Evolutionary dynamics of finite populations in games with polymorphic fitness equilibria

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 247, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 426-441

  Ficici, Sevan G ^a   Pollack, Jordan B ^a  

^a BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Finite population; Polymorphic fitness equilibrium; Replicator dynamics; Sampling error; Selection pressure

Indexed keywords

EQUILIBRIUM; EVOLUTION; FITNESS; GAME THEORY; POLYMORPHISM; POPULATION MODELING; SELECTION;

ARTICLE; EMPIRICISM; EVOLUTIONARY RATE; FITNESS; GAME; GENETIC POLYMORPHISM; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; MOLECULAR DYNAMICS; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SAMPLING ERROR; SIMULATION; STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE; STOCHASTIC MODEL; SYSTEMS THEORY;

ANIMALS; COMPUTER SIMULATION; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MARKOV CHAINS; MODELS, GENETIC; POPULATION DYNAMICS; SELECTION (GENETICS);

EID: 34250654528     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.03.004     Document Type: Article

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