Chapter 22 Reciprocity, altruism, and cooperative production

Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity

Volumn 2, Issue , 2006, Pages 1409-1435

  Putterman, Louis ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

altruism; labor managed firms; producer cooperatives; reciprocity; work incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649359545     PISSN: 15740714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02022-7     Document Type: Review

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