User innovator community norms: At the boundary between academic and industry research

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 77, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 2237-2274

  Strandburg, Katherine J ^a  

^a DEPAUL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 66749098395     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (231)

1. I will use the term "academic" throughout this essay, in part because much of the empirical work focuses on academics and industry scientists. For the most part, the discussion of academic scientists applies equally well to other scientists at nonprofit institutions.
2. DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR'S QUADRANT: BASIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (1997).
3. See, e.g., ERIC VON HIPPEL, D EMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 3 (2005);
4. Sonali K. Shah, Open Beyond Software, in OPEN SOURCES 2.0: THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION 339 (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 2006). In earlier work I argued that, since empirical evidence and common sense show that user innovation plays a major part in the invention of research tools, an infringement exemption for research tool use might be appropriate. Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 478 (2008);
5. see also, e.g., Nikolaus Franke & Sonali Shah, How Communities Support Innovative Activities: An Exploration of Assistance and Sharing Among End-Users, 32 RES. POL'Y 157, 158 (2003);
6. Christian Liithje, Cornelius Herstatt & Eric von Hippel, User-Innovators and "Local" Information: The Case of Mountain Biking, 34 RES. POL'Y 951, 953-54 (2005).
7. VON HIPPEL, supra note 3, at 3, 9-10; see also, e.g., Carliss Baldwin, Christoph Hienerth & Eric von Hippel, How User Innovations Become Commercial Products: A Theoretical Investigation and Case Study, 35 RES. POL'Y 1291 (2006);
8. Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 193 (2008);
9. Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 159-60;
10. Johann Füller, Gregor Jawecki & Hans Mühlbacher, Innovation Creation by Online Basketball Communities, 60 J. BUS. RES. 60 (2007);
11. Joachim Henkel, Selective Revealing in Open Innovation Processes: The Case of Embedded Linux, 35 RES. POL'Y 953 (2006);
12. Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: How Magicians Protect Intellectual Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (Christine A. Corcos ed., forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005564; Lüthje et al., supra note 3;
13. Peter B. Meyer, Episodes of Collective Invention 3 (U.S. Dep't of Lab. Bureau of Lab. Statistics, Working Paper No. 368, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=466880;
14. Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation 14 (Nov. 13, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661543;
15. Andrew J. Nelson, Institutional Convergence and the Diffusion of University-Versus Firm-Origin Technologies 158-67 (May 11, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
16. Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1983).
17. See VON HIPPEL, supra note 3;
18. Allen, supra note 5;
19. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4, at 193;
20. Henkel, supra note 4;
21. Meyer, supra note 4, at 5, 13, 21;
22. see also Baldwin et al., supra note 4;
23. Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 159-60;
24. Füller et al., supra note 4;
25. Luthje et al., supra note 3;
26. Loshin, supra note 4;
27. Merges, supra note 4, at 14;
28. Nelson, supra note 4, at 158-67.
29. Elsewhere I have analyzed some of the challenges posed to these traditional sharing practices in the nonprofit research community by the increasing importance of research materials and extensive databases, which cannot be shared by the low-cost mechanism of publication. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Norms and the Sharing of Research Materials and Tacit Knowledge, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF IP (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., forthcoming 2009) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
30. STEPHEN A. HANSEN ET AL., AM. ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXPERIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY: A REPORT BY THE PROJECT ON SCIENCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 24 (2007);
31. JOHN P. WALSH, CHARLENE CHO & WESLEY M. COHEN, PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 2 (2005) [hereinafter WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS];
32. Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research, in 8 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2008);
33. John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 315-16 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) [hereinafter Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents];
34. John P. Walsh, Wesley M. Cohen & Charlene Cho, Where Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research, 36 RES. POL'Y 1184 (2007) [hereinafter Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters].
35. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001);
36. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights];
37. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99 (1998);
38. F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science-A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001);
39. Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 648 (2007);
40. Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 707 (2001) [hereinafter Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms];
41. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 80 (1999) [hereinafter Rai, Regulating Scientific Research];
42. Paul A. David, Can 'Open Science' Be Protected from the Evolving Regime of IPR Protections? (Working Paper) (n.d.), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf702-42.pdf.
43. See, e.g., WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 15-16, 26-27;
44. Cohen & Walsh, supra note 8, at 12; Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters, supra note 8, at 1188-91, 1199.
45. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 19-20, 27-28;
46. Cohen & Walsh, supra note 8, at 15; Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters, supra note 8, at 1191-94, 1199.
47. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 25;
48. Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters, supra note 8, at 1191, 1193-94.
49. Katharine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology Transfer, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 93, 95 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).
50. See ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1973);
51. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 9, at 90;
52. Erik Ernø-Kjølhede, Scientific Norms as (Dis)integrators of Scientists? (Copenhagen Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14/2000, 2000).
53. See Baldwin et al., supra note 4;
54. Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 160;
55. Füller et al., supra note 4;
56. Liithje et al., supra note 3;
57. Meyer, supra note 4, at 3; supra note 4.
58. See VON HIPPEL, supra note 3;
59. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4, at 193;
60. Henkel, supra note 4;
61. Loshin, supra note 4;
62. Meyer, supra note 4, at 5, 13, 21.
63. See VON HIPPEL, supra note 3;
64. Baldwin et al., supra note 4;
65. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4, at 192-94;
66. Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 160;
67. Lüthje et al., supra note 3;
68. Shah, supra note 3;
69. Meyer, supra note 4, at 3.
70. Meyer, supra note 4, at 4-5.
71. Merges, supra note 4, at 14-16.
72. STEVE WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004);
73. Karim Lakhani & Eric von Hippel, How Open Source Software Works: "Free" User-to-User Assistance?, 32 RES. POL'Y 923 (2003);
74. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197 (2002).
75. Meyer, supra note 4, at 7.
76. Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared: Hybrid Exchange Strategies as a Source of Productive Tension at the Boundary of Overlapping Institutions, AM. J. SOC. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 19, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
77. Meyer, supra note 4, at 5-6.
78. Shah, supra note 3, at 347-50.
79. Lüthje et al., supra note 3.
80. See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 3;
81. Jean-Michel Dalle & Paul A. David, The Allocation of Software Development Resources in Open Source Production Mode, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 297, 324 n.5 (Joseph Feller et al. eds., 2005).
82. VON HIPPEL, supra note 3.
83. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4;
84. Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 160, 170;
85. Henkel, supra note 4;
86. Loshin, supra note 4;
87. Shah, supra note 3;
88. Meyer, supra note 4, at 5, 13,21.
89. Siobhán O'Mahony & Fabrizio Ferraro, Managing the Boundary of an 'Open' Project, in MARKET EMERGENCE AND TRANSFORMATION (John Padgett & Walter Powell eds., forthcoming 2010), available at http://www.umass.edu/digitalcenter/events/pdfs/ OMahony-open-project.pdf.
90. Baldwin et al., supra note 4;
91. Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 160;
92. Lüthje et al., supra note 3;
93. Shah, supra note 3.
94. It is worth noting here that, like social norms more generally, sharing norms that arise to benefit a particular community need not be optimal for society at large. While this is generally not an issue in the context of research tool invention, I return to this point briefly when I discuss the issue of materials transfer across the boundary between academia and industry.
95. STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD (2004);
96. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355 (1997).
97. HETCHER, supra note 32;
98. McAdams, supra note 32, at 355-76.
99. See, for example, HETCHER, supra note 32, at 58-59, for a discussion of social norms as solutions to iterated prisoner's dilemmas.
100. HETCHER, supra note 32;
101. McAdams, supra note 32, at 358.
102. I also assume here that sharing an invention means sharing it with the entire group. In many cases-such as when sharing is accomplished through publication or by demonstrating or using the invention in a group context or when social processes within the group ensure that information will spread throughout the group-this is a realistic assumption. I return to this point when discussing materials sharing below.
