Anarchy in the laboratory (and the role of the state)

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 56, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 297-329

  Duffy, John ^a   Kim, Minseong ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b Sungkyunkwan University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Anarchy; Experimental economics; Predation; Property rights; Social contract

Indexed keywords

EID: 13944278163     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.10.007     Document Type: Article

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