Saving Truth From Paradox

Saving Truth From Paradox

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-422

  Field, Hartry ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bivalence; Conditionals; Excluded middle; Incompleteness theorems; Revenge paradoxes; Vagueness; Validity

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049411193     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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