Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games

Economic Theory

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 541-549

  Govindan, Srihari ^a   Wilson, Robert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031537333     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050173     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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