An analysis of changes to a team-based incentive plan and its effects on productivity, product quality, and absenteeism

Accounting, Organizations and Society

Volumn 34, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 589-618

  Román, Francisco J ^a  

^a TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349126472     PISSN: 03613682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2008.08.004     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. Alchian A., and Demsetz H. Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review 62 5 (1972) 777-795
2. Allen S. Compensation, safety, and absenteeism: Evidence from the paper industry. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 34 2 (1981) 207-218
3. Baiman S. Agency research in managerial accounting: A survey. Journal of Accounting Literature 1 (1982) 154-213
4. Baker G. Incentive contracts and performance measurement. Journal of Political Economy 100 3 (1992) 598-617
5. Baker G., Jensen M., and Murphy K. Compensation and incentives: Practice vs. theory. Journal of Finance 43 (1988) 593-616
6. Bandiera O., Barankay I., and Rasul I. Cooperation in collective action. The Economics of Transition 13 3 (2004) 473-498
7. Bandiera O., Barankay I., and Rasul I. Social preferences and the response to incentives: Evidence from personnel data. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 3 (2005) 473-498
8. Banker R., Field J., Schroeder R., and Sinha K. Impact of work teams on manufacturing performance: A longitudinal field study. Academy of Management Journal 39 (1996) 867-890
9. Banker R., Lee S., and Potter G. A field study of the impact of a performance-based incentive plan. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21 2 (1996) 195-226
10. Banker R., Lee S., Potter G., and Srinivasan D. An empirical investigation of an incentive plan that includes nonfinancial performance measures. The Accounting Review 75 (2000) 1-65
11. Barron J., and Gjerde K. Peer pressure in an agency relationship. Journal of Labor Economics 15 (1997) 917-962
12. Blinder A. Paying for productivity: A look at the evidence. 2nd ed. (1999), The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
13. Boning B., Ichniowski C., and Shaw K. Opportunity counts: Teams and the effectiveness of production incentives. Journal of Labor Economics 25 4 (2007) 613-650
14. Bonner S., and Sprinkle G. The effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance: Theories, evidence, and a framework for research. Accounting, Organizations, and Society 27 (2002) 303-345
15. Brown D., and Armstrong M. Paying for contribution (1999), Kogan Page, Dover, NH
16. Brown S., Fakhfakh F., and Sessions J. absenteeism and employee sharing: An empirical analysis based on French panel data, 1981-1991. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 52 2 (1999) 234-251
17. Brown P., and Phillips P. The decline of the piece-rate system in California canning: Technological innovation, labor management, and union pressure, 1890-1947. The Business History Review 60 4 (1986) 564-601
18. Bullock R., and Lawler E. Gainsharing: A few questions, and few answers. Human Resources Management 23 1 (1984) 23-40
19. Cachon G., and Terwiesch C. Matching supply with demand: An introduction to operations management. 1st ed. (2006), McGraw Hill, Irwin
20. Che Y., and Yoo S. Optimal incentives for teams. American Economic Review 91 (2002) 525-541
21. Chow C. The effects of job standard tightness and compensation scheme on performance: An exploration of linkages. The Accounting Review 58 (1983) 667-685
22. DeMatteo, J., Eby, L., & Sundstrom, E. (1998). Team-based rewards: Current empirical evidence and directions for future research. In B. Staw, L. Cummins, (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 20, pp. 141-183).
23. Deutsch M. An experimental study of the effects of cooperation and competition upon group process. Human Relations 2 (1949) 129-152
24. Deutsch M. The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive processes. 1st ed. (1973), Yale University Press
25. Drago R., and Garvey G. Incentives for helping on the job: Theory and evidence. Journal of Labor Economics 16 1 (1998) 1-25
26. Fisher G., Peffer S., and Sprinkle G. Budget-based contracts, budget levels, and group performance. Journal of Management Accounting Research 15 (2003) 51-74
27. Hansen D. Worker performance and group incentives: A case study. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 51 (1997) 37-49
28. Hayes R., and Clark K. Exploring the sources of productivity differences at the factory level. In: Clark K.B., Hayes R., and Lorenz C. (Eds). The uneasy alliance: Managing the productivity-technology dilemma (1985), Harvard Business School Press, Boston
