Coordinating Effort under Team-Based and Individual Incentives: An Experimental Analysis

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 191-222

  Rankin, Frederick W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Compensation; Information; Mutual observability; Teams

Indexed keywords

EID: 2142818030     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1506/69Q1-BGLG-MA91-YALF     Document Type: Article

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