103. McAdams, supra note 32, at 357-58.
104. Meyer, supra note 4, at 15-17.
105. VON HIPPEL, supra note 3.
106. Id. at 68-70; Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 128 (1990).
107. Strandburg, supra note 3, at 513.
108. Fuller et al., supra note 4;
109. Meyer, supra note 4, at 8-11.
110. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES passim (1991);
111. HETCHER, supra note 32;
112. McAdams, supra note 32, at 357-58.
113. See, e.g., Jonathan Barnett, Sharing in the Shadow of Property: Rational Cooperation in Innovation Markets (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. C08-22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287283.
114. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4, at 192-94;
115. Henkel, supra note 4;
116. Loshin, supra note 4;
117. Meyer, supra note 4, at 4, 17-20.
118. Henkel, supra note 4.
119. Strandburg, supra note 13, at 109-13.
120. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1138-43(2000).
121. For a more detailed discussion of sharing of research tools and materials among nonprofit researchers, see Strandburg, supra note 7.
122. William Riggs & Eric von Hippel, Incentives to Innovate and the Sources of Innovation: The Case of Scientific Instruments, 23 RES. POL'Y 459 (1994).
123. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS: PRESENTED TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE DIRECTOR (1998), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm [hereinafter NIH REPORT].
124. MERTON, supra note 14;
125. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 9, at 89 & n.65.
126. Professors Rebecca Eisenberg and Arti Rai have written extensively on the subject of the potential adverse effects that the Bayh-Dole Act and other attempts to define commercial and proprietary rights in basic research results might have on traditional scientific norms. See Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 9;
127. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 9, at 115-16.
128. See Strandburg, supra note 13;
129. Strandburg, supra note 3.
130. Cf. J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 315, 335 ("[A]cademic researchers typically are not driven by the same motivations as their counterparts in industry ⋯ Rather, the motivations of not-for-profit scientists are predominantly rooted in intellectual curiosity, the desire to create new knowledge, peer recognition and career advancement, and the promotion of the public interest." (citing Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 9, at 178)). It seems plausible that life scientists in particular are also substantially motivated by a desire to contribute to society. It is unclear, however, whether university researchers differ from those who go into industry in this regard. While academic research may be less "tainted" by commercial concerns, industrial research is more practical and may be more immediately geared toward contributing to public health. Certainly commercialization of university research can contribute significantly to the public good and no doubt many researchers are motivated to assist in the commercialization of their discoveries by public interested motives. Thus, it is important in general to keep these public-spirited motivations in mind. The analysis here and in my earlier treatment of this question demonstrates, however, that there is no need to assume that university researchers are more public-spirited than commercial researchers to account for the traditional research norms in a rational choice theory.
131. There are exceptions to this contention, of course: some sufficiently theoretical work may require no more than pencil and paper, and some individual scientists may work independent of collaborators and keep up with the progress of others purely by reading scientific journals. But such scientists are extremely rare. Most scientific work requires significant funding and most researchers work collaboratively.
132. For a review, see Katherine J. Strandburg, The Research Exemption to Patent Infringement: The Delicate Balance Between Current and Future Technical Progress, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 107, 112-15 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) [hereinafter Strandburg, Delicate Balance].
133. See generally Rochelle Dreyfiiss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004);
134. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024-28 (1989);
135. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9;
136. Janice M Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004);
137. Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001);
138. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000);
139. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81.
140. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 37;
141. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 331.
142. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 3-4, 37;
143. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 324-28.
144. See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 7.
145. Magnus Gulbrandsen & Jens-Christian Smeby, Industry Funding and University Professors' Research Performance, 34 RES. POL'Y 932, 940 (2005) (presenting statistics on industry funding of research for different academic disciplines).
146. Of course, a research tool can always be a commercial product from the perspective of a tool supplier. Here I mean to discuss inventions that have alternative commercial uses in addition to their use in conducting research.
