Single-value Combinatorial Auctions and implementation in undominated strategies

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1054-1063

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Lavi, Ron ^b   Pavlov, Elan ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC ALLOCATION PROBLEM; SINGLE-VALUE COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; SINGLE-VALUE MULTI-MINDED BIDDERS;

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; POLYNOMIALS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS;

EID: 33244489885     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1109557.1109674     Document Type: Conference Paper

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