Spandrels of Truth

Spandrels of Truth

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-168

  Beall, Jc ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

Curry paradox; Dialetheic theory; Is true; Liar paradox; Transparent truth; Truth theoretic paradoxes

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049201506     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268733.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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