Multistage situations

Econometrica

Volumn 64, Issue 6, 1996, Pages 1415-1437

  Greenberg, Joseph ^a   Monderer, Dov ^a   Shitovitz, Benyamin ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Incomplete specifications; Multistage games; Multistage situations; Social situations

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010925308     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171837     Document Type: Article

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