Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 82, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 415-429

  Baik, Kyung Hwan ^a   Kim, In Gyu ^b   Na, Sunghyun ^c  

^a Sungkyunkwan University   (South Korea)

^b Hallym University   (South Korea)

^c PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

All pay auction; Contest; Private provision of public goods; Public good prize

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035650208     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00139-0     Document Type: Article

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