The stability of anarchy and breakdown of production

Defence and Peace Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 589-603

  Hausken, Kjell ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

Anarchy; Collective action; Fighting; Peace; Production

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751110227     PISSN: 10242694     EISSN: 14768267     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10242690601025492     Document Type: Review

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