The impact of insurance fraud detection systems

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 421-438

  Schiller, Jörg ^a,b  

^a WHU OTTO BEISHEIM SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT   (Germany)

^b Department of Organization Theory ^*  (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748440800     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: 15396975     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2006.00182.x     Document Type: Article

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