Mutually acceptable courses of action

Economic Theory

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 91-112

  Greenberg, Joseph ^a   Gupta, Sudheer ^b   Luo, Xiao ^c,d  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^d INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Course of action; Extensive games; Perfection; Rationalizability; Self confirming equilibrium; Strategic contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 64249157461     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0349-5     Document Type: Article

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