29. Holmstrom B. Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 30 1 (1979) 74-91
30. Holmstrom B. Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics 13 2 (1982) 324-340
31. Holmstrom B., and Milgrom P. The firm as an incentive system. American Economic Review 84 4 (1994) 972-991
32. Horngren C., Datar S., and Foster G. Cost accounting: A managerial emphasis. 12th ed. (2002), Prentice Hall
33. Ichniowski C., and Shaw K. Beyond incentive pay: Insiders' estimates of the value of complementary human resource management practices. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 1 (2003) 155-180
34. Ichniowski C., Shaw K., and Prennushi G. The effects of human resource management practices on productivity: A study of steel finishing lines. American Economic Review 83 3 (1997) 291-313
35. Indjejikian R. Performance evaluation and compensation research: An agency perspective. Accounting Horizons 13 (1999) 147-157
36. Kandel E., and Lazear E. Peer pressure and partnership. Journal of Political Economy 100 4 (1992) 801-817
37. Knez M., and Simester D. Firm-wide incentives and mutual monitoring at continental Airlines. Journal of Labor Economics 19 4 (2001) 743-772
38. Lazear E. Salaries and piece-rates. Journal of Business 59 3 (1986) 405-431
39. Lazear E. Labor economics and the psychology of the organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 2 (1991) 89-110
40. Lazear E. Performance pay and productivity. The American Economic Review 90 5 (2000) 1346-1361
41. Macho-Stadler I., and Perez-Castrillo J. Moral hazard with several agents: The gains from cooperation. International Journal of Industrial Organizations 11 (1993) 73-100
42. Milgrom P., and Roberts J. Economics, organizations, and management. 1st ed. (1992), Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ
43. Milgrom P., and Roberts J. Complementarities and fit: Strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19 (1995) 179-208
44. Nalbantian H., and Schotter A. Productivity under group incentives: An experimental study. The American Economic Review 87 (1997) 314-341
45. Paarsch H., and Shearer B. Piece rates, fixed wages, and incentive effects: Statistical evidence from payroll records. International Economic Review 41 1 (2000) 59-92
46. Petersen T. Individual, collective, and systems rationality in work groups: Dilemmas and market-type solutions. American Journal of Sociology 98 (1992) 469-510
47. Prendergast C. The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature XXXVII (1999) 7-63
48. Rankin F. Coordinating efforts under team-based and individual incentives: An experimental analysis. Contemporary Accounting Research 21 (2004) 191-221
49. Schuster M. Forty years on scalon plan research: A review of the descriptive and empirical literature. International yearbook of organizational democracy (1983), John Wiley, Chichester
50. Schuster M. The scanlon plan. A longitudinal analysis. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 20 (1984) 23-38
51. Sewell G. The discipline of teams: The control of team-based industrial work through electronic and peer surveillance. Administrative Science Quarterly 43 (1998) 397-428
52. Shearer B. Piece rates, fixed wages and incentives: Evidence from a field experiment. Review of Economic Studies 71 2 (2004) 513-534
53. Sprinkle G. The effects of incentive contracts on learning and performance. The Accounting Review 75 (2000) 299-326
54. Sprinkle G. Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting. Accounting, Organizations, and Society 28 (2003) 287-318
55. Stiglitz J. Incentives, risk, and information: Notes towards a theory of hierarchy. The Bell Journal of Economics 6 2 (1975) 552-579
56. Waller W., and Chow C. The self-selection and effort effects of standard-based employment contracts: A framework and some empirical evidence. The Accounting Review LX 3 (1985) 458-476
57. Weitzman M., and Kruse D. Profit sharing and productivity. In: Blinder A. (Ed). Paying for productivity. 2nd ed. (1999), The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
58. Welbourne T., Balkin D., and Gomez-Mejia L. Gainsharing and mutual monitoring: A combined agency-organizational justice interpretation. The Academy of Management Journal 38 3 (1995) 881-899
59. Young M. Field research methods in management accounting. Accounting Horizons 13 1 (1999) 76-84
60. Young M., Fisher J., and Lindquist T. The effects of intergroup competition and intragroup cooperation on slack and output in a manufacturing setting. The Accounting Review 68 3 (1993) 466-481