Doubt Truth to be a Liar

Doubt Truth to be a Liar

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-240

  Priest, Graham ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Aristotle; Dialetheism; Law of Non Contradiction; Logic; Negation; Paraconsistency; Rationality; Truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250740434     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199263280.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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