Delegation in contests

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 281-298

  Baik, Kyung Hwan ^a   Kim, In Gyu ^b  

^a Sungkyunkwan University   (South Korea)

^b Korea Development Institute   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Contests; Delegation; Total effort levels

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031138833     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00045-6     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Allard, R.J., 1988, Rent-seeking with non-identical players, Public Choice 57, 3-14.
2. Appelbaum, E. and E. Katz, 1987, Seeking rents by setting rents: The political economy of rent seeking, Economic Journal 97, 685-699.
3. Baik, K.H., 1993, Effort levels in contests: The public-good prize case. Economics Letters 41, 363-367.
4. Baik, K.H., 1994a, Winner-help-loser group formation in rent-seeking contests. Economics and Politics 6, 147-162.
5. Baik, K.H., 1994b, Effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players. Southern Economic Journal 61, 367-378.
6. Baik, K.H. and J.F. Shogren, 1992, Strategic behavior in contests: Comment, American Economic Review 82, 359-362.
7. Baik, K.H. and J.F. Shogren, 1995. Competitive-share group formation in rent-seeking contests, Public Choice 83, 113-126.
8. Baye, M.R., D. Kovenock and C.G. de Vries, 1993, Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction, American Economic Review 83, 289-294.
9. Bulow, J.I., J.D. Geanakoplos and P.D. Klemperer, 1985, Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic substitutes and complements, Journal of Political Economy 93, 488-511.
10. Dana, J.D., Jr. and K.E. Spier, 1993, Expertise and contingent fees: The role of asymmetric information in attorney compensation, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 9, 349-367.
11. Danzon, P.M., 1983, Contingent fees for personal injury litigation, Bell Journal of Economics 14, 213-224.
12. Delbono, F. and V. Denicolo, 1991, Incentives to innovate in a Cournot oligopoly, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 951-961.
13. Dixit, A., 1987, Strategic behaviour in contests, American Economic Review 77, 891-898.
14. Ellingsen, T., 1991, Strategic buyers and the social cost of monopoly, American Economic Review 81, 648-657.
15. Fershtman, C. and K.L. Judd, 1987, Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly, American Economic Review 77, 927-940.
16. Fershtman, C., K.L. Judd and E. Kalai, 1991, Observable contracts: Strategic delegation and cooperation, International Economic Review 32, 551-559.
17. Hillman, A.L. and J.G. Riley, 1989, Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1, 17-39.
18. Katz, ML., 1991, Game-playing agents: Unobservable contracts as precommitments, Rand Journal of Economics 22, 307-328.
19. Lee, S., 1995, Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking. Public Choice 85, 31-44.
20. Lee, T. and L.L. Wilde, 1980, Market structure and innovation: A reformulation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 94, 429-436.
21. Leininger, W., 1993, More efficient rent-seeking - A Münchhausen solution. Public Choice 75, 43-62.
22. Leininger, W. and C.-L. Yang, 1994. Dynamic rent-seeking games, Games and Economic Behavior 7, 406-427.
23. Loury, G.C., 1979, Market structure and innovation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 93, 395-410.
24. Nitzan, S., 1991, Collective rent dissipation. Economic Journal 101, 1522-1534.
25. Nitzan, S., 1994, Modelling rent-seeking contests, European Journal of Political Economy 10, 41-60.
26. Reitman, D., 1993, Stock options and the strategic use of managerial incentives, American Economic Review 83, 513-524.
27. Rogerson, W.P., 1982, The social costs of monopoly and regulation: A game-theoretic analysis. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 391-401.
28. Rosen, S., 1986, Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments, American Economic Review 76, 701-715.
29. Rosen, S., 1988, Promotions, elections and other contests. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 144, 73-90.
30. Rubinfeld, D.L. and S. Scotchmer, 1993, Contingent fees for attorneys: An economic analysis. Rand Journal of Economics 24, 343-356.
31. Schelling, T.C., 1960, The strategy of conflict (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).
32. Sklivas, S.D., 1987, The strategic choice of managerial incentives, Rand Journal of Economics 18, 452-458.
33. Tullock, G., 1980, Efficient rent seeking. In: J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society (Texas A & M University Press, College Station, TX) 97-112.
34. Vickers, J., 1985, Delegation and the theory of the firm. Economic Journal 95, Supplement, 138-147.