Cooperation in collective action

Economics of Transition

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 473-498

  Bandiera, Oriana ^a   Barankay, Iwan ^b   Rasul, Imran ^c  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action; Cooperation; Institutions

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; RURAL ECONOMY;

EID: 27744546510     PISSN: 09670750     EISSN: 14680351     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00228.x     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Agrawal, A. (1994). 'Rules, rule making and rule breaking: Examining the fit between rule systems and resource use', in Ostrom, E., Gardner, R. and Walker, J. M. (eds.), Rules, Games, and Common-pool Resources, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor: Michigan.
2. Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2000). 'Participation in heterogeneous communities', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, pp. 847-904.
3. Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2004). Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance, mimeo, Harvard University.
4. Alesina, A., Bagir, R. and Easterly, W. (1999). 'Public goods and ethnic divisions', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, pp. 1243-84.
5. Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W. and Vesterlund, L. (2003). The carrot or the stick: Rewards, punishments, and cooperation', American Economic Review, 93, pp. 893-902.
6. Baland, J., Bardhan, P., Das, S., Mookherjee, D. and Sarkar, R. (forthcoming). 'Inequality, collective action and the environment: Evidence from firewood collection in Nepal', in Baland J., Bardhan, P. and Bowles, S. (eds.), Inequality, Collective Action and Environmental Sustainability, Princeton, NJ: Russell Sage Foundation & Princeton University Press.
7. Baland, J. and Platteau, J. P. (1996). Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities? Oxford: Food and Agriculture Organization and Clarendon Press.
8. Bandiera, O., Barankay, I. and Rasul, I. (2005). 'Social preferences and the response to incentives: Evidence from personnel data', forthcoming Quarterly Journal of Economics.
9. Banerjee, A. and Somanathan, R. (2001). Caste, Community and Collective Action: The Political Economy of Public Good Provision in India, mimeo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
10. Banerjee, A., Mookherjee, D., Munshi, K. and Ray, D. (2001). 'Inequality, control rights and efficiency: A study of sugar cooperatives in Western Maharashtra', Journal of Political Economy, 109, pp. 138-90.
11. Banerjee, A., Iyer, L. and Somanathan, R. (2004). History, Social Divisions and Public Goods in Rural India, mimeo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
12. Bardhan, P. K. (2000). 'Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical analysis of 48 irrigation communities in South India', Economic Development and Cultural Change, 48, pp. 847-65.
13. Bardhan, P., Ghatak, M. and Karaivanov, A. (forthcoming). 'Inequality, Market Imperfections, and the Voluntary Provision of Collective Goods', in Baland, J., Bardhan, P. and Bowles, S. (eds.), Inequality, Collective Action and Environmental Sustainability, Russell Sage Foundation & Princeton University Press.
14. Bohnet, I. and Frey, B. S. (1999). 'The Sound of Silence in Prisoner's Dilemma and Dictator Games', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 38, pp. 43-57.
15. Cardenas, J. C. (2003). 'Real wealth and experimental cooperation: Experiments in the field lab', Journal of Development Economics, 70, pp. 263-89.
16. Dayton-Johnson, J. (2000). 'Determinants of collective action on the local commons: A model with evidence from Mexico', Journal of Development Economics, 62, pp. 181-208.
17. Duflo, E. and Chattopadhyay, R. (2004). 'Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India', Econometrica, 72, pp. 1409-43.
18. Edmonds, E. (2002). 'Government initiated community resource management and local resource extraction from Nepal's Forests', Journal of Development Economics, 68, pp. 89-115.
19. Esteban, J. and Ray, D. (1999). 'Conflict and distribution', Journal of Economic Theory, 87, pp. 379-415.
20. Esteban, J. and Ray, D. (2001). 'Collective action and the group size paradox', American Political Science Review, 95, pp. 663-72.
21. Fehr, E. and Gachter, S. (2000). 'Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments', American Economic Review, 90, pp. 980-94.
22. Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). 'A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, pp. 817-68.
23. Gachter, S., Herrmann, B. and Thoni, C. (2004). 'Trust, voluntary cooperation, and socioeconomic background: Survey and experimental evidence', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 55, pp. 505-31.
24. Gugerty, M. K. and Miguel, E. (2004). 'Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya', Journal of Public Economics, in press.
25. Hardin, G. (1968). 'The tragedy of the commons', Science, 162, pp. 1243-8.
26. Harrison, G. and List, J. (2004). 'What constitutes a field experiment in economics?', Journal of Economic Literature, 42, pp. 1009-45.
27. Hausman, J. A. and Newey, W. K. (1995). 'Nonparametric estimation of exact consumers surplus and deadweight loss', Econometrica, 63, pp. 1445-76.
28. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H. and McElreath, R. (2001). 'In search of homo economicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies', American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 91, pp. 73-8.
29. Khwaja, A. (2003). Can Good Projects Succeed in Bad Communities? Collective Action in the Himalayas, mimeo, Harvard University.
30. La Ferrara, E. (2002). 'Inequality and group participation: Theory and evidence from rural Tanzania', Journal of Public Economics, 85, pp. 235-73.
31. Lam, W. F. (1998). Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructure, and Collective Action, ICS Press, Oakland: California.
32. Ledyard, J. (1995). 'Public goods: A survey of experimental research', in Kagel, J., Roth, A. (eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 111-94.
33. List, J. (2004). 'Young, selfish, and male: Field evidence of social preferences', Economic Journal, 114, pp. 121-49.
34. Masclet, D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S. and Villeval, M.-C. (2003). 'Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism', American Economic Review, 93, pp. 366-80.
35. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge: Massachusetts.
36. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press: New York.
37. Ostrom, E., Gardner, R. and Walker, J. M. (1994). Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor: Michigan.
38. Ostrom, E., Walker, J. M. and Gardner, R. (1992). 'Covenants with and without a sword: Self-governance is possible', American Political Science Review, 86, pp. 404-17.
39. Pande, R. (2003). 'Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? Theory and evidence from India', American Economic Review, 93, pp. 1132-51.
40. Sefton, M., Shupp, R. and Walker, J. M. (2001). The Effects of Rewards and Sanctions in the Provision of Public Goods, mimeo, Indiana University.
41. Silverman, B. W. (1986). Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis, London: Chapman and Hall.
42. Tang, S. Y. (1992). Institutions and Collective Action: Self-governance in Irrigation, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco.
43. Tang, S. Y. (1994). 'Institutions and performance in irrigation systems', in Ostrom, E., Gardner, R. and Walker, J. M. (eds.), Rules, Games, and Common-pool Resources, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor: Michigan.
44. Wade, R. (1988). Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.