Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count

Economic Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 411-430

  Barbie, Martin ^a   Puppe, Clemens ^a   Tasnádi, Attila ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

^b Institute of Data Analytics and Information Systems   (Hungary)

Author keywords

Borda count; Restricted domains; Strategy proofness; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 18144420100     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0603-4     Document Type: Article

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