147. Each of these kinds of overlap might affect the viability of norms of sharing research tools and materials. These effects are distinct from other important effects that interactions between academic and commercial researchers may have on the direction of research. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143 (2009);
148. Strandburg, supra note 13. The question of research tool sharing between industry and nonprofit researchers is also mostly distinct from questions about the most effective means of technology transfer of "embryonic" university inventions to the commercial sector. Research tools, methods, and materials that are traditionally shared by a purely academic researcher community will not be "embryonic"-at least from the researcher perspective.
149. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra. For overviews of research into the relationship between university patenting and technology transfer, see generally DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY- INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES (2004);
150. Nicola Baldini, University Patenting and Licensing Activity: A Review of the Literature, 15 RES. EVALUATION 197 (2006);
151. Paul A. David et al., Is Public R&D a Complement or Substitute for Private R&D? A Review of the Econometric Evidence, 29 RES. POL'Y 497 (2000);
152. Bhaven Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL'Y 772, 772-89 (2006);
153. Jerry Thursby & Marie Thursby, Knowledge Creation and Diffusion of Public Science with Intellectual Property Rights, in 2 I NTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GROWTH AND TRADE 199 (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2008);
154. Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University Innovations: Alternative Approaches (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976005.
155. See generally NIH REPORT, supra note 51;
156. Strandburg, Delicate Balance, supra note 57, at 146.
157. Arti K. Rai, Genome Patents: A Case Study in Patenting Research Tools, 77 ACAD. MED. 1368 (2002).
158. It makes sense to speak of a commercial supplier of a do-it-yourself dual-purpose research tool because what is do-it-yourself for researchers may not be do-it-yourself for consumers, either because of issues of absorptive capacity or because of the need for further development of the innovation for commercial use.
159. Whether the use of a patent on a university invention to protect commercial sales is beneficial from a public policy perspective depends on to what extent the patent is needed to motivate commercial firms to invest in commercializing the invention, to what extent patent exclusivity is used to compensate the university inventor for assisting with commercialization, and to what extent improvements made to prepare the invention for a commercial market are themselves patentable. This is, of course, the familiar debate over the virtues of the Bayh-Dole Act and university patenting in general. One distinguishing characteristic of dual-purpose research tools is that such tools are far from "embryonic," at least as regards their employment in research. Thus, the arguments in favor of patenting may be relatively weak in this context. In any event, I lay that debate to the side here and discuss the potential for sharing norms to persist in the face of patenting of dual-purpose inventions.
160. The caveat that the need to obtain patent protection may occasion some delay in publication is appropriate here, however. For discussions of publication delays, see David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Science: Evidence from a National Survey of Faculty, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1224 (1997);
161. Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence from a National Survey, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 473 (2002);
162. Jeremy M. Grushcow, Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent System Revealed, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2004).
163. An example of commercial use of a do-it-yourself invention would be the use of a patented process in a commercial, nonresearch context. It is also reasonable to discuss commercial sales of a do-it-yourself research tool in the sense that some scientists may be happy to make their own research tools in the lab, while others may prefer to purchase a standardized tool (or expert assistance in performing a standard method) from a commercial supplier.
164. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 324-28.
165. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 15.
166. Id. at 16.
167. Id. at 26-27.
168. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding university research ineligible for the experimental-use exemption because it "unmistakably further[s] the institution's legitimate business objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects");
169. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv, Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("While [the] SEC tries to cloak these tests in the guise of scientific inquiry, that alone cannot immunize its acts.").
170. W70ALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 6;
171. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 324-28.
172. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 324.
173. Id. at 324-28.
174. Id. at 325.
175. Id. at 327.
176. Id. at 317.
177. Murray, supra note 22, at 27.
178. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 2.
179. Id. at 36.
180. Id. at 37; Walsh et al, Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 317, 324-28.
181. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 63 (1997) [hereinafter NRC REPORT];
182. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 325.
183. Murray, supra note 22, at 27;
184. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 325.
185. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 327-28.
186. Id.
187. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 36.
188. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 309 n.38.
189. Id. at 327n.58.
190. Id. at 327-28.
191. Id. at 328.
192. Id. at 327.
193. Id. at 326-28;
194. see also WALSH ET AL. PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 17.
195. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 326-27.
196. Id. at 327n.57.
197. Gerard George et al., Academics or Entrepreneurs? Entrepreneurial Identity and Invention Disclosure Behavior of University Scientists 14 (Sept. 6, 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the Fordham Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=799277.
198. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 321-22.
199. University researchers often do get substantial discounts on research materials. Sometimes these discounts have little to do with sharing norms among scientists. Commercial suppliers may be motivated to offer discounts on their own initiative as a form of price discrimination, given that academic scientists may have limited ability to pay. Commercial suppliers may also be susceptible to reputational penalties. Those for whom scientists are important customers can be susceptible to a "boycott" approach. Some areas of research are so important to public health or some other public concern that the public at large may protest a failure to provide research discounts. These factors may lead to academic discounts for manufacturer-developed tools.
200. See supra note 100.
201. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 25, 35-36;
202. Murray, supra note 22, at 25.
203. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 23-25, 35.
204. When materials were transferred to academic scientists, however, up-front fees were rare and almost never more than $1000.
205. David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Academic Patents and Materials Transfer Agreements: Substitutes or Complements?, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 157 (2007).
206. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 11.
207. Id. at 55 fig.2.
208. Meyer, supra note 4, at 15-17.
209. Id. at 2-3; see also NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., NAT'L ACAD. OF ENG'G, INST. OF MED., OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2003 FEDERAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BUDGET (2002);
210. Arti K. Rai, "Open and Collaborative" Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 131,131-59 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2005).
211. I say "may" here because some industry scientists do rely significantly on public funding, though the scientific community may not control that funding through peer review.
212. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 63, at 1; Joel West & Scott Gallagher, Patterns of Open Innovation in Open Source Software, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM 82 (Henry Chesbrough et al. eds., 2006).
213. Henry Etzkowitz, The Evolution of the Entrepreneurial University, 1 INT'L J. TECH. & GLOBALISATION 64 (2004);
214. Tomas Hellström & Merle Jacob, Emerging Issues in R&D Evaluation: The Case of University-Industry Partnership Networks, in THE FUTURE OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE ACADEMY 95 (Merle Jacob & Tomas Hellström eds., 2000);
215. Merle Jacob & Tomas Hellstrom, From Networking Researchers to the Networked University, in THE FUTURE OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE ACADEMY, supra, at 81;
216. James Stuart, Comment, The Academic-Industrial Complex: A Warning to Universities, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2004);
217. Waverly Ding, Does Science Chase Money?-The Impact of Industry Research on the Selection of Research Topics Among Academic Scientists (n.d.) (unpublished study, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
218. SCOTT STERN, BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE CENTERS: KNOWLEDGE HUBS FOR THE LIFE SCIENCES passim (2004) (detailing the history, impact, and future of biological resource centers).
219. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 35-36. 114. Mat25.
220. Eliot Marshall, Need a Reagent? Just Sign Here, 278 SCIENCE 212, 213 (1997);
221. Mowery & Ziedonis, supra note 104, at 161.
222. See Strandburg, supra note 3, for a discussion of the effects of a research-use exemption on tool suppliers.
223. ASS'N OF AM. MED. COLLS, ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 3 (2007), available at http://news-service.stanford. edu/news/2007/march7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 9, at 147.
227. Strandburg, supra note 7 (manuscript at 1).
228. Murray, supra note 22, at 36.
229. ASS'N OF AM. MED. COLLS, ET AL., supra note 117, at 2.
230. In the tables included in this appendix, "A" stands for academic scientist, and "I" stands for industry scientist. An extended discussion of sharing between academics (A ↔ A) may be found in Strandburg, supra note 7.
231. "UBMTA" stands for the Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement.