Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3122, Issue , 2004, Pages 27-38

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Blumrosen, Liad ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; OPTIMIZATION; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

BEST APPROXIMATIONS; BUILDING BLOCKES; DISCRETE MODELING; ECONOMIC SETTING; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; SOCIAL WELFARE; TRUTHFUL AUCTIONS; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 29344443027     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-27821-4_3     Document Type: Article

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