A theorem on the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 353-359

  Quint, Thomas ^a   Shubik, Martin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040747444     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01263276     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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3. Gul F, Pearce D, Stacchetti E (1993) A bound on the proportion of pure strategy equilibria in generic games. Mathematics of Operations Research 18: 548-552
4. Harsanyi J (1973) Oddness of the number of equilibrium: A new proof. International Journal of Game Theory 2: 235-250
5. Jansen M (1981) Regularity and stability of equilibrium points of bimatrix games. Mathematics of Operations Research 6: 530-550
6. Lemke CE, Howson JT (1964) Equilibrium points in bimatrix games. SIAM Journal of Applied Math 12: 413-423
7. Nash JF (1950) Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 36: 48-9
8. Nash JF (1953) Noncooperative games. Annals of Mathematics 54: 286-95
9. Quint T, Shubik M (1994) On the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1089, Yale University
10. Quint T, Shubik M (1995) A bound on the number of Nash equilibria in a coordination game. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1095 Yale University
11. Shapley LS (1974) A note on the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Mathematical Programming Study 1: 175-89