Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 283-290

  Konrad, Kai A ^a,b   Peters, Wolfgang ^c   Wärneryd, Karl ^d  

^a WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^c EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY VIADRINA   (Germany)

^d STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 13244259328     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1182     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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