A symmetry of fixation times in evoultionary dynamics

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 243, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 245-251

  Taylor, Christine ^a   Iwasa, Yoh ^b   Nowak, Martin A ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b KYUSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Detailed balance condition; Evolutionary games; Finite populations; Fixation time; Moran process; Wright Fisher process

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; FIXATION; MODELING; MUTATION;

ARTICLE; EVOLUTION; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; MUTANT; POPULATION DYNAMICS; POPULATION SIZE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; THEORETICAL MODEL;

ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MARKOV CHAINS; MODELS, GENETIC; MUTATION; SELECTION (GENETICS); SELECTION, GENETIC;

EID: 33749642862     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.016     Document Type: Article

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