On the value of coordination in network design

SIAM Journal on Computing

Volumn 38, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 2273-2302

  Albers, Susanne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Coalition; Price of anarchy; Price of stability; Shapley cost sharing; Strong Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

COALITION; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PRICE OF STABILITY; SHAPLEY COST SHARING; STRONG NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

CONTROL THEORY; COST EFFECTIVENESS; GAME THEORY; GRAPH THEORY; PHOTOVOLTAIC EFFECTS; STABILITY; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

COSTS;

EID: 65949105470     PISSN: 00975397     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1137/070701376     Document Type: Article

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