoning county, he found that welfare and other public expenditures by local governments were only 5.5 per cent of total expenditures. Xiaobo Lu, "The Politics of Peasant Burdens in Reform China", The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (October 1997), p. 120.
19. Scott Rozelle characterizes the village leader as "an income-seeking and effort-minimizing individual" who "has access to privileged income-earning opportunities and other perks in the local community", owing to his official position, and who "derives welfare from the satisfaction, status, and job security that comes when he/she can effectively address the concerns of villagers". Cited in Jean C. Oi and Scott Rozelle, "Elections and Power: The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages", The China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000), 524.
20. Oi, Rural China Takes Off, pp. 84-5.
21. Unlike state cadres who are officially prohibited from running their own enterprises, both township and village officials claim that such regulations do not apply to village cadres within the system of village self-governance.
22. The difficulty of balancing private and public commitments may also be salient in the poorest villages where cadres have trouble getting paid for their work. O'Brien reports that cadres' spouses sometimes beg them to pay less attention to their public responsibilities and more to their families. O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform", p. 47.
23. O'Brien identifies four categories of villages in his study of the implementation of the Organic Elections Law. A central element of the first type of "authoritarian villages" is the continuation of close ties with the township government and "comprehensive township leadership and support". Ibid, p. 55.
24. Ibid, p. 51.
25. "Dajiaqiao shi kaizhan cunwu gongkai qingkuang de diaocha baogao" (An Investigative Report on the Promotion of Village Financial Transparency in Dajiaqiao Municipal District), Nongye Jingji (Agricultural Economy) (September 1999), p. 45.
26. There is a general consensus among Chinese and foreign scholars that Fujian's elections are some of the best implemented in China. A survey by Emerson Niou ranks Fujian's implementation of elections third highest in the country. Emerson Niou, "Implementing Village Elections in China: Voting Methods and Outcomes", unpublished manuscript, 2000, p. 15. Also see Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan, "The Meaning of China's Village Elections", The China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000), p. 509; O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform", p. 42; China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui falu zhidu (The Legal System of Village Committees in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1995); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin daibiao huiyi zhidu (The Village Representative Assemblies in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1994); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju zhidu (The Election of Village Committees in Rural China), (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1993).
27. There is a general consensus among Chinese and foreign scholars that Fujian's elections are some of the best implemented in China. A survey by Emerson Niou ranks Fujian's implementation of elections third highest in the country. Emerson Niou, "Implementing Village Elections in China: Voting Methods and Outcomes", unpublished manuscript, 2000, p. 15. Also see Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan, "The Meaning of China's Village Elections", The China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000), p. 509; O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform", p. 42; China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui falu zhidu (The Legal System of Village Committees in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1995); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin daibiao huiyi zhidu (The Village Representative Assemblies in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1994); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju zhidu (The Election of Village Committees in Rural China), (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1993).
28. There is a general consensus among Chinese and foreign scholars that Fujian's elections are some of the best implemented in China. A survey by Emerson Niou ranks Fujian's implementation of elections third highest in the country. Emerson Niou, "Implementing Village Elections in China: Voting Methods and Outcomes", unpublished manuscript, 2000, p. 15. Also see Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan, "The Meaning of China's Village Elections", The China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000), p. 509; O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform", p. 42; China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui falu zhidu (The Legal System of Village Committees in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1995); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin daibiao huiyi zhidu (The Village Representative Assemblies in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1994); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju zhidu (The Election of Village Committees in Rural China), (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1993).
29. There is a general consensus among Chinese and foreign scholars that Fujian's elections are some of the best implemented in China. A survey by Emerson Niou ranks Fujian's implementation of elections third highest in the country. Emerson Niou, "Implementing Village Elections in China: Voting Methods and Outcomes", unpublished manuscript, 2000, p. 15. Also see Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan, "The Meaning of China's Village Elections", The China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000), p. 509; O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform", p. 42; China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui falu zhidu (The Legal System of Village Committees in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1995); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin daibiao huiyi zhidu (The Village Representative Assemblies in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1994); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju zhidu (The Election of Village Committees in Rural China), (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1993).
