A model of search intermediaries and paid referrals

Information Systems Research

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 414-436

  Weber, Thomas A ^a   Zheng, Zhiqiang ^b  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Markets and auctions; Paid referrals; Search intermediary

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; CONSUMER BEHAVIOR; MACHINE DESIGN; SEARCH ENGINES;

BIDDING STRATEGY; DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKETS; PAID REFERRALS; PRODUCT OFFERINGS; PRODUCT PERFORMANCE; REVENUE MAXIMIZING; SEARCH INTERMEDIARY; WEIGHTED AVERAGES;

PRODUCT DESIGN;

EID: 61349156204     PISSN: 10477047     EISSN: 15265536     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/isre.1070.0139     Document Type: Article

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