A revenge-immune solution to the semantic paradoxes

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 139-177

  Field, Hartry ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Conditionals; Curry paradox; Determinateness; Liar paradox; Truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746617389     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1023027808400     Document Type: Article

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