30. There is a general consensus among Chinese and foreign scholars that Fujian's elections are some of the best implemented in China. A survey by Emerson Niou ranks Fujian's implementation of elections third highest in the country. Emerson Niou, "Implementing Village Elections in China: Voting Methods and Outcomes", unpublished manuscript, 2000, p. 15. Also see Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan, "The Meaning of China's Village Elections", The China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000), p. 509; O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform", p. 42; China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui falu zhidu (The Legal System of Village Committees in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1995); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin daibiao huiyi zhidu (The Village Representative Assemblies in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1994); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju zhidu (The Election of Village Committees in Rural China), (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1993).
31. There is a general consensus among Chinese and foreign scholars that Fujian's elections are some of the best implemented in China. A survey by Emerson Niou ranks Fujian's implementation of elections third highest in the country. Emerson Niou, "Implementing Village Elections in China: Voting Methods and Outcomes", unpublished manuscript, 2000, p. 15. Also see Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan, "The Meaning of China's Village Elections", The China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000), p. 509; O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform", p. 42; China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui falu zhidu (The Legal System of Village Committees in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1995); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin daibiao huiyi zhidu (The Village Representative Assemblies in China) (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1994); China Research Society of Basic-Level Governance, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju zhidu (The Election of Village Committees in Rural China), (Beijing: China Society Publications, 1993).
32. See Kevin O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform", pp. 33-59.
33. O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform", p. 52.
34. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); James Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
35. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); James Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
36. See, for example, Jean Oi, "Communism and Clientelism: Rural Politics in China", World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 2 (January 1985), pp. 238-66.
37. As a particularly striking example, an opening ceremony of a Sun lineage hall in December 2000 drew not only hundreds of participants but numerous village heads and Party secretaries from across the Xiamen and Tongan districts.
38. James Kung describes how the fear of social sanctions has led village Party secretaries in Wuxi, Jiangsu, when deciding among institutional alternatives for enterprise reform, to select privatization instead of the shareholding system. See James Kai-Sing Kung, "The Evolution of Property Rights in Village Enterprises: The Case of Wuxi County", in Jean Oi and Andrew Walder (eds), Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 104-5.
39. This finding contrasts with the correlation that Kevin O'Brien finds between lineage or religious identification and paralysed villages, in which villagers refuse to comply with directives from village officials. See O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform", pp. 52, 57-8.
40. Even poor households make a tremendous effort. For example, in one western Fujian village, several households with an income per capita of 2,000 yuan still gave 100 yuan per person to a temple reconstruction effort.
41. On the 15th day of the first lunar month, the incumbent council's members meet to divine who the village god wants to serve on the council by throwing a pair of yin-yang blocks for each married man in their small group. The two men for whom the blocks come up one yin and one yang the highest number of times are appointed to be on the next year's council.
42. The last road they paved, in December 2000, cost 70,000 yuan. The temple council paid 30,000 yuan, organized households whose homes bordered the road to donate 500 or 1,000 yuan each, and asked the village government to contribute another 20,000 yuan.
43. According to the memorial stele on one of the courts, the temple council paid 20,000 yuan, the village government paid 10,000 yuan, and donations from villagers made up the rest of the 46,000 yuan total cost.
44. Zhongguo jingji nianjian (China Economic Yearbook) (Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Nianjian She, 2000), p. 920.
45. According to one villager's receipt for local taxes collected in 1994, township levies totalled 66 yuan while village levies totalled 30 yuan.
46. Li was easily "elected" in the 1998 elections, the village's most recent round of elections, as township officials carried the ballot box around to each household accompanied by Li, their preferred candidate.
47. On a village in North China where norms of maintaining community-wide relations are stronger than the distinctiveness or separation of lineage and sub-lineage groupings within the village, see Ellen R. Judd, Gender and Power in Rural North China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 54-5.
48. Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 61.
49. See Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off; also her "Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China", World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1, October 1992, pp. 99-126.
50. See Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off; also her "Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China", World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1, October 1992, pp. 99-126.
51. When I observed the entire 2000 election process in River Bridge and West Gate, both villages implemented elections with unrestricted villager nomination of candidates, primary elections, public debate about procedural ambiguities, campaign speeches, secret and fixed ballot booths, and public vote counting.
52. Financial transparency regulations have been unevenly implemented throughout China, and even where they seem to have been implemented, township and village officials may only be paying lip service to the law. River Bridge probably does not report completely accurate financial statistics, but at least what they publish is internally consistent and regularly publicized. One article points out that posted accounts might report false data, that some posted accounts are not sufficiently detailed or understandable, and that the items in the accounts are not standardized. Additionally, some villages do not publicize accounts in a timely manner, some post accounts written on paper that quickly disintegrates in weather, and some post accounts inside, where it is not as easy for villagers to walk past and read them. See "Dajiaqiao shi kaizhan", p. 46.
