An experimental test of a predator-prey model of appropriation

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 83-97

  Carter, John R ^a   Anderton, Charles H ^a  

^a Department of Biology   (United States)

Author keywords

Appropriation; C72; C92; Conflict; D74; Experiment; Game

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346941590     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00165-7     Document Type: Article

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