Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 377-396

  Kräkel, Matthias ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Managerial incentives; Oligopoly; Strategic delegation; Tournaments

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645982881     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-005-0136-8     Document Type: Article

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