New maximal numbers of equilibria in bimatrix games

Discrete and Computational Geometry

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 557-568

  Von Stengel, B ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033463683     PISSN: 01795376     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/PL00009438     Document Type: Article

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