The consistency of the naïve theory of properties

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 54, Issue 214, 2004, Pages 78-104

  Field, Hartry ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845959508     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00343.x     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. 'Is the Liar Sentence Both True and False?', in J. Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds), Deflationism and Paradox (Oxford UP, forthcoming)
2. S. Kripke, 'Outline of a Theory of Truth', Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), pp. 690-716
3. P. Maddy, 'Proper Classes', Journal of Symbolic Logic, 48 (1983), pp. 113-39
4. 'A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes', Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32 (2003), pp. 139-77
5. 'The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness', inj. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps (Oxford UP, forthcoming)
6. H. Putnam, 'On Properties', in his Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers, Vol. I (Cambridge UP, 1975), pp. 305-22