(When and how) do voters try to manipulate? : EExperimental evidence from borda elections

Public Choice

Volumn 139, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 39-52

  Kube, Sebastian ^a   Puppe, Clemens ^b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Borda rule; Bounded rationality; Laboratory experiment; Manipulation; Mechanism design; Satisficing; Strategic voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 62949086983     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9376-9     Document Type: Article

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