Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 31-50

  Battigalli, Pierpaolo ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008338859     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0535     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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