Truthful mechanisms via greedy iterative packing

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5687 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 56-69

  Chekuri, Chandra ^a   Gamzu, Iftah ^b  

^a University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY; ITERATIVE APPROACH; MONOTONICITY; NATURAL PROPERTIES; ONLINE MECHANISM; PARAMETER SETTING; SOCIAL WELFARE; SUBMODULAR FUNCTIONS; TRUTHFUL APPROXIMATION; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION; COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY; GAME THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN; TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 70350587312     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03685-9_5     Document Type: Conference Paper

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