53. Chih-Jou Jay Chen finds that the resurgence of village social institutions, such as lineage organizations and ancestral halls, have shaped property rights arrangements of enterprises in southeast Fujian. See Chih-Jou Jay Chen, "Local Institutions and the Transformation of Property Rights in Southern Fujian", in Jean C. Oi and Andrew Walder (eds), Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 59, 62-3.
54. Steven Sangren points out that the distinction between lineage corporations and similar corporations, such as deity cults, open to villagers of more than one surname group is not a clear one. See P. Steven Sangren, "Traditional Chinese Corporations: Beyond Kinship", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May 1984), p. 400. Yunxiang Yan discusses numerous studies of interlineage cooperation and villages in which a sense of community supersedes its multiple lineages. See Yan's The Flow of Gifts: Reciprocity and Social Networks in a Chinese Village (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 114-5.
55. Steven Sangren points out that the distinction between lineage corporations and similar corporations, such as deity cults, open to villagers of more than one surname group is not a clear one. See P. Steven Sangren, "Traditional Chinese Corporations: Beyond Kinship", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May 1984), p. 400. Yunxiang Yan discusses numerous studies of interlineage cooperation and villages in which a sense of community supersedes its multiple lineages. See Yan's The Flow of Gifts: Reciprocity and Social Networks in a Chinese Village (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 114-5.
56. One reason for village cadre resistance to the implementation of village elections was the possible humiliation of losing an election. See also O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform", p. 48.
57. Notably, none of the villages that I visited had officially registered their religious or lineage institutions with the state. One villager in West Gate observed that the village committee, in its official capacity, looks the other way or "closes one eye" when the hamlets set up temples and temple councils. Tony Saich reports an estimate of one million social organizations in China, a figure given at a meeting on social organizations held in November 1998. Out of these, only 187,000 were officially registered in 1996, according to Zhongguo falü nianjian 1997 (Law Yearbook of China 1997) (Beijing: Zhongguo Falü Nianjianshe Chuban, 1997). In contrast to associations that exist within the confines of an administrative village, the state may be more strict with those whose members come from multiple villages. The Sun Research Society, a Xiamen organization devoted to researching the genealogy and history of the Sun lineage, has members in villages all over the Xiamen and Tongan areas, and its chair reports that they have formally registered with the state.
58. Deepa Narayan, "Complementarity and Substitution: The Role of Social Capital, Civic Engagement, and the State in Poverty Reduction" (Washington DC: World Bank, February 1999), pp. 48, 50.
59. The agreement is also known as a responsibility commission (zeren zhuang). See O'Brien and Li, "Selective Policy Implementation", p. 172.
60. Bernstein and Solinger, "The Peasant Question for the Future".
61. Interview with Wang Zhenyao, 28 November 2000; Interview with Department of Basic-Level Governance and Community Development official, Ministry of Civil Affairs, 28 November 2000.
62. See Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom, "Public Goods and Public Choices", in E. S. Savas (ed.), Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977); Elinor Ostrom, "Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development", in Peter Evans (ed.), State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 187-89.
63. See Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom, "Public Goods and Public Choices", in E. S. Savas (ed.), Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977); Elinor Ostrom, "Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development", in Peter Evans (ed.), State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 187-89.
64. Evans, State-Society Synergy, pp. 178-206.
65. Huang and Odend'hal have observed that an overwhelmingly dominant and well-organized lineage in a Shandong village was able to mobilize the community for concerted actions more easily. The internal cohesion of this village made it more appealing for higher levels of government seeking to identify local models of policy implementation. Village officials, as representatives of the dominant lineage and an internally cohesive village community, were able to broker deals with higher levels of government that exchanged benefits from higher levels for the village's willingness to be a "model village" in implementing government policies. See Huang Shu-min and Stewart Odend'hal, "Fengjia: A Village in Transition", in Walder, Zouping in Transition, pp. 86-114.
66. Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom, "Public Goods and Public Choices", p. 75.
67. Narayan, "Complementarity and Substitution", p. 49.
68. Richard Rose, "Russia as an Hour-Glass Society: A Constitution Without Citizens", East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Summer 1995).
69. Bernstein and Solinger, "The Peasant Question for the Future".