War or peace?: A dynamical analysis of anarchy

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 243-279

  Vanderschraaf, Peter ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33745975230     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: 14740028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267106000897     Document Type: Article

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