Chapter 41 Strategic equilibrium

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volumn 3, Issue , 2002, Pages 1521-1596

  Van Damme, Eric ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

equilibrium refinements; equilibrium selection; Nash equilibrium; non cooperative games; stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649370958     PISSN: 15740005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03004-7     Document Type: Review

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