Intelligence and impact contests in systems with redundancy, false targets, and partial protection

Reliability Engineering and System Safety

Volumn 94, Issue 12, 2009, Pages 1927-1941

  Levitin, Gregory ^a   Hausken, Kjell ^b  

^a ISRAEL ELECTRIC CORPORATION   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

Attack; Damage; Defense; Elements; False targets; Intelligence; Optimization; Protection; Redundancy; Survivability; System demand

Indexed keywords

ATTACK; DAMAGE; DEFENSE; ELEMENTS; FALSE TARGETS; INTELLIGENCE; PROTECTION; SURVIVABILITY; SYSTEM DEMAND;

OPTIMIZATION; QUALITY ASSURANCE; REDUNDANCY; TARGETS;

COMPUTER CRIME;

EID: 69249212146     PISSN: 09518320     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2009.06.010     Document Type: Article

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