A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 205-232

  Brandauer, Stefan ^a   Englmaier, Florian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Arms races; Contests; Distributional conflict; Political economy; Rent seeking; Strategic delegation

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349280594     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0058-3     Document Type: Article

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