Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 280-313

  Kohlberg, Elon ^a   Reny, Philip J ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013378462     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2295     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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