On the relation among some definitions of strategic stability

Mathematics of Operations Research

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 611-635

  Hillas, J ^a   Jansen, M ^a   Potters, J ^a   Vermeulen, D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Game theory; Strategic stability

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; SET THEORY; STABILITY;

STRATEGIC STABILITY;

OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

EID: 0035435193     PISSN: 0364765X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/moor.26.3.611.10585     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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16. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
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