Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 66, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 893-919

  Picard, Pierre ^a  

^a ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Credibility; Good faith; Insurance; Risk verification

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349089532     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.025     Document Type: Article

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