The right to remain silent

Theory and Decision

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 193-204

  Greenberg, Joseph ^a  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

(Nash) equilibrium in Strategies; Ambiguity; Dynamic games; Knightian uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042688299     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005205630723     Document Type: Article

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